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Kierkegaard

scholarship,

the

abbreviations used follow those of the International Kierkegaard
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available, by the citation from the English translation: s0ren
Kierkegaard's

Journals

and

Papers,

8

vols.,

edited

and
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IX

INTRODUCTION

I: THE POLITICAL IN KIERKEGAARD'S THOUGHT

To say that S0ren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) has a political
philosophy is not an esoteric thought as some would have it.
The question that needs to be asked when confronted with such
a proposition is what might the concept "political philosophy"
mean in this connection. To explain what is here meant by the
concept of political philosophy is also to explain the title
of this dissertation.
Political philosophy, it is generally assumed, deals with
the fundamental questions of human existence especially as
they address the relationship of the human individual and
society,

the

possibilities

and

limitations

of

such

a

relationship as well as the foundational principles, if any,
that may guide it. 1 We believe these belong among the most
important philosophic questions that can be asked,

inasmuch

as they address what is common to the human condition.
It is the human condition that concerns Kierkegaard, and
especially what he considers most essential about the human

1

See especially Leo Strauss,
"What is Political
Philosophy,"
in Poli ti cal Philosophy: Six Essays by Leo
Strauss, ed. Hilail Gildin (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 3-57.

condition. To be human is for him to possess characteristics,
actual and potential, that significantly differentiate, for
better or for worse,

the human condition from that of the

divine, of which we know nothing, and from that of animals,
of which we claim to know much. The human condition is thus
different from either in that it alone consciously confronts
its

own

mortality.

Kierkegaard argues,

In

that

very

confrontation,

"it is every human being's

however,
(Menneske J

destiny (Bestemmelse) to become free, independent, itself" (SV
12,267; WL,

259),

all of which to Kierkegaard are ethical

qualifications. 2
It is this very difference that simultaneously embodies
the capacity for acting at times as animals, and hence purely
sensually, and at other times, we like to think, divinely; it
is

this

difference

that

originally

spawned

political

philosophy. It is something specific in the human condition
that makes possible and necessitates political philosophy.
This something specific is the human capacity to think,
the

fact

perceive

that

human

reality

and

beings
act

are

thinking

accordingly

2

and

beings

who

can

simultaneously

"The one who ethically chooses himself, he chooses
himself concretely as this specific individual (Individ) . .
. . The individual thus becomes conscious of himself as this
specific individual with these talents, these inclinations,
these drives, these passions, influenced by this specific
social milieu, as this specific product of a specific
environment. But as he becomes conscious of himself in this
way, he assumes everything as his responsibility" (SV 3,232;
EO, 250-51).
2

imagine ideality and strive to go beyond the givens of this
world. They are thinking beings who can abstract from their
own condition and thus transcend it, but who are also capable
of

concretizing

their

own

condition

in

an

attempt

to

understand and act upon its possibilities and its limitations.
As Kierkegaard has Johannes Climacus say in the Postscript,
"The subjective thinker is someone existing, and yet he is
someone thinking; he does not abstract from Existents and from
the contradiction, but he is in it, and still he must think"
(SV 10,52; CUP, 314).
Political philosophy addresses itself to this thinking
capacity

not

meaningfulness

only
of

for

the

purpose

thinking,

but

also,

of

addressing

the

as

implied

the

in

earliest manifestation of this symbolic expression of reality 3
by the Socratic dictum "know thyself," to provide a guidance
for

thinking.

Immediately

we

see

that

thinking

is

qualitatively qualified by philosophy, which to Kierkegaard
means that the character of thinking is ethically qualified.
Importantly "[t]he ethical has to do with particular (enkelte]
human beings,

and, note well, with every single self [hver

Enkelt]" (SV 10,25; CUP, 284).

3

This expression has been borrowed from the introduction
to John G. Gunnell's Political Philosophy and Time: Plato and
the Origins of Political Vision (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1968 and 1987), pp. 4-10. Also Eric Voegelin,
Israel and Revelation, vol. 1 of Order and History (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), pp. 20, 34,
and the "Introduction" in passim.
3

In

the

age

of

modernity

where

the

ethical

and

the

political have become sharply differentiated, this explanation
of the meaning of political philosophy still does not 9ualify
Kierkegaard's philosophy as political. We need to see how he
conceives of the ethical. First, in an early journal note he
briefly explains the content of the last chapter of book X of
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics as the ethical's relation to
the political of which it is a part. He then comments on how
strange it is that Aristotle's own dialectic "almost suspends
[h~ver, as in the German aufheben] this observation inasmuch
as the contemplative life is the highest, and this lower form
of happiness lies in the practice of the political virtues.
But the contemplative life is isolation. 114 For Kierkegaard to
think for the sake of thinking is not to think in the most
human manner; rather it is to think disinterestedly. Thinking
must

have

a

comprehending

purpose
the

beyond

human

itself.

condition

Thinking
which

must

aim

at

essentially

is

relational -- to the other, to society. Thinking must address
the "idea of community."
Second, the individual, by becoming conscious of the self
as

a

relational

being

and

hence

as

a

responsible

being

constitutive of belonging in some way, gains identity of the
self as equal to the other.

Thereby the single self

4 PAP IV C 27 (JP 114).
4

(den

Enkelte)

5

fulfills its highest potential, its destiny. 6 This

5

Den Enkelte strictly translated means "the only one" or
"the single one. " However, the adverb enkel t can also mean
"simple." We have chosen to translate Kierkegaard's principal
category of den Enkelte as "the single self" rather than as
"the individual," inasmuch as the latter is not only overused,
it also connotes so much related to liberal theory that was
not necessarily true of Kierkegaard's category. This choice
of translation also enables us to avoid most sexist language
by using the third person singular neuter in connection with
"the
single
self."
In
this
way
translations
and
interpretations
begin
to
look
much
more
like
what
Kierkegaard's original Danish text intended.
This is not to say that there are not problems with this
choice of translation, or that Kierkegaard did not at times
use sexist language. When connected with nouns and sometimes
adjectives, it has been necessary to retain the translation
of the adverb "individual" as, for example, in "individual
existence. " Moreover, sometimes Kierkegaard does use the
Danish Individ. In those cases it has always been translated
as "individual." Whenever Kierkegaard uses the masculine "he"
we have done the same in translating quotations. We also
recognize, however, that the word "self" connotes a particular
level of consciousness in much contemporary literature. Such
connotations should not be attached to our translation of den
Enkelte as "the single self." Any change in consciousness of
the single self will be evident in the context the category
appears, and only then.
Furthermore, the fact that den Enkelte is capitalized has
nothing to do with Kierkegaard's attachment to this category.
Rather it is because he is following the rules of writing of
his time, and den Enkelte is a noun. Not until 1948 were the
new "rules of correct writing" (retskrivningsregler) imposed
on the Danish language. Among other more confusing changes,
all capitalization was abandoned except for pronouns.
Much has been made in English translations of the old
rule of capitalization of nouns under which Kierkegaard
worked, giving eager translators an opportunity for pursuing
personal agenda and thus unnecessarily influence their
translations interpretively by also capitalizing particular
words in the English translation that would not normally be
capitalized. Kierkegaard had many means of emphasizing
particular words or phrases or even sentences, and he used all
of them, but capitalization was not one of them. The new
translations of "Kierkegaard Writings," edited and in many
cases translated by the tireless Howard v. and Edna H. Hong
and published by Princeton University Press are thankfully
free of such aberrations.
5

identity as equal and as a

belonging being qualifies the

single self's comportment toward the world.

Although this

stance of equality and belonging may be purely formal,
matter

of

consciousness,

anthropological

it

characteristic.

As

nevertheless
Kresten

has

a
an

Nordentoft

has

pointed out in his interpretation of Kierkegaard,
the task could not be set if it were not possible
for man to realize it.
. Thus every person
becomes conscious of himself in concern for himself
because his existence takes place upon conditions
of ambiguity, in time, in hope or fear. 7
To think

in terms

of equality and

belonging,

an

ethical

dimension to be achieved, is precisely to love one's self. As
Kierkegaard puts it,

it is the purest form of human love

(Menneskekjerlighed). 8 To think one's equality and relatedness
in this

way

is

for

Kierkegaard to

act

out the

"idea of

community," and indeed constitutes an act of freedom.

It is

a stance he considers the optimal potentiality of the human
condition. Thus he seeks to describe the single self as it
essentially

comports

itself

toward

the

world,

and

he

understands it in that particular way he admires in Plato's
political philosophy in which the state is not made higher

6

"To the best world belongs equality." PAP VII 1 B 88,
p. 295. See also PAP VII B 202, PAP VIII 2 B 31:24: "• . . to
love the neighbor is precisely to want to be essentially equal
for all people." Also PAP VIII 2 B 71:9.
7

Kierkegaard's
Psychology,
tr.
Bruce
Kirmmse
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1978), p. 76.
8 PAP VII 1 B 202.
6

than the single self. The single self remains individuated in
its concern for the good of the whole. 9
In community (Menighed) the single self is; the
single self is dialectically decisive as the
presupposition for forming community,
and in
community the single self is qualitatively something
essential and can at any moment also become higher
than "community," precisely as soon as "the others"
fall away from the idea. The cohesiveness of
community is that each is a single self, and then
the idea. . . . Evero" single self in community
guarantees community. 1
In order to understand the
Kierkegaard

unfolds

that

structure

single

self

of

the

in

single

its

self

essential

dimension which is decisively ethical/political.
Without risking much, then, we can say Kierkegaard has
learned his political philosophy from Plato and Aristotle. He
approaches the fundamental questions partly in an analogous
manner,

and partly he rewrites the script to formulate a

political philosophy commensurable with the Christian teaching
he

knows

from

revelation,

and

especially

from

Pauline

teaching.
With this understanding of Kierkegaard's conception of
political philosophy, the title of this project should also
become

clear.

To

be

a

citizen

is

to

strive

to

be

ethical/political before being in any other way. To be in this
way, to understand one's self in this relational manner, that
is,

to think essentially,

9

is to be a person of character.

PAP VII 1 A 70 (JP 3327).

lO PAP X 2 A 390

(JP 2952).
7

Neither citizenship nor character are qualities that would
describe divine beings or animals. They belong exclusively to
the human condition.
From

this

perspective

it

would

seem

Kierkegaard

understands the ethical/political to have a natural basis as
Plato and Aristotle maintained. For Kierkegaard this is both
true and not true. In the Fragments he talks about a human
being's

"second

nature."

But

even

here

he

almost

embarrassingly parallels Plato who also claims that naturally,
not wisdom, but the desire for pleasure rules the soul. It is
only after experiencing periagoge, the turning around, that
wisdom comes to rule in the soul which is now ordered by
justice. 11 It is only after the self's acceptance of itself as
it optimally and hence truly is, something that according to
Kierkegaard is occasioned by God's grace which enables the
single self to acknowledge its original condition as untruth,
it is only then the self becomes conscious of the actual
(egentlige) sense of citizenship. Character is achieved in the
enactment of this awareness, in the single self's comportment
toward the world.
The implication of a second nature that allows the single
self fulfillment of its most genuine self suggests that the

11

Gorgias
491e-492a
and
Republic
443c-444e.
Kierkegaard's following of Plato's political philosophy is
considered embarrassing only in view of his occasional
derogatory remarks about what he sometimes considered Plato's
speculative tendencies: for example SV 9,171-172n; CUP, 184
and note.
8

self's

original

nature

suffers

from

a

pathology

of

consciousness that renders it untrue and therefore incapable
of citizenship and character. The aim of this dissertation is
first to lay bare the cause of this pathology, a pathology
which

Kierkegaard

believed

was

fundamentally

grounded

in

modern philosophy's adaptation of scientific methodology by
which

a

separation

of

knowledge

and

experience

occurred.

second, we seek to explain the consequent symptomatic effects
on thinking as Kierkegaard understood them. Third and finally
the aim is to present his therapeutic "corrective," by which
he intended to restore the possibility for the single self to
achieve

its

optimal

condition.

As

such,

the

dissertation

suggests that Kierkegaard's project constitutes a

philosophy

of political consciousness framed as a phenomenology garbed
in Christian language.

*
S0ren Kierkegaard has been examined from many points of
view, predominantly philosophical, theological, psychological,
and literary. These analyses have for the most part focused
on his earlier pseudonymous writings of indirect communication
emphasizing his differentiation of aesthetic,

ethical,

and

religious realms of existence.
This study will focus on the direct communication of his
later works almost exclusively published under his own name.
9

Its aim is to suggest the appropriateness of interpreting the
thought of Kierkegaard with a

particular concern for

its

implications on political meaning. It will be shown that his
later writings,

and especially Two Ages and Works of Love

reveal a heretofore unexamined dimension that indicates the
undeniable presence of a philosophy of political consciousness
that is therapeutic in form.
This is not to say that earlier writings will not be
consulted. Indeed, in order to fully appreciate what we call
Kierkegaard's "corrective" of liberal theory,
necessary

to

examine

certain

philosophical

it has been
concepts

that

embody his general critique of modern society, concepts that
are only touched upon in the later works, but which are more
fully

detailed

in

the

indirect

communication

of

the

pseudonymous literature and especially in the works authored
by

Johannes

Climacus

Philosophical

Fragments,

Concluding

Unscientific Postscript, and De Omnibus Dubitandum Est.
Of most interest in the later writings is Kierkegaard's
novel understanding of human rights as well as his critical
assessment of certain fundamental defects of his time to which
he was one of the first serious thinkers to respond. It will
be shown that Kierkegaard engages in a "corrective" of the
natural rights'
doing so,
tenets

of

he

understanding of freedom and equality.

establishes his
modern

political

own

interpretation of these

existence

as

existential

obligations, and hence as something to be achieved,
10

In

rather

than as given rights.
In

order

Kierkegaard's

to

fully

appreciate

theory of

freedom

the

and

radical

equality,

nature

of

it becomes

necessary to understand the underlying assumptions of his
critique of modernity and the consequent symptomatic effects
that necessitated this therapeutic "corrective." Kierkegaard
characterizes the liberal concept of rights as given as one
of

the

fundamental

misunderstandings

of

modernity

that

originated in the separation of knowledge and experience. This
separation was the consequence of the emergence of modern
natural science with its emphasis on method and objective
truth. In chapter one we shall see how Kierkegaard's attack
on modern philosophy's adaptation of scientific methodology
to

all

epistemological

confrontation

with

inquiry

Hegel's

leads

to

systematic

an

all

development

out
of

consciousness by means of logical and historical explanation.
Kierkegaard's argument is that classical philosophy's
teleological approach to questions of being and Christianity's
emphasis on transcendental providence had been replaced with
an

exclusive

rendering

focus

on

questions

of

immanent
the

good

and

indefinite

all

but

progress

irrelevant.

For

Kierkegaard the idea of such a dependency on logic and the
course of history is absurd inasmuch as logic cannot explain
existence

and

historical

events

can

only

be

considered

accidental or approximate and can provide no certainty about
the future.

The problem for Kierkegaard is that systematic
11

philosophy

has

rendered

experience

nonessential

what
in

he

its

calls

essential

quest

for

human

objectivity,

something Kierkegaard interprets as disinterestedness.

All

emphasis is now on reflection (e.g. calculation), which leaves
human

beings

as

passive

observers

on

the

margin

of

all

essential relationships, lost in the consequent chasm between
fact and value.
When, in addition, Christianity has been posited as an
historical phenomenon and its truth cognitively revealed as
an eternal truth as in Hegel's philosophy, then the problem
of the truth of Christianity has been removed, meaning the all
important dialectic of human experience has been rejected. For
Kierkegaard

this

development

completes

the

separation

of

knowledge and experience inasmuch as the realm of knowledge
has

now

been

circumscribed

leaving

human

experience

undifferentiated.
Both in chapter one and in chapter two Kierkegaard's
attack on Hegel's system will be the focus.
dividing

up

Kierkegaard's

critique

of

The point of

Hegel's

systematic

philosophy in this way is not to deny the oneness of the
system.

Rather,

it

is,

in the

first

place,

to show that

philosophy's conformity to scientific method has wrought a
cleft in the union of knowing and experience, a union that was
all important to classical philosophy. In the second place,
it

is

to show the

tendency

on

symptomatic effects

theoretical

and
12

of

practical

this objective
thinking,

and

consequently to show how a pathology of consciousness has
emerged.

The latter will be discussed in chapters two and

three.
The dissertation then turns to the most debilitating
symptomatic effect to follow from this separation of knowledge
and experience, an effect Kierkegaard diagnosed as the loss
of

authority.

This

loss,

he

claimed,

had

pathologically

affected individual consciousness manifesting itself both in
theoretical and practical thinking.
On a
tendency"

philosophical level,

he rejected the

"objective

which had intellectualized ethical conduct and

subordinated religious life to speculative philosophy. This,
of course, was especially true in Hegelianism which speculated
systematically and objectively on the truth of things, such
as Christianity, projecting them as indisputable historical
phenomena

of

equivalent

veracity.

Likewise

Kierkegaard

rejected Hegel's imposition of logic on existence by which an
attempt was made to generate

identity between object and

subject, thought and being. Inasmuch as logic cannot explain
movement, according to Kierkegaard, by so doing, he charged,
Hegel had only confirmed the loss of meaningful existential
experience.
On a religious level, the problem of making Christianity
merely an object of cognition had relaxed the tension of the
paradox of the Incarnation. It meant that becoming a Christian
was as easily achieved as citizenship requiring no special
13

effort

and

posing

no

"offense"

(Forargelse)

to

reason,

Kierkegaard's definition for an act against the understanding.
Moreover,

it meant the relationship between philosophy and

Christianity had become confused inasmuch as Christianity, on
the

one

hand,

had

been

transformed

into

a

reflective

objectivity aimed at transcending existential uncertainty. On
the other hand, in order to appear reasonable, Christianity
by its embrace of worldly aspirations had

jeopardized its

mystical authority, and thus it had deformed its own truth in
the very creation of "Christendom."
Kierkegaard's

differentiation

of

Christianity

and

"Christendom" will be discussed in detail only inasmuch as it
affects the existential condition of the single self,

and

likewise the problematic of the paradox of Christianity. This
paradox he posits as a challenge to reason to recognize its
own

limitations,

Christianity

as

and

to

the

essentially

single

self

subjective

to
and

recognize
hence

of

existential concern. Refusal to do so, Kierkegaard charges,
implies a rejection of foundational authority, the source of
ultimate happiness.
In chapter three we shall turn to the symptomatic effects
of the separation of knowledge and experience on practical
thinking -- again expressed as a loss of authority.
On a political level, Kierkegaard accepted the emergence
of the liberal state, but with severe qualifications. On the
one hand,

liberal politics had produced
14

"the

illusion of

"the false prophets of

perfect equality" conjured up by

secularism in the name of Christianity." On the other, there
was the obsessive preoccupation with worldly things generated
by

"the

present

age"

and

its

unquestioned

adherence

to

materialism. Envy becomes "the negatively unifying principle"
meaning people are brought together on the basis of what they
are against, rather than what they support. The implication
for Kierkegaard is the principle of characterlessness.
He juxtaposes the two foremost structures of modernity:
revolution to achieve civic freedoms and the leveling process
to acquire
anarchy

equality.

while

stillness

the

that

The

latter

nullified

former
now

had

was

all

led to

leading

individual

violence

to

a

and

stifling

achievement.

The

implication was an equivocation of all relationships, be they
political or familial, meaning the natural authority inherent
to such relationships had eroded.

Consequently the role of

citizenship had become marginalized, as the leveling process
had rendered the single self atomized, isolated, and impotent
engrossed

with

computing

the

problems

of

the

political

relationship, but never actively participating in the decision
making

process,

and

therefore

separated

from

the

shared

morality that is constitutive of the "idea of community."
Finally,
negative

on a psychological level,

categories

dominate

everyday

Kierkegaard claims
existence

rendering

impotent human beings the victims of "externality. 11 The human
condition, he charges, is determined by public opinion as the
15

self

is

defined

in

terms

of

its

public

role

based

on

superficial consciousness of social differentiations. It is
an alienated state, quantitatively justified, that implicitly
denies all
11

investments of erotic feeling

inwardness"

( Ind er 1 ighed) .

or of political

The consequence is an abstract

form of subjectivism that entails a denial of human nature as
Kierkegaard understands it.
Kierkegaard uncovers this problematic by juxtaposing the
categories of excellence and leveling, showing that the latter
negates the former, meaning that there is no longer a basis
for political will, but rather a "spiritlessness" (Aandl0shed)
best described by its philistine-bourgeois mentality.

This

mentality constitutes a pathology that Kierkegaard will argue
is articulated in the voluntary mediation of the principle of
contradiction, an axiom of human existence. He shows how the
suspension of the principle of contradiction leads to selfcontradiction
demonstrate

through

the

lack

a
of

number

of

authority.

examples
The

problem

that

all

is

that

authority is inherent to being in harmony with the self.
In chapters four and five the dissertation turns to its
central theme: Kierkegaard's radical therapeutic "corrective"
of

the

tenets

of

liberal

Kierkegaard put his trust
believing

that

the

single

existence.
in the
self,

We

shall

see

how

individual human being,
if

shown

the

way,

will

ultimately choose the course of action that will bring him the
most fulfillment and hence the most happiness. Modernity has
16

prevented such a course of action precisely by its confusion
of the two realms of existence and the consequent symptomatic
equivocation of values, and hence it has engaged in a denial
of differentiated experience.
This part of the analysis will focus on the declaration
of

the

rights

Kierkegaard's

of

man

rigorous

(Menneske-Rettigheder),
interpretation

which

signified

in

mankind's

self-deification. The declaration posited rights as political
in nature and assumed them as given, implying they dictated
certain political circumstances. But Kierkegaard argues this
is

a

fundamental

misunderstanding.

The rights

of man had

already been provided, meaning they are existential and must
be viewed as obligations or duties to which the single self
is

intentionally dedicated

for

the

purposes

of

achieving

genuine freedom and equality.
The problem as he sees it,

is that only an inadequate

understanding of freedom can be derived from political rights,
and

inasmuch as

human

beings

by

nature

are distinct,

an

imposed equality is but a chimera. In other words, modernity
has confused what is by the grace of God with what is by human
design.

To

Kierkegaard

freedom

and

equality

are

ethical

categories that essentially engage each individual in a common
purpose without suppressing the original individuation idea.
That is to say, they are tasks the single self must undertake
in order to realize community and personal fulfillment.
Kierkegaard's novel and undeniably rigorous conception
of freedom and equality assumes the religious (and rational)

17

expectation expressed in the law's demand,

"You shall love

your neighbor as yourself." In its fulfilled state, this law
constitutes the foundation of his "idea of community." This
1aw, therefore, has universal application. In order to fulfill
this law's demand, Kierkegaard appeals to what he considers
the deepest

and most

fundamental

characteristic of

human

nature: love.
Love

(Kierlighed),

underlying

such

he

argues,

essential

is

the

experience.

In

dynamic
its

force

"eternal

transformation," i.e. in understanding it as duty to the law's
demand,

love not only separates itself from the bonds of

necessity,

it also frees the single self of "preferential

love" (such as erotic love (Elskov) or friendship) which makes
distinctions and like acquisitiveness excludes. "Only law can
give freedom," Kierkegaard reasons, establishing a connection
between love and freedom. And only the law that requires the
single self to love its neighbor indiscriminately, only that
law does not make distinctions,

establishing a

connection

between love and equality.
From the perspective of love as obedience to a law, it
becomes

clear

true

establishing
Kierkegaard
Lighed).
necessary

freedom

is
the

originates

humanity

constitutes

That
is

that

to

human

(Menneskelighed)

genuine
say,

in

the

realization

of

human

the

which

equality

reform

action

(Menneske-

Kierkegaard

thought

to

of

deems

equality

(Lighedstanken) which only through love can be effected and
still maintain freedom. Such a comportment toward the world
18

not only fulfills the

II

idea of community,

11

but assures the

single self of the greatest happiness precisely because it
expresses its most genuine self.
Where Liberalism basically posits freedom and equality
in enlightened self-interest, it follows that the single self
need only prudently to act on its self-understanding of these
interests to achieve fulfillment. In this case an appreciation
of the political dimension of human existence is diminished
insofar as individual freedom is expressed in proprietary acts
that owe nothing to society. In contrast, Kierkegaard claims
that

freedom

and

equality are

grounded

in

acts

of

self-

determination expressed as obligation to a law. Inasmuch as
this

act

originates

satisfaction

in

consciousness

becomes

fulfillment

of

in

love,

community,
a

human

it

necessity

which

essentially

follows
for

experience.

that

the

That

seeks

political

completion and

is

to

say,

the

realization of community as an external social arrangement
presupposes an internal transformation of the understanding
of human nature proper.
What appears to be unique about Kierkegaard's concept of
love

is

its

upbuilding

(opbyggende)

quality.

Loving your

neighbor (the person before you) presupposes the presence of
love as the ground in that other person,

and by this very

presupposition he builds up love in him without attempting to
make any demands of him.

This capacity for upbuilding is

present in every single self, Kierkegaard will argue, inasmuch
as it is not dependent upon natural or social advantages.
19

Rather it is in every person (Menneske) by virtue of character
demonstrated "through his behavior in common things, through
his relationship with his fellows, through his langua9e, his
expression."
Such an upbuilding quality, Kierkegaard is certain could
not be derived from the positing of a universal criterion that
with

unqualified

truthfulness

could

evaluate

every

human

action.

The proper conception of love can only be derived

through

the

God-relation,

he

insists,

and

only

exercised

through citizenship and character and thereby express the
"idea of community." In that sense, love as upbuilding has an
efficacious

quality

inasmuch

as

Kierkegaard

expects

the

qualitative personality of the single self to uplift political
and social life rather than vice versa.

For him the single

self is prior to society inasmuch as it is personal conduct
that

will

upbuilding
project

determine
sense,

has

the

character

therefore,

defined

as

love
a

of

society.

constitutes

philosophy

of

In

that

what

this

political

consciousness.

*
Since Howard A.

Johnson in 1962 published a critical

essay "Kierkegaard and Politics, 1112 only a few attempts have
been made to elucidate the presence of political meaning in

12 A Kierkegaard Critique, ed. Howard a Johnson and Niels
Thulstrup (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1962), pp. 74-84.
20

Kierkegaard's thought. 13 They have almost exclusively been
based on the early writings 14 beginning with Kierkegaard's
dissertation The Concept of Irony with Constant Reference to
socrates

(1841)

15

and

ending with

Concluding Unscientific

postscript (1846). Of the later writings, only Two Ages has
received some attention from this perspective. 16 It is the
intent of this study to show the wealth of political insight
revealed in these later works.

13

Some noteworthy examples are Russell H. Davis,
"Kierkegaard and Community" in Union Seminary Quarterly Review
XXXVI, 4 (Summer 1981): 205-222; Gregor Malantschuk, The
controversial Kierkegaard, tr. Howard v. and Edna H. Hong
(Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980); Paul
Milller, "Kierkegaard som social of poli tisk tamker" in
Kierkegaardiana, 13 (1984): 122-127; and Merold Westphal,
Kierkegaard's Critique of Reason and Society (Macon, GA:
Mercer University Press, 1987.
14

A notable exception is Bruce H. Kirmmse, whose twovolume dissertation "Kierkegaard's Politics: The Social
Thought of S0ren Kierkegaard in Its Historical Context,"
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley,
1977), focusing on all Kierkegaard's later works has made a
major contribution to Kierkegaard scholarship by analyzing the
historical context including its political aspects. Also John
w. Elrod, Kierkegaard and Christendom (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1981); and "Kierkegaard on Self and Society"
in Kierkegaardiana, 11 (1980): 178-196.
15 For all references to Kierkegaard's writings both in
the original Danish and English translations see the
bibliography with the appropriate names of pseudonymous
authors as well as year of first publication and generally
accepted
abbreviations
of
each
work
preceding
this
Introduction.
16

Merold Westphal, "Kierkegaard's Sociology" in Op. Cit.
pp. 43-59; Werner Stark, "Kierkegaard on Capitalism" in
Kierkegaard's Presence in Contemporary American Life, ed.
Lewis A. Lawson (Methuen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. ,
1970), pp. 120-149; and David Bruce Fletcher, Social and
Political Perspectives in the Thought of s0ren Kierkegaard
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1982).
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such a revelation would be of great significance to the
discipline of political science inasmuch as it would add a
novel

dimension

thought.

But

it

to

the

would

study
also

of

contemporary

introduce

the

political

question

why

Kierkegaard's understanding of freedom and equality has not
been uncovered before and hence why his writings have not been
included in the mainstream of political theory. 17
Much of this is due to the popular but mistaken belief
that Kierkegaard's philosophy of the single self (den Enkelte)
is

acosmic,

distances
apolitical

meaning

itself
in

it

from

emphasizes
all

nature. 18

social

Moreover,

an

individualism

concerns

and

contemporary

that

hence

is

political

17

Only two dissertations that deal exclusively with
Kierkegaard have come out of Political Science: Robert Dale
Bonser, "The Role of Socrates in the Thought of S0ren
Kierkegaard" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
Santa Barbara, 1985); and Knud Rasmussen, 11 s0ren Kierkegaard's
Political Ideas" (PH.D. dissertation, Rutgers University,
1965). To the best of our knowledge no published writings on
Kierkegaard have come out of Political Science.
18

See, for example, Louis Mackey, "The Loss of the World
in Kierkegaard's Ethics" in Kierkegaard: A Collection of
Critical Essays, ed. Josiah Thompson (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1972), pp. 266-88; Louis Dupre,
"The Sickness Unto Death: Critique of the Modern Age" in
International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness Unto Death,
ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon GA: Mercer University Press,
1987), pp. 85-106; and Josiah Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth:
Kierkegaard's
Pseudonymous
Works
(Carbondale:
Southern
Illinois University Press, 1967).
In the Postscript Johannes Climacus suggests that charges
of acosmism may be ill founded: "If ethics were to take away
the entire world from . . . a thinker, letting him keep his
own self, he would probably regard such a trifle as not worth
keeping and would let it go with the rest -- and so it becomes
acosmism. But why does he think so slightingly of his own
self? If it were the meaning that he should give up the whole
world in order to content himself with another person's
ethical reality, he would be justified in disdaining the
exchange, sv 10,44; CUP, 305. In a double sense Kierkegaard
22

theorists tend to think of Kierkegaard as a religious author,
which is indeed what he called himself (SV 18,81; POV, 5), and
hence it is believed that his writings could not embody a
rational political philosophy. 19
affirms the political relation.
19

David Bruce Fletcher,
Op.
Cit.
has correctly
identified three noted authors who held this view: H. Richard
Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper & Row, 1951),
pp. 243-44; Marjorie Grene, Introduction to Existentialism
(Chicago: Phoenix Press, 1959), pp. 38-40; and s.u. Zuidema,
Kierkegaard (Philadelphia: Presbytarian and Reformed, 1974),
pp. 18-19. Both Zuidema and Grene draw on Kierkegaard's
personal history to bolster their conclusions. Fletcher does
the same to prove the opposite. One aim of this project is to
show that it is not necessary to include biographical data to
demonstrate Kierkegaard's political or philosophical concerns.
see Paul Holmer, "On Understanding Kierkegaard, " A Kierkegaard
Critique, eds. Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Company, 1962), in passim. Finally there is
Walter Kaufmann, From Shakespeare to Existentialism (Garden
City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960), who is a favorite
of political theorists because of his excellent translations
especially of the works of Nietzsche and Goethe. His
interpretations of Kierkegaard's writings, however, leave a
lot to be desired, and, we want to suggest, have negatively
influenced political theorists on the subject of Kierkegaard.
Kaufmann is not only negative in his overall assessment of
Kierkegaard, his critique is all but an assassination of him
both personally and in terms of his thought, an approach that
makes little sense inasmuch as he in fact includes Kierkegaard
in this and other surveys. The major points of his critique
involve misquoting, misreading, and misunderstanding of
Kierkegaard's thought, for example, attacking his psychology
as inferior to Freud's when in fact Kierkegaard's psychology
is
far
different
and
is
generally
characterized
as
anthropological
philosophy
(p.
184).
He
characterizes
Kierkegaard's single self as a tormented individuality without
the open horizon of Nietzsche, Goethe, or Kant (pp. 184 and
189), when in fact it is Kierkegaard who is willing to
entertain the idea of something beyond the scope of reason or
empirical inquiry. He describes Kierkegaard's religion as
authoritarian omitting an explanation of what it is the age
in fact refuses to obey, namely the potentiality of their own
selves, and omitting the fact that Kierkegaard's most
important ethical principle is freedom (p. 176-77). The brief
positive comments at the end of this diatribe, which few
readers probably ever arrive at, demonstrate that at least in
part Kaufmann is perfectly capable of reading Kierkegaard with
23

But

one

should

also

keep

in

mind

that

exploring

Kierkegaard's authorship involves immense problems because
Kierkegaard himself consciously set out "to make a penetration
of his work more difficult. 112
modes

of

communication,

° Kierkegaard

both

direct

and

wrote in various
indirect,

often

publishing both simultaneously under his own and pseudonymous
names,

and

Moreover,

making

much

use

his formulation

of

a

dialectical

approach. 21

sometimes would make use of an

aphoristic style and at other times of a Hegelian and hence
convoluted
caprice,"

style
and

giving

making

it

"the

appearance

difficult

to

of

chance

discover

and

"what

an

exceedingly rigorous ordering" underlies the development of
his

thought.

Indeed,

Kierkegaard

seems

to

appeal

an open mind ( especially p. 2 02) , which makes
unrestrained critique look even more strange.

to

a

the prior

20

v.

Gregor Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, tr. Howard
and Edna H. Hong {Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1971), p. 3.
21

This approach should not be confused with Hegelian
dialectics. Kierkegaard distinguishes between two kinds of
dialectics: conceptual and qualitative dialectics. As Sylvia
Walsh Utterback,
"Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Christian
Existence" (Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1975), pp.
11-13,
explains:
"Conceptual dialectic refers to the
conceptual or logical method of viewing one thing and its
opposite simultaneously. The dialectical task is to sustain
a dual perspective which emphasizes the opposition, duplicity,
and tension between concepts rather than the synthesis and
mediation of opposition as in Hegelian dialectics. While
opposites seem to contradict each other, sometimes they
actually complement each other." Qualitative (e.xistential)
dialectic refers not to cognitive concepts, but rather to
existence. It is what Kierkegaard calls "the dialectic of
inwardness or 'the ethical' in individual existence." See also
Paul Holmer, "Kierkegaard's Logic, " in Kierkegaardiana 2
{1957), pp. 34-5.
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particular audience when he in his journals notes "the task
must be made difficult, for only the difficult inspires the
noble- h ear t ed.

1122

That he also wrote in a relatively obscure language and
suffered

much

in

early

English

translations

has

only

aggravated the circumstances of interpretation. At best, then,
Kierkegaard's writings are regarded as "essentially esoteric
literature, 1123 difficult to approach. Nevertheless, this study
is also meant to encourage political scientists to further
explore the riches of this immense authorship, especially in
view of the emergence of the excellent new translations of the
entire "Kierkegaard Writings," in order to dig open new areas
of

thought

as

well

as

a

different

approach to political

meaning. Kierkegaard's somewhat obscure phenomenology deserves
to be poured over by theorists, political and otherwise, as
this projects hopes to show.

*
II: THE DIALECTICS OF KIERKEGAARD'S AUTHORSHIP

Kierkegaard utilizes an indirect methodology in conveying
his propositions about the single self. That is to say, he

22

Malantschuk, Op. Cit. p. 4. Quotations are from PAP
VII 1 A 104 (JP 656) and PAP VIII 2 B 88, pp. 184-85.
23

c. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and
"Postscript": The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983), p. 2.
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does not prescribe a philosophy of existence by dictating a
psychiatric restorative to the problem of existence.

That

would not provide the proper condition for the achievement of
freedom

and

equality

and

would

be

to

misunderstand

his

Socratic perception of the teacher-student relationship (SV
6,17; PF, 12). Rather he maieutically provokes the reader to
seek and acquire insight into the optimal standard for human
activity

whereupon

the

single

self

is

expected

to

existentially appropriate this cognitive authority into its
own life experience.

The best way to do this,

Kierkegaard

suggests, is to catch the reader's attention not by pointing
an accusing finger, but by carefully leading the reader to the
point where self-consciousness becomes activated (SV 18, 1010 2 ; POV, 3 5 ) .
To activate the consciousness of the reader necessitated
an aesthetic detour which Kierkegaard himself characterized
as deceptive (SV 18,105; POV, 40). It was designed to "lift" 24
the illusion under which the recipient (the reader) presumably
existed. It was to be a proper preparation for a communication
of truth, but to make this effective Kierkegaard insists "I
must understand more than he -- but first and foremost I must
surely understand what he understands {SV 18,97; POV,

27).

Kierkegaard refers to this "deceptive" method as "the indirect

24

I have used the English translation "lift" (ha!ve) in
the sense of "lifting away" to underscore Kierkegaard's
implied illusion as something ephemeral that would have to
float up and away --if someone blows at it hard enough. Later
it will become obvious this illusion is anything but
ephemeral.
26

mode of communication" as opposed to "direct communication. 1125
Employing a direct attack Kierkegaard believes would only
confirm the deluded in his illusion as well as embitter him,
while the indirect approach would allow the deluded recipient
to find his own way out of the illusion. Thus Kierkegaard
reasons that the religious author in the present age must
abandon "all the old military science" (SV 18,103; POV, 38)
of direct attack and instead get in touch with the people in
a

less direct manner. That is to say,

he must begin with

aesthetic achievement, "[t]hat is earnest money" (POV, 26).
The point of Kierkegaard's argument is his insistence
that

he

has

to

communicate

an

uncomfortable

truth,

and

therefore he must proceed with caution.
Consequently one does not begin in this way: I am
a Christian, you are not a Christian; but in this
way: you are a Christian, I am no Christian. Or one
25

"Objective thinking is wholly indifferent to the
subjectivity,
and
thereby
also
to
inwardness
and
appropriation; its mode of communication is therefore direct .
. . . [I]t can be understood directly and be recited by rote.
Objective thinking is therefore conscious only of itself, and
is therefore not a communication [ . J
• Everywhere the
subjective is of importance in cognition, and consequently
appropriation constitutes the main issue; there communication
is a work of art. It is doubly reflected, and its first form
is precisely the subtlety that the subjectivities must be held
divinely apart from one another, and not be permitted to fuse
or coagulate into objectivity. This is objectivity's parting
from the subjectivity," sv 9,65-8; CUP, 70-3. Moreover, "The
indirect mode of communication makes communication an art in
a different sense than when it is assumed by imagining it in
this way:
that the communicator has to present the
communication to someone knowing, that this person may judge
it, or to someone not knowing, that he may learn something.
But no one bothers himself about the next consideration, that
which precisely makes the communication dialectically so
difficult: that the recipient is someone existing, and that
this is the essential," SV 9,232; CUP, 246-47.
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does not begin in this way: It is Christianity I
proclaim,
and you
live merely
in aesthetic
categories; no, one begins in this way: let us talk
about the aesthetic; the deception lies in that one
talks in this way precisely in order to arrive at
the religious. Given the assumption, however, the
other is, after all, also in the illusion that the
aesthetic is the Christian, for he believes he is
Christian, and yet he lives in aesthetic categories
(SV 18;105; POV, 41).
The

approach

doctrinaire,

of

indirect

avoid

the

communication
pretense

of

is

to

theory,

avoid

the

which,

if

communicated as knowledge, the recipient might misunderstand
as something to be "known. 1126 As Louis Mackey explains, "his
purpose was not mystification but distance. 1127
Kierkegaard makes it very clear in his digression on the
authorship in the middle of the Postscript that the fact "that
there is no author is a means of keeping the reader at a
distance" (SV 9,211; CUP, 226). The point is, the reader is
not to dwell on the author in an exercise of hermeneutic
gymnastics, but rather on the indirect communication which is
meant to convey the state of illusion the reader presumably
is in.
As a religious author Kierkegaard was well aware of his
polemic situation,

striking out as he did from within the

society in which he himself had a stake. Thus his intention
was

not

to

absent

himself

to

the

proverbial

Archimedean

26

"That there is no result and no finite decision, is an
indirect expression for the truth as inwardness, and thus,
perhaps, a polemic against the truth as knowledge," SV 9,211;
CUP, 226.
27

Kierkegaard: A kind of Poet, (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 247.
28

point. He recognized that "Every religious author, or speaker
or teacher who absents himself, who is not there where the
danger is, and where evil has its stronghold, he is a decei-

( sv 18,117;

ver, and that will eventually become apparent"
59-60) . 28

poV,

it

Importantly,

should

be

noted,

that

Kierkegaard's aim was not destruction but reform (SV 12,20318; WL,

199-212).

He considered his efforts as a necessary

therapeutic "corrective" to the present age 29 as will become
clear in chapter four.
Understanding Kierkegaard's methodology is to a
degree

to

understand

his

authorship

which

is

large
both

dialectically complex and intriguing, especially in view of
its

pseudonymous

dimension. 30

The

explanation

of

the

28

Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 61, has
suggested that this is also the common stance of the social
critic. "He is not a detached observer, even when he looks at
the society he inhabits with a fresh and skeptical eye. He is
not an enemy, even when he is fiercely opposed to this or that
prevailing
practice
or
institutional
arrangement. His
criticism does not require either detachment or enmity,
because he finds warrant for critical engagement in the
idealism, even if it is a hypocritical idealism, of the
actually existing moral world."
29

,

K1rmmse, Op. Cit. p. 738.
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It should be noted that Kierkegaard did not just write
under a pen name. Most of his pseudonymous writings each have
their own carefully chosen pseudonym some of which, like
Johannes Climacus, the rationalist, has been involved in more
than one work. In each case, Kierkegaard aimed to convey a
message with the name. Thus Climacus is the Latin for ladder,
meaning he is the rationalist constantly climbing toward and
beyond the limitations of reason. What he finds beyond
reason's limitations he may not embrace existentially, but he
refuses to stifle thought that by virtue of passionate wonder
pushes itself toward the paradox, toward what it cannot know.
It is in this sense this inquiry understands openness.
Indeed, Kierkegaard in relation to himself ranks the
29

authorship

that

follows

is

analyzed

with

a

view

to

Kierkegaard's political philosophy. From this perspective it
is possible to argue that among other things he,
beginning

of

his

authorship,

was

aiming

at

a

from the
political

philosophy motivated by the circumstances of his historical
situation.

This

is not to say that Kierkegaard asks

'who

should rule.' He for all intents and purposes accepted the
decisions of regime made for many Western European nations by
the dramatic political upheavals

of the late eighteenth and

early nineteenth centuries. Liberal democracy was becoming an
undeniable fact.
What concerns him now are the consequences of this new
form of representative democracy that seems to

sever the

relationship between the single self and the state and in so
doing generates internal relational conflicts. What concerns
him now is the social condition as he mockingly observes the
inevitable:
[T]he dialectic of monarchy is historically both
tried and settled. Now we are going to begin at
another point, namely upon the intensive development
of the state itself. Then emerges the category of
"the single self. 1131

pseudonyms hierarchically referring to them as higher and
lower pseudonyms depending upon whether they are upbuilding
or
merely
aesthetic.
See
Howard
Hong's
"Historical
Introduction" to The Sickness Unto Death, pp. xxi-xx11.
Importantly, and as stated in "A First and Last Declaration"
at the end of the Postscript,
Kierkegaard wants to be
distinctly separated from these works, SV 10,285; CUP, no
pagination, "p. 551," precisely because they represent unreal
personalities lacking concretion. They are idealizations
unbound by actual moral limitations of reality, Ibid.
31

PAP 1 A 108 (JP 4116).
30

And Kierkegaard continues in a margin note, this time
positing a warning:
It is one thing when the people, the crowd, the
opposition
struggles
against
the
king,
t~~
government (that is what we call politics),
another thing is when there are disturbances in the
state in the sense as when in a dwelling the
residents on the various levels become antagonistic
-- not toward the landlord, but among themselves. - Controversy within the floors, all the way from
the basement to the attic, but among themselves. 1133
11

Kierkegaard

is

transferred

from

concerned
its

with

religious

how
and

authority
political

had

been

origins

to

spontaneously arising social structures that were eagerly
embraced by an unconnected public. 34
problem of

society was

not

to

be

In

other words,

expected

to

come

the
from

outside, but rather from within where, as Kierkegaard puts it,
the house is in a disarray.
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It should be noted that in chapter four we
differentiate between "the political" in Kierkegaard which
constitutes an existential condition closely associated with
the ethical dimension of the single self and "politics" as
here explained by Kierkegaard himself.
33

PAP VIII 1 A 109 (JP 4117) . Also Merold Westphal,
"Kierkegaard's
Sociology,"
International
Kierkegaard
Commentary: Two Ages, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer
University Press, 1984), pp. 133-34.
34

Cf. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), Ch. 2 in passim and
especially p. 40: "It is decisive that society, on all its
levels, excludes the possibility of action .
. Instead,
society expects from each of its members a certain kind of
behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which
tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to
exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement." Also
Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1960), Ch. 10 in passim; and John H. Hallowell, The
Moral Foundation of Democracy (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1954), p. 69.
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It is this pathological condition Kierkegaard wants to
make the reader aware of and especially the effect it has on
the single self's spiritual health, and consequently on its
understanding of the concept of citizenship.
His

authorship

can best

be understood

as

he,

in

an

Aristotelian fashion and hence scientifically, isolates the
most important element from the context of the whole in order
to analyze this element from its most ideal, indeed extreme,
position.

Like Aristotle,

Kierkegaard presents

this

ideal

version of individual existence in what Kresten Nordentoft has
referred

to

as

"literary-psychological

experiments,

1135

on

three progressive levels: aesthetic existence the end of which
is

pleasure,

ethical

institutionalized good

existence
such

as

which

marriage

aims
or

at

vocation,

some
and

religious existence which in Kierkegaard's scheme consists of
two

levels.

In

religiousness

A the

single

self

pursues

dialectical inwardness in a development of self through selfknowledge in a relationship with God. In religiousness B the
individual reclaims the world in relationship and community
yet maintains the "dialectical tension with the passionate
inwardness

of

religiousness

A. 1136

Thus

in

Kierkegaard's

35

Kresten
Nordentoft,
Kierkegaard's
Psychology
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1978), p. 13.
36

Russell M. Davis, "Kierkegaard and Community" in Union
Seminary Quarterly Review 36 no. 4 (Summer 1981): p. 212. For
a formal analysis of the "structure" of Kierkegaard's theory
of stages see Stephen N. Dunning, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of
Inwardness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). Mark
C Taylor's Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of
Time and the Self (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1975) is also helpful here.
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"phenomenology of spirit" the single self is placed "in a
progressively more self-conscious position of responsibility
for his own life, " 37 a

progression,

implications of logical necessity.

however,

that has no

These various

forms of

existence allow Kierkegaard to work out his category of the
single

self

(den

Enkelte)

exposing

all

the

traits

and

attributes these various experiences embody, and in so doing,
he demonstrates his considerable psychological prowess.
These spheres of existence are presented in the form of
more

or

less

poetic

prose

from

exciting

and

profound

Nietzschean type disjunctive aphorisms and only apparently
disorganized essays 38 in Either-or, vol. I, to extraordinarily
long,

awkward,

and

repetitive

Calvinistic type

essays

in

Either-or, vol. II, that depict the kind of ethical life that
grounds its principles in social institutions and thereby
expresses the God-relationship, 39 an ethical life distinct

The implication of structure in the stages of existence
should not be confused with Hegel's systematic dialectics
emphatically castigated by Kierkegaard's pseudonyms. It is
interesting to note that in his later writings of direct
communication,
Kierkegaard
all
but
abandons
these
differentiations of forms of existence as his attack on the
present state of affairs becomes more overt and radical. In
a sense these later writings present the "either-or" of
concrete existence: the life of the "philistine-bourgeois" or
the life of the "ethico-religious personality."
37

Stephen Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel
vs Kierkegaard on Faith and History (Chambersburgh, PA:
American Academy of Religion, 1972), p. 74.
38

George Connell, To Be One Thing: Personal Unity in
Kierkegaard's Thought (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press,
1985), p.54.
39

b'd p.
L.L,

161.
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from the Christian life described in the later literature.
However, it is what is in between these two extremes, and that
includes the rest of Either-or, vol. I and all the other early
pseudonymous writings that demonstrate the breadth and depth
of Kierkegaard's analytical acumen. From this perspective it
is no wonder these early works have captured the imagination
of readers throughout the world.
From the perspective of political philosophy, however,
these are the works that render the least to an understanding
of Kierkegaard's writings. In these works the single self is
portrayed abstractly, without a concrete context and would
seem to exist in a void. 4

° Kierkegaard

himself points to this

problem in the essay entitled "The Tragic in Ancient Drama
Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama" in Either-Or, vol.
I. There he equates the form of his pseudonymous authorship
with the modern experience as he describes how in modern
tragedy there are no epic circumstances. The hero is not tied
to categories of state, of family, or of destiny (something
that will become clear in chapter three)

nor to a context

which in Greek tragedy represents the fatalistic element where
the

hero's

suffering.

destruction
In

modern

is

the

tragedy,

result
in

of

both

contrast,

deed

and

Kierkegaard

contends the hero's destruction results from his deeds alone

40

Russell Davis, op. cit. pp. 214-16, has admirably
attempted to deduct a theory of community from the
pseudonymous authorship, but even he must in the end resort
to the later literature and especially to Works of Love to
find concrete meaning to religiousness B's requirement for
community.
34

and hence "situation and character are actually predominant."
The pain belongs to the hero alone; he is transparent only
unto himself. There is "no epic foreground, no epic residue.
The

hero

stands

and

falls

entirely

on

his

own

deeds

(Gjerninger)" (SV 2,133; EO I 144).
Kierkegaard presents the category of the single self in
these pseudonymous writings of indirect communication exactly
as

that

self

disinterested,

exists

in

"the

if transparent,

present

age,"

only to the

unattached,

self,

but not

comprehensible to others, and completely preoccupied with the
self as most poignantly exemplified in the essay "Johannes the
Seducer," that concludes Either-Or, vol. I.
With this explanation in mind it becomes necessary to ask
how these early pseudonymous writings are to be understood,
especially in view of the fact that they were accompanied by
a parallel series of direct communications that Kierkegaard
refers to as "Upbuilding Discourses."
first

of these

Either-or,

latter,

published

It was in the very

just three months

after

that Kierkegaard introduced his category of the

single self undeniably underscoring his claim in the Point of
View that he wanted, at least for his own sake, to remind the

35

world that his was a religious project. 41 He knew well that
people would not read these discourses, and certainly not with
the enthusiasm accorded especially Either-Or.

Howeve_r,

the

presence of these direct communications only intensify the
problem of the early writings inasmuch as they too focus upon
an unattached and hence abstract single self.

Kierkegaard

explains the parallel series this way.
"The religious is immediately present straight from
the beginning. Conversely, the aesthetic is again
present still at the last moment . . . . Hence first
and last assurance is provided against interpreting
the phenomenon thusly: that it is an aesthetic
author who with the lapse of time has changed and
has kind of become a religious author" (SV 18,86;
POV, 12}.
But this does not explain the problem of the abstract single
self,

and thus

dialectical

it would seem that at the outset of this

authorship

two

things

seem

to

be

occupying

Kierkegaard.
On the one hand, he wants to present what is going to
form the central focus for his work as an author, namely the
single self as it emerges most ideally within the various
spheres of existence. It would be described in such a way as
to appear either detrimental or beneficial to its spiritual
health,

but

without

the

clutter

41

that

a

social

context

See the chapter titled "The Expectation of Faith" in
Edifying Discourses, in passim. Note that in all the latest
scholarship, including the new translations, the Danish word
used so much by Kierkegaard to characterize the "right" form
of love (see chapter five}: opbyggende, which Walter Lowrie
translated as "edifying," is now generally agreed upon should
be translated as "upbuilding." However, because the new
"Kierkegaard Writings" have not yet been completed, the reader
must still rely on Lowrie's translation.
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necessarily generates. Thus within these early writings the
reader is only exposed to the internal impulses this single
self must overcome if it is to achieve what Kierkegaard refers
to as

inwardness. 42 On the other hand,

that something

is

missing is not lost on Kierkegaard.

In a journal note from

184 7,

of

the

year

of

the

publication

Works

of

Love,

he

chastises his readers because they have not understood the
meaning of his "maieutic prudence" designed to advance slowly
so as not to reveal how much he is aware of, not to reveal
what is to follow.
On the occasion of my new upbuilding discourses
there will probably be cries about that I do not
know what the next is to be, do not know about
sociality. Those fools!
On the other hand, I owe
to myself before God to confess, that there in some
sense is some truth in it, only not as people
understand it, namely that it constantly, when first
I have quite clearly and sharply drawn up the one
side, then the other side stands out so much
stronger.
Now I have the theme for the next book. It will
be called:
Works of Love. 43

It

is,

then,

only

in

the

later

writings,

and

42

This
is where
the
reader
is
introduced
to
Kierkegaard's renowned concept of despair that takes a
different form in each sphere of existence. Note, however,
that this category is not worked through properly until the
later literature, in other words, not until the social aspect
of the individual's experience has been included. See The
Sickness Unto Death, in passim, where Kierkegaard gives this
concept its final comprehensive formulation.
43

PAP VIII 1 A 4. Note that Kierkegaard in the Danish
has a different spelling than throughout Works of Love of the
word translated as love: Kjrerligheden. It is closer to the
modern spelling of that word which simply eliminates the "j".
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especially in Works of Love and Two Ages, where the social
context is included,

that the reader is introduced to the

imposition of the reductionism of the collective idea in its
historical manifestation, and is introduced to the qualifying
or

authenticating

need

(N0dvendighed)

of

the

"idea

of

community" expressed in loving one's neighbor as oneself. Only
then does Kierkegaard reveal all the external measures that
manifest themselves internally, measures which the single self
must incorporate into the economy of its life in its quest for
existential authenticity.
In every one of the pseudonymous works, in one way
or another, this about 'the single self' appears;
but there the single self is that aesthetically
qualified in a preeminent sense, the excellent, etc.
In every one of the upbuilding writings, and as
officially as possible, this about 'the single self'
appears; but there the single self is what every
human being is or can be. The point of departure
for
the
pseudonyms
is
precisely
in
the
differentiation between human beings [menneske og
menneske]
in terms of
intellect,
cultivation
[dannelse) etc; the point of departure for the
upbuilding discourses is in the upbuilding, and
consequently in the universally human. But this
double meaning is precisely the dialectic of 'the
single self.' 'The single self' can signify the only
one among all, and 'the single self' can signify
everyone (SV 18,159-60; POV, 124).
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CHAPTER I
A PROBLEM OF MODERNITY:
THE SEPARATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE

. . . I cannot understand how you can talk so cotdly
and so calmly about what affects me so deeply.
I wonder if my gaze is not turned away from what is
important by letting myself begin with physiology,
instead of as~uming the whole of physiology and
saying: Begin.

S0ren Kierkegaard is one of the first serious thinkers
to address what he considers the primary problem of modern
thought,

a problem he believes has permeated all realms of

human experience be they theoretical or practical. In view of
the perceived seriousness of this problem, Kierkegaard found
it necessary to introduce a radical rewriting of the most
cherished

tenets

of

the

modern

experience,

freedom

and

equality. He realized that he could not mitigate the problem
unless he addressed what was most fundamental to the human
condition in the present age.

1

Thus it is not a

rewriting

S0ren Kierkegaards Papirer, ed. P.A. Heiberg og v. Kuhr
(K0benhavn: Gyldendal, 1915), VII 1 A 182, p. 118 (S0ren
Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, ed. and tr. Howard v. and
Edna H. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978,
#2807). Hereafter known as PAP followed by volume and number
and (JP followed by number}.
2 Ibid, p. 119.

grounded

in

subjective

arbitrariness

nor

in

religious

enthusiasm. Kierkegaard's concern lies with the health of the
consciousness of the single

self

(den

believed had been severely threatened

Enkelte) 3 which he
in the modern age.

However, in order to fully appreciate the radical nature of
Kierkegaard's theory of freedom and equality, what will here
be referred to as his "corrective," it becomes necessary to
understand the underlying assumptions
modernity

and

the

consequent

for his critique of

symptomatic

effects

of

the

imputed problem. 4

I:1

The underlying assumptions for Kierkegaard's critique of
modernity had their origin in the fundamental separation of
knowledge and human experience, a separation which Kierkegaard
believed,
natural

occurred as a result of the emergence of modern

science and philosophy's adoptation of

methodology. 5

He

argues

this

separation

ensued

scientific
from

the

rejection of classical philosophy's teleological approach to
questions

of

being.

Classical

philosophy

presupposed

an

3 For more on Kierkegaard's category of the single self
and our choice of translation see Introduction, p. iv, note
5.
4

These symptomatic effects as they express themselves
theoretically and practically will be dealt with in chapters
II and III respectively.
5 See especially PAP VII 1 A 182-215 (JP 2807-2820) and
SV 10,46-51; CUP, 307-312.
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ordered whole that could be consciously known and experienced,
creating for the single self a place in the world that would
fundamentally shape the framework of his thought and thus make
human

existence

directed

and

purposeful.

This

holistic

approach was replaced by modernity's rigorous application of
scientific methodology to all epistemological inquiry and with
an exclusive focus on natural measurable objects. 6
In our time it is the natural sciences which are
especially dangerous. Physiology 7 will ultimately
extend itself to the point that it embraces ethics.
There are already sufficient clues of a new
endeavor: to treat ethics as physics, whereby all
of the ethical becomes an illusion, and the ethical
in the race is treated statistically by averages or
is calculated as one calculates vibrations in laws
of nature. 8
Ethical and religious categories were excluded from modern
philosophical

analysis,

signifying

secularization of consciousness. 9

for

Kierkegaard

a

This transformation of the

6 The unfinished and during his own lifetime unpublished
Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est (JC) by
Johannes Climacus illuminates Kierkegaard's understanding of
the shift that philosophy underwent as a result of Descartes'
adaptation of the scientific approach to rational inquiry.
7

By "physiology" Kierkegaard means biology and the
doctrine of evolution (udviklingsl~re) according to Gregor
11
Malantschuk,
s0ren Kierkegaard og Naturvidenskaberne,"
Kristligt Dagblad (October 22, 1951). Malantschuk appears to
be a little ahead of himself since Darwin did not publish The
Origin of Species until 1859, and hence Kierkegaard could not
have known the doctrine of evolution.
8 PAP VII 1 A 182 (JP 2807).
9

"When the rich man drives with lights on his carriage
in the dark night, he sees a small area better than the poor
who drives in the dark -- but neither does he see the stars;
precisely the lights prevent that.
Just so with all
secularized understanding (Forstandighed); it sees well close
41

h0W and what of philosophical inquiry led him to fear that
all inquiry into the good, and hence questions of essential
human experience, would lose their transcendent ground and
instead

be

mathematized

and

answer

only

to

material

efficient causes, as if they were laws of nature. 10

and

That is

to say, the scientific method's insistence upon objectivity
had resulted

in a

disinterestedness

fundamental
which

aesthetic

Kierkegaard

and

intellectual

interpreted

as

"an

expression for indifference to reality" (SV 10,24; CUP, 282).
Inasmuch as Kierkegaard's philosophical anthropology 11
implied an eternal quality to which the ethical dimension of
existence responds, the separation of knowledge and experience
meant that the potentiality,
language,

"the possibility"

or to use Kierkegaard's

own

(Muligheden) of essential human

experience was no longer the aim of philosophical inquiry.
Everywhere it is decisively concluded that thinking
is the ultimate; science moves farther and farther

up, but is deprived of the infinite view." PAP VII 1 A 234 (JP
2289).
1

°

Compare Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, tr. David Carr
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 9, where
he explains how the new science dropped all metaphysical
questions, and further on pp. 22-3, where he suggests modern
natural science produced an altogether
"new idea of
mathematical natural science" that transformed the general
idea of philosophy.
11

See chapter four, note 65 for Reidar Thompte's
"Historical Introduction" to The Concept of Anxiety, p. xiv,
on how we are to understand Kierkegaard's concept of
philosophical anthropology.
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away from the primitive impressions of Existents. 12
There is nothing to experience, nothing to learn,
everything is completed and the task of speculation
is now to rubricate, classify, and methodically
arrange the particular conceptualization of thought.
one does not love, does not believe, does not act,
but one knows what erotic love (Elskov) 13 is, what
faith is, and now the only question is about their
place in the system: in the same way the domino
player has his pieces lying before him and the game
consists in putting them together (SV 10,46; CUP,
307-08).
That is to say, the scientific approach could not pursue the
metaphysical categories essential to human experience,

and

12

Ordinarily Kierkegaard would use the Danish word
Tilv~relse for existence. Here he is eager to emphasize the
special meaning he brings to his particular conception of
existence, a meaning spelled out in the Postscript, but which,
according to Climacus, has its origin in Plato's Symposium.
"Existents itself, to exist as such, is striving and is
equally as pathetic as it is comic. It is pathetic because
striving is infinite, that is, it is directed toward the
infinite, is the actualization of infinitude which is the
ultimate form of pathos; it is comic because striving is
inherently a self-contradiction.
This quality of
Existents recalls the Greek conception of Eros as found in the
Symposium [ 2 03bff] [where] . . . erotic love (Elskov) here
means unconcealed Existents or that by which life is in its
totality, the life which is a synthesis of the infinite and
the finite. Poverty and wealth, according to Plato, begat Eros
whose nature is created from both. But what is Existents? It
is that child begat of the infinite and the finite, the
eternal and the temporal, and therefore is continuously
striving.
This was
Socrates'
meaning:
therefore
love
(Kjerlighed) is continuously striving, that is, the thinking
subject is existing. It is only systematists and the objective
philosophers who have ceased to be human beings and have
become speculative philosophy which belongs in the realm of
pure being (SV 9,79-80; CUP, 84-5). See also sv 20,66-7 where
Jens Himmelstrup elaborates on Kierkegaard's use of the word
"Existents."
13

Climacus differentiates between erotic love (Elskov)
and love (Kjerlighed) as in love of neighbor (see note above).
This differentiation becomes very important in chapters IV and
V where it will be shown that Kierkegaard's "corrective" is
fundamentally grounded in the latter conception of love.
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hence could render no meaningful explanations of the most
important dimension of human existence: the striving embodied
in the movement from possibility to actuality.
Although Kierkegaard is addressing the problem of the
natural sciences,

"the conflict with the objections of the

natural sciences and the struggle in this regard will .
be analogical to the conflict with the system. 1114 Natural
science could not incorporate this intentional movement on a
concrete

level,

that

is,

in

individual

human

existence.

Kierkegaard is addressing the Hegelian system which was the
major focus of his attack on speculative philosophy as it
manifested itself in the guise

(method)

of modern natural

science (something that will become clear in the present as
well as in the following chapter) . 15 In other words, knowledge
has become its own end,
could

bring

14

to

this

and the more dexterity scholarship

gathering

of

information,

the

more

PAP X 5 A 73 (JP 2823).

15

In referring to Hegelian systematic philosophy, which
Kierkegaard believes took its cue from Cartesian rationalism
(see JC in passim), his sardonic irony comes to the fore: "The
objective tendency (which proposes to make everyone an
observer and in its maximum into such an observer that he like
a ghost is scarcely to be distinguished from the monstrous
spirit of past eras) naturally refuses to hear anything and
to know anything except what stands in relation to itself (SV
9,110; CUP, 118). This extravagance of speculative philosophy
has also been captured by Husserl, Op. Cit. pp. 8-9: "In a
bold,
even extravagant,
elevation of the meaning of
universality, begun by Descartes, this new philosophy seeks
nothing less than to encompass, in the unity of a theoretical
system, all meaningful questions in a rigorous scientific
manner, with an apodictically intelligible methodology, in an
unending but rationally ordered progress of inquiry."
44

knowledge became removed from what mattered in life,

what

Kierkegaard refers to as essential experience. 16
"The subjective thinker is not a scientist, he is
an artist. To exist is an art. The subjective
thinker is aesthetic enough to give his life
aesthetic content, ethical enough to regulate it,
dialectical enough to thoughtfully govern it" (SV
10,52; CUP, 314).
This means the subjective thinker is a person of reason,

a

reason which governs the other traits.

I:2
Kierkegaard's intentional philosophy derives mainly from
Aristotle. 17 According to Aristotle,
into

the

nature

of

things

required

philosophical
both

inquiry

knowledge

and

16

"That essential knowledge essentially relates itself
to existence -- does not mean . . . that knowledge relates to
something existing as its object, but means that knowledge
relates itself to the knower, who is essentially an existing
being and that for this reason all essential knowledge is
essentially related to Existents, to existing as such. Only
ethical and ethico-religious knowledge is therefore essential
knowledge. But all ethical and all ethico-religious knowledge
is essentially related to the fact that the knower exists (SV
9,164-65; CUP, 177). See also SV 9,126-27; CUP, 135-36; SV
9,173; CUP, 185; and again PAP XI 2 A 191 (JP 2303):
"[M]athematical,
historical learning,
and so on,
[are
intellectual disciplines) which are not related to what kind
of life one lives,
to character." For a
contrasting
interpretation of Hegel's "system," see Hans-Georg Gadamer,
Reason in the Age of Science, tr. Frederick G. Lawrence
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1981), pp. 36-7.
17

"[When Aristotle) already has said that the transition
from possibility to actuality is a kinesis, then he is not
talking about the logical possibility and actuality but about
that of freedom, and therefore he correctly posits the
movement." PAP IV B 117, p. 290. Also PAP IV C 47 and SV
10,45; CUP, 306.
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.

exper1ence.

18

Without

experience

human

beings

would

be

determined by fate unable to explain or adequately apply in
a practical sense the data of their cognitive insigh_t. The
philosopher is compelled to establish the truth of things by
theoretical investigation, 19 and only by reflecting on that
experience

would

principles. 20

there

be

an

awareness

of

universal

Only by applying both knowledge and experience

could one hope to answer the What and Why of the world and
thus discover its meaning.
18

Metaphysics 981a, tr. taken from A.E. Taylor Aristotle
on His Predecessors {La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing
company, 1969): "· . . the human species lives also by the
guidance of rules of art and reflective inferences .
. [S]cience and art in man are a product of experience. For
'experience has created art,' as Polus correctly remarks, 'but
inexperience chance.' .
. Now, for purposes of practice
experience is recognized to be not inferior to art; indeed,
we observe that persons of experience are actually more
successful than those who possess theory without experience.
The reason of this is that experience is acquaintance with
individual facts, but art with general rules, and all action
and production is concerned with the individual. Thus the
physician does not cure man, except in an accidental sense,
but Callias or Socrates or some other individual person of
whom it is an accident to be a man. Hence, if one possesses
the theory without the experience, and is acquainted with the
universal concept, but not with the individual fact contained
under it, he will often go wrong in his treatment; for what
has to be treated is the individual."
To "possess theory without experience" in this sense is a
serious problem in the present age according to Kierkegaard.
He uses the connection between knowledge and experience
differently than Aristotle's example shows only to the degree
that his individual, unlike Aristotle's physician, is not
acting upon somebody else, but on himself.
19

Metaphysics,
tr. Richard Hope
{Ann
University of Michigan Press, 1952), 997a13.
20

Arbor:

The

·
·
·
A.E. Taylor, Ar1stotle
(New York: Dover Publ1cat1ons,
Inc., 1955), p. 37.
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Aristotle's point, according to Werner Jaeger, is that
only when,

for example, politics "is studied on scientific

principles

and

regarded

as

a

normative

discipline,"

can

knowledge "give the statesman insight into the ultimate norms
in accordance with which he must direct his activity. 1121 This
kind of move from theoretical insight to practical application
is embodied in Aristotle's understanding of the nature of
philosophy as teleological, meaning "(t]he very art or applied
science and every . . . action and choice seem to aim at some
good. 1122 That is to say everything comes into being for the
sake of an end.
always

appears

In Jaeger's words,
as

the

final

"an end is that which

result

of

a

development,

in

accordance with natural law and by a continuous process, and
in which the

process attains

its

completion. 1123

In other

words, classical philosophy conducted its epistemological and
ontological

inquiries

precisely

in

order

to

allow

participation in being making human existence directed and
purposeful.

21

Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His
Development, tr. Richard Robinson (London: Oxford University
Press, 1948), pp. 76-7.
22

Nicomachean Ethics, tr. Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1962), 1094a.
23 Jaeger,

Op. Cit. p. 75.
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J:3

with the scientific and philosophical revolution of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, a quantitative
equivalence of all changes in nature had emerged which denied
in its most
physical

negative aspect

dimension

the possibility of

intervening

in

the

course

of

any

non-

physical

events. Rather than engaging in discoveries that would make
the universe meaningful in human terms, modern natural science
concentrated

its

efforts

on

explaining the

efficient and

material causes underlying the phenomena of nature without
concern for the practical aspects of life (SV 10,24; CUP, 28283)

It meant that the act of thinking changed as did the

.24

way of life for the single self. Not only was the contingency
of its existence revealed, but as Karl Lowith has commented,
it also implied a denaturing of human life. 25 This single self
also

became

separated

from

his

world,

a

world

that

was

characterized "as a relatively insignificant background of
man's forlorn existence. " 26

It was

a

world situated in a

24

As Hannah Arendt has so aptly commented in Between
Past and Future (New York: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 57:
"Emphasis shifted from interest in things to interest in
processes, of which things were soon to become almost
accidental by-products." Compare Hans Jonas, "Seventeenth
Century and After: The Meaning of the Scientific and
Technological Revolution," Philosophical Essays (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 47.
25

Nature. History. and Existentialism
Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 24.
26

b'd pp. 27, 103.
LL,
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(Evanston,

IL:

seemingly infinite universe "that is the farthest removed from
immediate existential concern of a self with itself, 1127 and
subject

only

discovered.

to

certain

In these,

laws

human

that

beings

could
could

be

cognitively

not

participate

inasmuch as these laws rendered no universal categories for
what Kierkegaard has defined as essential experience,

and

consequently

the

the

single

self

was

utterly

lost

in

contingency of that world.
I am at the end of my rope. I am nauseated by life,
it is insipid without salt and meaning.
. One
sticks a finger into the ground to smell what
country one is in; I stick my finger into existence
-- it smells of nothing. Where am I? What does it
mean: the world?
What does this word mean?
Who
tricked me into this whole thing and now leaves me
standing there? Who am I? How did I get into the
world; why was I not asked, why was I not informed
of the rules and regulations, but thrust into the
ranks as if I was bought from a peddling shanghaier
of human beings?
How did I get involved in this
big enterprise called reality?
Why should I be
interested? Is it not a matter of free choice? And
if I am compelled to be interested, where is the
conductor, I have something to say about this (SV
5,171; R, 200).
It

is this circumstance that prompts Kierkegaard to call

natural science sophistical and the scientist a sophist, 28
27

Ibid, p. 102.

28

PAP VII 1 A 195 (JP 2815); PAP VII 1 A 196 (JP 2816);
PAP VII 1 A 199 (JP 2819); and PAP VII 1 A 185 (JP 2295).
Malantschuk in Kristligt Dagblad reminds the reader that
Kierkegaard's critical stance toward the natural sciences were
at his own time difficult to comprehend in view of the general
and often blinding enthusiasm over scientific progress. Today
his stance, although embraced by many, would to some degree
also be misplaced inasmuch as we have come to understand that
scientific knowledge is not as radically separated from the
knower's mind as was thought in Kierkegaard's time and indeed
up to very recently. See, for example, Michael Polanyi,
49

precisely

because

the

relationship

between

science

and

philosophy had become confused.
The confusion lies in the fact that it never becomes
dialectically clear which is which, how philosophy
is to use natural science. Is the whole thing an
ingenious metaphor (then one might as well be
ignorant of it), is it an example, an analogy, or
is it of such importance that theory must be revised
in relation to it? 29
The consequences for the single self would be detrimental,
Kierkegaard laments,

inasmuch as he believes that knowledge

affects the knower's mind, 30 and the knower is essentially
interested.
objectivity

Scientific methodology,
and

hence

in

contrast,

disinterestedness,

as

requires
when

II

a

physiologist counts the pulse-beat and studies the nervous
system (which] has no relation to ethical enthusiasm. 1131
Personal Knowledge (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1958 and 1962), esp. pp. 299-324; and Stephen Toulmin, "The
Construal of Reality: Criticism in Modern and Postmodern
Science," The Politics of Interpretation, ed. W.J.T. Mitchell
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 112. See
also note 79 this chapter.
29

PAP VII 1 A 200 (JP 2820). For somewhat parallel
arguments see Hans Jonas, pp. 47, 66; Eric Voegelin, "The
Origins of Scientism," Social Research 15 (1948), pp. 470-72;
and Husserl, Op. Cit. p. 61.
30

"All knowledge has something captivating about it,
but, on the other hand, it also alters the entire state of the
knower's psyche." PAP VII 1 A 182 (JP 2807). See also note 15
this chapter.
31

PAP VII 1 A 182 (JP 2807). In the margin to this
journal notation Kierkegaard has added: "Scientific admiration
of nature's ingenuity in the human physiology is entirely
heterogeneous, indeed is heresy in relation to the ethical
which has nothing to do with admiration but only with this:
You shall." PAP VII 1 A 183 (JP 2808). These (two) quotations
are crucial to a partial demonstration of what Kierkegaard
identifies as the modern pathology of consciousness and the
50

The scientific preoccupation with the configuration of
the

universe

or

newly

discovered

biological

structures

strictly for the sake of information gathering rendered what
Kierkegaard calls essential human experience nonessential. 32
The demand for objectivity, which required disinterestedness
and

impersonal

analysis,

had

produced

an

investigator

attaining knowledge of the world, but acquiring little,

if

any, self-knowledge. 33 This mechanical approach to a study of
the universe had necessarily eliminated or so transmuted the
ethical dimension that questions about the good are rendered

consequent need for a "corrective." Malantschuk, Op. Cit.
explains Kierkegaard's objection to the scientific approach
vividly: "Kierkegaard finds that what is most comical are the
materialist biologists: first they kill the spirit, that is,
they acknowledge only the lifeless, the material as the
foundational, and out of this dead stuff they then believe
they can derive an explanation of life and all its variety.
The material apprehension, according to Kierkegaard, has to
do with 'that by killing one believes to have found the spirit
that animates it.'"
32

For parallel interpretations see,
for example,
Alexandre Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite
Universe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1957), p. 2; E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of
Modern Science (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press,
1952), pp. 89-90; A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World
(New York: The Free Press, 1925 and 1953), p. 30; and Hannah
Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 261ff.
33

PAP VII 1 A 200 (JP 2820). Compare to Husserl who in
his "Vienna Lectures," Op. Cit., p. 295, stated: "Someone who
is raised on natural science takes it for granted that
everything merely subjective must be excluded and that the
natural scientific method, exhibiting itself in subjective
manners of representation, determines objectivity. Thus he
seeks what is objectively true even for the psychic." See also
pp. 56-7.
51

insignificant and even irrelevant, erecting an insurmountable
chasm between fact and value. Kierkegaard refers directly to
this chasm when he tries to explain the consequences of the
scientific approach that has either engaged in hypocrisy by
insisting that natural science will lead to God, 34 or has
altogether set God aside leaving questions of good and bad to
be decided "en masse." Thus he argues that neither moral nor
religious

judgments can be settled by human consensus

( SV

15,172; SUD, 123-24 and SV 18,155; POV, 114) . 35 As Paul Holmer

comments,

for

Kierkegaard

philosophers

had

forgotten

the

meaning of existence; the familiar had escaped them. 36
34

PAP VII 1 A 186 (JP 2809). It is surprising that
Kierkegaard
in
this
regard
nowhere
comments
on
his
contemporary H.C. 0rsted, the discoverer of electro-magnetism,
except to react negatively to a positive account of his book
Aanden i Naturen (K0benhavn: Vintens Forlag, 1978), in the
newspaper Berlingske Tidende, K0benhavn (Dec. 28, 1849).
Kierkegaard's remark is little else than an ill tempered
generalization when he notes: "·
. the whole book is from
first to last, scientifically, that is, philosophically
scientifically, insignificant." PAP X 2 A 302. 0rsted's book
sets out to elucidate the relationship between faith and
science. The chapter titled "Videnskabsdyrkningen, betragtet
som Religionsud¢velse" (The Cultivation of Science viewed as
Religious Exercise), p. 146, is especially revealing: "The
constant in nature comes from the eternally independent; the
utterings on life from him who is life itself, the coherence
and harmony of the whole from the one perfect wisdom."
35

For parallel interpretations see Leo Strauss, Natural
Right and History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1953), pp. 8 and 35-80; Koyre, Op. Cit. pp. 2, 100-01, 105;
Burtt, Op. Cit. p. 303; and Whitehead, Op. Cit. p. 142.
36

"Kierkegaard and Philosophy," New Themes in Christian
Philosophy, ed. Ralph M. Mcinerny (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1968), p. 17. See also p. 33 for Holmer's
interpretation of Kierkegaard's charge that modern philosophy
is fearful of knowledge which cannot be categorized and
systematized
and
therefore
is
placed
outside
of
52

By eliminating questions about the good, the two distinct
realms

of

human

conflated,

experience

positing

worldly

had

become

values

as

confused,

indeed

authoritative.

The

language of the spiritual realm as Kierkegaard recognized it,
had

been

transmuted

expectations

(processes)

rejection of a
single

self

by

the

secular

implying

for

world's

Kierkegaard

material
a

clear

genuine dialectical life and rendering the
unconnected

and

therefore

scientific

approach

confused

and

unfulfilled.

I:4
That

the

also

opposed

Christian

teaching's emphasis on the importance of the existence of the
single self, the essence of which was rooted in an empirically
unverifiable

soul,

only

aggravated

the

problem

from

Kierkegaard's perspective. In this mechanized view of nature
man was reduced to an observer by which Kierkegaard meant an
"outsider" (Trediemand), a spectator (Tilskuer), someone who
stood at the margin of all essential relationships (SV 14,73;

epistemological concerns. Compare to Leo Strauss, "The Three
Waves of Modernity," Political Philosophy: Six Essays by Leo
Strauss, ed. Hilail Gildin (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 81-2: "The crisis . . . of modernity
reveals itself in the fact . . . that modern western man no
longer knows what he wants -- that he no longer believes that
he can know what is good and bad, what is right and wrong . .
• . The crisis of modernity is, then, primarily the crisis of
modern political philosophy."
53

37
TA, 202).

The

active

moral

agent

so

elementary

to

classical

philosophy and Christian teaching had been replaceq. by a
11totali ty"

( SV 9, 4 7;

CUP,

50)

made up of an aggregate of

individuals about whom it was assumed, as a matter of course,
that they were Christians. As Johannes Climacus 38 explains the
Hegelian speculative viewpoint, "the philosopher contemplates
Christianity
speculative

for

the

thought;

sake
aye,

of
with

interpreting
his

it

genuinely

with

his

speculative

thought" (SV 9,48; CUP, 51).
But, Anti-Climacus responds, truth, as Christ argued, is
like a food,

it is a matter of "appropriating" (tilegne) it

through "eating" (spise), not through lectures that leave the
impression

"truth

is

understanding."

Hence

"Christianly

understood, the truth consists not in knowing the truth but
in

being

the

truth"

(SV

16,193;

TC,

201-02).

Therefore

Christianity cannot be taught as such.
The aim of teaching
cognitively.

The

end

particular lifestyle.

of

is a

result,

believing

is

In other words,

learning something
a

way

of

life,

a

the Christian single

37

As E.A. Burtt, Op. cit. p. 90, has so poignantly
expressed this problem: "[M)an is hardly more than a bundle
of secondary qualities (as he) . . . begins to appear for the
first time in the history of thought as an irrelevant
spectator and insignificant effect of the great mathematical
system which is the substance of reality."
38

For more on this pseudonym see Introduction, p. xxix,
note 30.
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self had become obj ecti vi zed,

and this happened precisely

because speculative philosophy had posited Christianity as an
historical phenomenon in the development of consciousness of
freedom (SV 9,46-52; CUP, 49-55; and SV 16,207; TC, 216). 39
By positing Christianity as an historical phenomenon, it
is assumed that its truth

is cognitively revealed as the

eternal truth, meaning the problem of its truth is removed.
To remove

the problem of

Christianity

dialectic of human experience,

is

and hence

to

obviate the

in Kierkegaard's

opinion to deny human nature proper. Climacus summarizes the
distinction
viewpoints

between
in

a

the

terse

scientific

statement

in

and
the

the

Christian

Postscript:

"The

difference is merely this, that [modern natural] science will
teach that the way is to become objective, while Christianity
teaches that the way is to become subjective, i.e. to become
a subject in truth" (SV 9,109; CUP, 117) . 40 To make his point
39

Here Anti-Climacus engages in an appropriate and most
interesting discussion about the difference between truth and
truth and hence the confusion between Christianity and the
triumphant church. He suggests that Christianity has been
viewed as truth in terms of the result rather than viewing it
as truth in terms of "the way'' (Veien) (SV 16,194; TC, 202}.
However, a detailed analysis of this discussion is beyond the
scope of this project.
4

o Also PAP VII 1 A 196 (JP 2816}; PAP VII 1 A 182 (JP
2807}; PAP VI B 40:5 (JP 2286); and PAP VII 1 A 34 (JP 2292}.
It should be noted that Kierkegaard does not deny the value
of the natural sciences. Indeed, he concedes with undeniable
hubris he was quite inspired by the possibilities they
provided. But he was more interested in the questions of
existence: "By virtue of reason and freedom, life has always
interested me most, and it has always been my desire to
clarify and solve the riddle of life." Kierkegaard: Letters
and Documents, tr. Henrik Rosenrneier, ed. Howard v. and Edna

55

climacus engages in a linguistic quip that loses little in
translation:

"The

guidance

of

science

is

misguidance"

(Videnskabens Veiledning er Vildledelse).
Kierkegaard's fear is that the thinker has been left to
oscillate with all the results his talents and instincts have
provided him about the universe. This undialectical pursuit
does not render him certainty of spirit, it does not allow him
to "become transparent to himself in the decisiveness of the
spirit, in the ethical appropriation of his talents," 41 and so
he ends up understanding the world, but not himself. 42 And if
he

does

not

Kierkegaard

understand
concludes,

himself
his

in

this

existence

Socratic
is

sense,

essentially

meaningless.
To the extent that there is a sort of unconscious
life in such a person's knowledge, the sciences may
be said to demand his life, but to the extent that
there is not, his activity is comparable to that of
the person who nourishes the earth by the decay of

H. Hong, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 45.
Hereafter known as Letters.
41

By "the ethical appropriation of his talents"
Kierkegaard means something very close to what Charles Taylor
in his seminal work Sources of the Self (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 18 and 28, has called a
framework, an orientation in moral space toward the good.
"Framework is that in virtue of which we make sense of our
lives spiritually. Not to have a framework is to fall into a
life which is spiritually senseless."
42 PAP VII 1 A 200 (JP 2820).

In the margin Kierkegaard
added a further notation of his skepticism at the thought of
such a person living "happily in this way without feeling any
misgivings because the deceptive variety of observations and
discoveries continuously conceals the total unclarity."
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her dead body." 43
By

removing

experience

from

"essential

knowing"

(ya:!sentlig erkjenden) , an awareness of an intentional movement
in

the

human

condition

has

also

been

eliminated.

The

implication is that becoming fully human only demands what
the world wants (SV 12,251; WL,

244).

It also suggests the

scientific method has been successful, but as Paul Feyerabend

43

Letters, p. 44. Compare Paul Feyerabend, Farewell to
Reason (London: Verso, 1987), p. 4: "The imposition of . . .
'objective'
information
detached
from
[existential]
preferences and problems emptied existence of its epistemic
ingredients and made it barren and meaningless." And again on
p. 5: "To say that a procedure or a point of view is
objective(ly true) is to claim that it is valid irrespective
of human expectations, ideas, attitudes, wishes." But as he
also and most appropriately reminds the reader, "Rationalism
did not introduce order and wisdom where before there was
chaos and ignorance; it introduced a special kind of order,
established by special procedures and different from the order
and the procedures of historical traditions." (p. 118) .
. "Philosophy is the domain of thought and thought seems to
be objective and independent of styles, impressions, feelings .
. . . This is itself a philosophical theory. There are other
views, such as that of Kierkegaard, who also asserts that
thought receives content by being connected with a thinker,
is essentially subjective and is incapable of producing
'results' -- that is, permanent and unchanging signposts for
an evaluation of the evanescent opinions of humanity. While
objective thought, writes Kierkegaard [Climacus], translates
everything into results and helps all mankind to cheat, by
copying these off and reciting them by rote, subjective
thought puts everything in process and omits the results;
partly because this belongs to him who has the way and partly
because as an existing individual he is constantly in process
of coming to be, which holds true of every human being who
has not permitted himself to be deceived into becoming
objective, inhumanly identifying himself with speculative
philosophy in the abstract.'' (p. 153). Cf. SV 9,63; CUP, 68.
For more on the problem of the scientific method's demand for
results see Stephen Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom:
Hegel vs Kierkegaard on Faith and History (Chambersburg, PA:
American Academy of Religion, 1972), pp. 61-2; and for more
on Climacus' objections, see sv 9,117-37; CUP, 126-47.
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cautions, "this success is in part a result of a historical
path of least resistance.
under

these

1144

circumstances

However, a deepening of the self
would

be

neither

possible

nor

required (SV 12,223; WL, 217). But a deepening of the self is
precisely what Kierkegaard's

intentional philosophy allows

for.
Kierkegaard operates with two conceptions of intentional
existence,

one that posits an absolute

end that

requires

existence to express "a pathetic relationship to an eternal
happiness," and thus "involves a volitional concentration in
the highest sense," and one that posits relative ends. Even
the latter, Climacus argues, in itself could transform human
existence,

at

least

partially,

except

that

modernity has

become so preoccupied with "thinking about everything,

we

rarely see an existence that devotes itself energetically even
to a relative end."
The point of relative ends is that they are willed for
the sake of other ends, while the absolute end "must be willed
for its own sake" (SV 10,87-8; CUP, 352-53). This would mean
that the decisive criterion for relating absolutely to the
absolute would be that "one is willing to give up the relative
whenever the relative conflicts with the absolute." As C.
Stephen Evans goes on to say, for Climacus this is a universal
argument

44

and

"is

valid

even

if

someone

understands

the

Farewell to Reason (London: Verso, 1987), p. 157n5.
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absolute end differently than he does. This state of being
willing to give up any and every finite good for the sake of
the infinite Climacus calls resignation.

1145

Climacus' language of resignation and its differentiation
from suffering which, according to Evans, is "the condition
of

the

individual

condition

but

misunderstood

self who

has
to

not
mean

is

fully
a

attempting

to

realize

his

so I

1146

has

often

been

from

the

world.

done

withdrawal

But

climacus is very clear on this point.
It is the absolute telos for the one willing, who
wants to strive absolutely.
. [T]he pathetic
lies in existentially (existerende] expressing this
in Existents; the pathetic lies not in witnessing
about an eternal happiness, but in transforming
one's own Existents into a testimony about it (SV
10,88; CUP, 353 emphasis added).
Climacus has three Socratic moments in mind here.
First:
(Kjerlighed),

what

he

which

calls
is

the

Socratic

constantly

to

meaning

strive,

of

a

love

subject

discussed above (SV 9,80; CUP, 85) . 47
Second:

the

Socratic

meaning

of

the

problem

of

immortality: "But Socrates! He puts the question objectively
in a problematic manner: if there is an immortality. .

On

this "if" he stakes his whole life, he dares to die, and he

45

Kierkegaard's 'Fragments' and 'Postscript': The
Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus (Atlantic Highlands,
NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1983), pp. 163-64.
46

Ibid.

47

See also note 11 this chapter.
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has so arranged the pattern of his life that it must be found
acceptable -- if there is an immortality" (SV 9,168; CUP 180).
climacus concludes,

"the Socratic uncertainty was thus an

expression of the fact that the eternal truth is related to
an existing individual self, and hence must remain a paradox
to him as long as he exists" (Ibid) . 48
Third:

what

he

characterizes

as

the

"infinitely

meritorious of the Socratic position (which] was precisely to
accentuate that the knower is existing, and that to exist is
the essential" (SV 9,173; CUP, 185). This means to appropriate
into one's life what one knows, requiring what one knows is
meaningful

to

existence.

To

strive

for

the

absolute

end

absolutely is meaningful. This end is not meant to be achieved
-- the paradox of striving -- for in that case it would be a
finite end.
The

point

Kierkegaard

is

trying

to

advance

in

the

language of Climacus is that the striving takes place in this
world,

is expressed in this world. 49 As this project will

argue,

this is precisely the form of the "corrective" the

content of which, as will become clear, is "You shall love the

48 The translation of this latter part of the quotation

is from Hannah Arendt, "What is Existenz Philosophy?" Partisan
Review 13 (1946), p. 43.
49

"If the rights of knowledge are to have their due, one
must venture out into life, out upon the sea, and raise one's
scream in hopes that God will hear, not stand on the beach and
see the others struggle and strive -- only then does knowledge
acquire its true official registration." PAP III A 145 (JP
2279).

60

neighbor as yourself." For Kierkegaard, then, to love God or
to 1ove the good is expressed by loving the other, a thisworldly act of consciousness which indeed is what is meant by
Existents. 50

In other words, the solution to the problem of

the contingency of human existence is to be found in our own
experience, not outside of it, and the proof of its worth lies
not in theoretical exegesis but in "practical activity." 51
By positing a requirement for a dialectical existence
that

appeals

both to

absolute

as

well

as

relative

ends,

Kierkegaard has posited a standard, or as Leo Strauss would
put

it,

"a

solid

basis

of

all

efforts

to

transcend

the

actual." 52 By not providing a standard, any hope of improving
the lot of humanity would appear to be superfluous. This seems
especially true in an age where the dominant political theory
appeals to

the reductive view that denounces all qualitative

distinctions in a celebration of the lowest common denominator
of human characteristics and provides only minimalist rules

so The "corrective" will be dealt with in chapters IV and
V.
51

Arnold Ljungdal, Problemet S0ren Kierkegaard, tr. Ina
Rhode (K0benhavn: Stig Vendelk~rs Forlag, 1964), p. 60.
52

Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 15. Strauss
might object to Climacus' standard being considered a "solid
basis" inasmuch as he is thinking of what is best by nature
and would most likely consider Climacus' standard dogmatic
(Ibid, pp. 320-21). Nevertheless, insofar as Strauss himself
considers Locke's adaptation of di vine law from the New
Testament to have both relevatory and rational validity (Ibid,
pp. 204-05), and what is best by nature is something we can
know as rational beings, the comparison does not seem out of
hand.
61

that

allow

accentuated.

those
53

lowest

human

characteristics

to

be

,

In the dominant political theory one finds only

material goals to strive for, and although these have all too
well captured the human imagination, the crisis of modernity
only appears to deepen.

Thus Kierkegaard's

standard can be considered unproblematic.

emphasis
It

is

on a

only the

implied content, which for Kierkegaard derives from Christian
teaching, that may prove questionable. However, insofar as his
focus

is

on

Existents,

expressed

in

loving the

other

as

oneself, and hence constitutes a manifestation of community,
and is a
appears

religious as well as a
the

dogmatics

rational

Kierkegaard

engages

principle, 54
in

would

it
not

necessarily prove problematic for non-Christians.

I:S

Kierkegaard's conception of philosophy as intentional is
closely connected to his understanding of history. He analyses
this concept under the general problematic of Philosophical
Fragments: "Can a historical point of departure be given for
an eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure
be of more than historical interest; can an eternal happiness
(Salighed) be built on historical knowledge?" (SV 6, 7; PF, 1).

53

We are especially thinking of John Locke, Second
Treatise of Government, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1980), chapters 2-5, 8-9.
See also Charles Taylor, Op. Cit. p. 23.
54

Strauss, Op. Cit., pp. 204-05.
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His argument directly confronts Hegel's conception of
history, which is that it constitutes the unfolding of human
consciousness,

an unfolding that takes place with logical

necessity, whereby the freedom presupposed in the Christian
view of

life apparently disappears.

Against this Climacus

posits a conception of history which preserves a realm of
freedom within which the single self has two major choices.
one choice is to strive to fulfill one's potential, to choose
to exist in that essential sense that Kierkegaard has labelled
Existents: to live in terms of qualitative distinctions. The
other

choice

is

material world,

to wholly

succumb

to

the

givens

of

the

in which the end of all action is always

already another end and hence constitutes a life of insatiable
self-indulgence
by

which

he

sort of like Socrates' leaky jar analogy
attempts

to

convince

Callicles

of

the

of

the

meaninglessness of his existential priorities. 55
From

Hegel's

perspective,

the

problematic

Fragments has been rendered unproblematic

inasmuch as the

transcendent has been immanentized by the logical movement
which follows the law of necessity. In the "Introduction" to
the Phenomenology of Spirit he claims
"the goal is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as
the serial progression; it is the point where
knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where
knowledge
finds
itself,
where
Notion
[Idea]
corresponds to object and object to Notion

55

Plato, Gorgias, tr. W.C. Helmbold (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1952), 493b-c.
63

[Idea). 1156
Later he adds, "The movement of carrying forward the form of
its self-knowledge

is the

labor which

it accomplishes

as

actual History. 1157 Hegel's aim was to reconcile subject and
object, what Descartes had wrestled apart and Kant was unable
to bring together.
Kierkegaard, believing that it is impossible to reconcile
subject and object and still maintain existential freedom
except in the abstract realm of pure thinking,

adopts the

Kantian dichotomous relationship of these entities. However,
rather than concentrating on'~he object and how we are to
understand such a
entity,

phenomenon,

he

focuses

on the thinking

on the subject who for him is a concrete existing

single self faced with a reality that, as Arnold Ljungdal has
interpreted

Kierkegaard,

"every

second

demands

our

interruption in the form of decisions and resolutions of the
will." As Kierkegaard sees it the role of philosophy is to
clarify what the ultimate presuppositions are for such an
"active interruption" and hence to make human existence, not
necessarily easier,

but more meaningful.

It

is

from this

perspective that we must understand Kierkegaard's conception
of freedom as well as his claim about truth being located in

56

Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A.V. Miller (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1977), #80, p. 51.
57

Ibid, #803, p. 488.
64

subjectivity. 58 "It does not mean that there is no objective
reality

outside

appropriated, " 59

of

us,

something

but
the

it

must

scientific

be

personally

method

and

its

implication of logical necessity does not allow for.

I:6

The problem of the imposition of logic into existence
will be discussed in chapter II. Here the focus will be on the
problematic of historical necessity allowing us to see yet
another dimension of Kierkegaard's analytical dexterity. That
he sees a problem here cannot surprise anyone considering how
this historical

necessity expresses

itself politically in

Hegel's philosophy as discussed above. There his solution to
the

problem

of

the

subject-object

dichotomy

was

given

political meaning in his concept of "Ethical Life." In his
Philosophy of Right he claims this ethical life constitutes
the Idea of freedom in that . . . self-consciousness
has in ethical existence its absolute foundation and
the end which actuates its effort . . . The objective
ethical
order
posits
within
itself
distinctions whose specific character is thereby
determined by the concept, and by means of which the
ethical order has a fixed content -- necessary and
independent
and an existence elevated above
subjective opinion and choice. These distinctions
are absolutely valid laws and institutions.

58

For more on Kierkegaard's concept of subjectivity see
chapter two, section II:2:3.
59 Op •

C 1' t .

p • 59 •
65

Hegel concludes his definition of ethical life by emphasizing
the logical necessity of this movement.

"Hence the ethical

order is freedom or the absolute will as what is objective,
a circle of necessity whose moments are the ethical powers
which regulate the life of (accidental] individuals.
Climacus,

for some reason,

1160

does not directly address

Hegel's Philosophy of Right, only the methodology that informs
it. But he is not only interested in attacking speculative
philosophy's

conception of history as

necessary,

implying

existence is subordinated to the self-questioning moments of
the development of absolute consciousness, he is, as S0ren
Holm has suggested, also interested in addressing the common
sense view of existence which believes "the past cannot be
changed and the future is extremely uncertain.

1161

This common

sense view, in other words, is willing to accept risk inasmuch
as it sees no way out of it, a point that will prove important
to Climacus.
First,

however,

we

want

to

understand

Kierkegaard's

60

Hegel's Philosophy of Right, tr. T.M. Knox (London:
Oxford University Press, 1967), #142-45, p. 105, emphasis
added. Translation is from Peter J. Steinberger, Logic and
Politics: Hegel's Philosophy of Right (New Haven: Yale
University Press University Press, 1988), p.151. He comments:
"Thus, the laws and institutions of Ethical Life are
'absolutely valid' not because of consent, not because they
owe their existence to the best of intentions, not because
they are selected by virtuous persons, but rather because they
have in some sense been philosophically demonstrated."
61

S0ren Kierkegaards Historiefilosof i
Nordisk Forlag, 1952), p. 31.
66

(K0benhavn:

Nyt

questioning of the possibility of freedom in the concrete
existence of the single self in Hegel's system.

The first

point of disagreement with Hegel comes when he, according to
clirnacus,

omits

an explanation of

how becoming.

that

is,

coming into existence, 62 can possibly be incorporated under
the category of necessity. After all, Hegel himself insists
that becoming is only a factor when being and nothing are
distinguished which implies a movement into time.

It is at

this point, of course, that the quality of determinateness is
added

to
,

becoming.

being
63

and

nothing

in

the

very

synthesis

of

For Clirnacus, the problem concerns the kind of

change that takes place in becoming or corning into existence
(Tilblivelse). 64 He understands all of history in its broadest
sense to be a transition from possibility to actuality, and
the condition for this actualization is kinesis. As S0ren Holm
62

According to Hegel's Science of Logic, tr. A.V. Miller
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc.,
1969), pp. 82-3, becoming is a synthesis of being and
nothingness. "Pure being and pure nothing are . . . the same.
What is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being
-- does not pass over but has passed over -- into nothing and
nothing into being.
. Their truth is, therefore, this
movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other:
becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished but by
a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself."
63

Ibid, p. 92.

64

"In spite of all Hegel's talk about process, he does
not understand world history in terms of becoming, but with
the help of the illusion attaching to pastness, understands
it in terms of finality where all becoming is excluded," SV
1O,14n; CUP, 272n. See David Humbert, "Kierkegaard's use of
Plato in his Analysis of The Moment in Time," Dionysius, VII
(Dec. 1983) , p. 161.
67

explains,
it is the actualization of the possible in its
capacity of possibility which constitutes movement.
A thing only begins movement and change when its
actualization
is
this
movement.
In
this
actualization, however, there is no logical selfdevelopment embedded, and Kierkegaard can therefore
say in The Concept of Anxiety: "It is therefore not
to be understood logically, but in the direction of
historical
freedom
when
Aristotle
says
all
transiti~n
from
possibility
to
actuality
is
kinesis. 5
Hereby Kierkegaard strongly
emphasizes that change, coming into existence, and
becoming
(Verden)
are
concepts
which
belong
exclusively within the realm of being (V~ren) . .
. and this factual or empirical being is in t~e
domain of human life called existence (Existents) . 6
climacus warns that these categories must not be confused with
timeless

or

eternal

being.

With

all

other changes

it

is

presupposed that that which changes exists even though change
implies the suspension of its existence. But not so with the
change implied in becoming, for inasmuch as what becomes does
not remain the same or unchanged, then what has become is not
this becoming but another. Climacus provides an enlightening
example:
If, in coming into existence [becoming), a plan is
intrinsically changed, then it is not this plan that
comes into existence; but if it comes into existence
unchanged, what, then, is the change of coming into
existence?
This change, then, is not in essence
[V~sen) but in being [V~ren) and is from not
existing to existing .
( S) uch a being that
nevertheless is a non-being is possibility, and a
being that is being is indeed actual being or
actuality, and the change of coming into existence
65

Cf. Aristotle's Physics, tr. Richard Hope (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 201b.
66

Op. Cit. pp. 34-5.
68

is the transition from possibility to actuality (SV
6, 68; PF, 7 3-4) .
climacus

procedes

to

ask:

"Can

the

necessary

come

into

existence?" His answer is that becoming implies a chan~e, but
the necessary cannot be changed inasmuch as it "always relates
itself to itself, and relates itself to itself in the same
way"

(SV 6,68; PF,

thing

which

precisely

74). Therefore the necessary is the one

cannot

because

become,

the

cannot

necessary

is.

come
To

into

existence

demonstrate

this

absolute difference, Climacus explains that the necessary does
not

endure

the

suffering

that

afflicts

actuality

when

possibility is excluded not only as possibility as such but
also the anticipation of possibility by becoming actuality.
"[B]y

actuality,"

insists,

Climacus

annihilated (tilintetgjort)"

"possibility

is

(Ibid). Said differently, once

we have history, the event cannot be changed, and thereby any
other possible outcome has been ruled out; precisely by coming
into existence, everything that becomes demonstrates that it
is not necessary.

Utilizing the Aristotelian definition of

change Climacus concludes that "the change of coming into
existence is the transition from possibility to actuality"
( Ibid) .
Hegel then goes on to say that necessity is the unity of
possibility and actuality. 67

Climacus

67

is

adamant

in his

"What is necessary cannot be otherwise; but what is
simply possible can; for possibility is the in-itself that is
only positedness and therefore essentially otherness. Formal
possibility is this identity as transition into a sheer other;
69

response claiming that this is metaphysically contradictory.
His point is that possibility and actuality are not different
in essence (or nature)

(V~sen) but in being (V~ren)

(Ibid).

Hegel does not appear to make this distinction. Nevertheless,
from this difference in being, Climacus insists, no unity can
be formed and certainly not a necessary unity, since necessity
is not a category of being, but of essence, and "the essence
of

necessity

is

to

be"

(SV

6,69;

PF,

74).

Otherwise

possibility and actuality, by becoming necessity, would become
an

entirely

different

essence.

However,

this

would

not

constitute a change in being. Moreover, by becoming necessity,
possibility and actuality "would become the one and only thing
that

precludes

coming

into

existence

which

is

just

as

impossible as it is self-contradictory" (Ibid) . 68
Necessity stands all by itself; nothing whatever
comes into existence by way of necessity, no more
than necessity comes into existence or anything
coming into existence becomes the necessary. Nothing
whatever exists (er til) because it is necessary or
because the necessary is. The actual is no more
necessary than the possible for the necessary is
absolutely different from both {SV 6,69; PF, 74-

but real possibility, because it contains the other moment,
actuality, is already itself necessity. Therefore what is
really possible can no longer be otherwise; under the
particular conditions and circumstances something else cannot
follow. Real possibility and necessity are therefore only
seemingly different; this is an identity which does not have
to become but is already presupposed and lies at their base.
Real necessity is therefore a relation pregnant with content;
for the content is that implicit identity that is indifferent
to the differences of form." The Science of Logic, p. 549.
68

See also SV 15,92-98; SUD, 35-42.
70

5 ) • 69

The intriguing nuances of the abstract and the concrete
that

preoccupies Hegel's

Logic

through

844

pages

do

not

concern Climacus whose only focus is the meaningfulness of all
this

to

concrete

existential

experience.

As

should

be

sufficiently clear from the above is that Climacus' argument
constitutes

a

direct

refutation

of

Hegel's

deterministic

conception of time, a refutation of his historicism. Climacus'
conclusion

to

the

whole

thought

process,

his

assumptions grounded in Christian teaching,
coming

into

existence

occurs

in

imperative

is that "(al 11

freedom,

not

by

way

of

necessity" (SV 6,69; PF, 75, emphasis added).
On an abstract level, Kierkegaard (Climacus) is in full
agreement

with

Hegel

and

indeed

69

admires

his

theoretical

Kierkegaard appears frustrated at what he considers a
careless relating of these categories by Hegel: "Perhaps an
investigation into the concepts of possibility, actuality, and
necessity is something our time needs the most in order to
clarify the relationship between the logical and the
ontological. To be desired, however, would be for the one who
wished to furnish something in this regard was influenced by
the Greeks." PAP VI B 54:21.
71

dexteri' t y. 70

Putting

the

two

theories

into

perspective,

however, one is not a refutation of the (logical) validity of
the other. It is more like two ships passing in a foggy ~ight:
there is no recognition. That is to say, Kierkegaard rejects
Hegel's project because it operates in the realm of the idea
and

immanentizes

the

absolute

what

end

for

Climacus

constitutes the necessary -- and thereby it is finitized. 71
But this is metaphysically impossible.
Hegel's
results,

scientific

approach

seeks

the

but to Kierkegaard nothing is secure,

certain about concrete human existence.

security

of

nothing is

Life is a striving

that must acknowledge its own incompleteness precisely because
of the paradox of existence: that we can think the ideal but
never concretely experience it. An existence confronted with
such a paradox must necessarily be a tension-filled existence
that accepts the contingency of its becoming and recognizes

70 The fact that history is the conception of the Idea

has certainly given Hegel "the occasion to display a rare
scholarship, a rare sway in shaping the material in which
through him there is turmoil enough. But he has also prompted
the learner's mind to become distracted, with the result that
he . . . forgot to examine whether there has now appeared at
the conclusion, at the end of that enchanted journey, that
which was continually promised at the beginning, that which
was, after all, the primary issue, that which all the world's
glory could not replace, the only thing that could make up for
the untimely tension in which one was kept -- the correctness
of the method."
71 As Climacus with irony intimates

in the Postscript,
and as some interpreter with equal irony has commented, God
may be a Hegelian, but that is better than the other way
around. Cf. SV 9,117; CUP, 126.
72

the futility of speculating about what is to be yet continues
to hope for a more perfected outcome in the future.
Life's task (is] to become subjective, and to the
same degree the uncertainty becomes more and more
dialectically
penetrating
in
regard
to
my
personality; it therefore becomes more and more
important to me to think it in every moment of my
life. Since its uncertainty is in every moment, this
uncertainty can be overcome only by mf overcoming
it every moment (SV 9,139; CUP, 149) . 7
For Kierkegaard, historical events have come about by chance,
or as he says in the Postscript, "maximally the objectivity
that has come into existence, subjectively speaking, is either
a hypothesis or an approximation because all eternal decision
lies precisely in subjectivity"
approximation
inasmuch

as

is
it

meant
came

that

into

(SV

"the

9,161;

past

existence;

CUP,

is
it

not
did

173).

By

necessary
not

become

necessary by coming into existence (a contradiction), and it
becomes even less necessary through anyone's apprehension of
If

it.

apprehension,"

what

is

Climacus

apprehended
warns

rather

is

changed

tersely,

in

the

"then

the

apprehension is changed into a misunderstanding" (SV 73; PF,
79-80) . 73 In other words, there can be no cognitive certainty
72

In The Sickness Unto Death, Anti-Climacus undertakes
a discussion of despair "defined by possibility/necessity,"
analyzing the impact on the self by the lack of either. Both
possibility and necessity (as both Climacus and Anti-Climacus
understand the latter) are "equally essential to becoming (and
the self must, after all, become itself in freedom)" SV 15,92;
SUD, 35.
73

Climacus,
in addition to making an historical
argument, also appears to be making a hermeneutical statement.
For more on Kierkegaard's conception of history as an
approximation see Evans, Op. Cit. pp. 118 and 124: "Insofar
73

about historical events.
As will become clear, the truth of an historical event
will necessarily implicate an existential decision. But before
continuing this line of argument, its present stage suggests
a Kierkegaardian concern that is of much importance to the
present project.

I:7
Climacus'

perception of history as accidental -- "the

unchangeableness [and hence the necessity] of the past is that
its actual

'thus and so'

cannot become different,

but from

this it does not follow that its possible 'how' could not have
been

different"

(SV

6,71;

PF,

77)

is

intriguingly

comparable to Rousseau's conception of history. 74

However,

where Rousseau appears to come to such a conclusion in order
to allow for the positing of an alternative which he presents
in the Social Contract, Kierkegaard's aim is to safeguard the

as objective truth concerns existence, only approximations can
be realized, not the truth itself. Insofar as final truth is
achievable, it is achieved by abstracting from existence. In
neither case does the truth exist, in Climacus' special sense,
though truth may be nonetheless eternally real and, for God,
actual." Also Crites, Op. Cit. p. 22n; Stephen N. Dunning,
Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis
of the Theory of Stages (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1985), p. 182; and Mark c. Taylor, Kierkegaard's
Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and Self (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 41.
74

"Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality
among Men," The First and Second Discourses, tr. Roger D. and
Judith R. Masters (New York: st. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 97
and in passim.
74

category of freedom which he considers essential and therefore
a primary ethical category which he derives from Christian
teaching, but which, as it were, is also a primary category
of modern thought as a whole,

whether we are considering

Hegelian, liberal, or Marxist political theory.
The problem with Hegel's approach is that the experience
of absolute mind at its various stages of development and
concretion

is

an

absolute

method

that

has

enchanted

scholarship to the point where it has forgotten to examine the
method itself.
The concretion,

as Climacus says,

was distracted away

from inquiry, meaning it became so enthralled with its own
theory that it forgot about its practical application. Indeed,
Climacus

chastises

examples

to prove

Hegel
his

for

point,

utilizing
when

the

world-historical
Idea

shows

itself

equally well in the life of a single self. 75
Paraphrasing

Johannes

Sl0k,

Die

Anthropologie

Kierkegaards 76 the Danish editors of S0ren Kierkegaard Samlede
V~rker explain that from Climacus' perspective the concrete
is

"not an

expression

for

identity with

reality,

but

an

expression for the one who has shown himself to be able to
take charge of himself, while the one who is not capable of
doing this, but lives in the immediate, lives in the abstract"

75

PAP VB 14 (JP 50, 3301). Also SV 9,118; CUP, 126.

76

K0benhavn: Rosenkilde og Bagger, 1954).
75

(SV 6,337). Thus the change that occurs in becoming is the
presence of actuality from possibility,

a

transition that

happens by virtue of choice and hence within the category of
freedom.

Nothing

comes

into

existence

by

way

of

logical

causality (ratio), but everything by way of a freely acting
cause (SV 6,70; PF, 76). That is to say, everything that has
come into existence belongs to the historical category. This
is also true of nature, according to Climacus, albeit only to
a certain degree. 77
The problem for Climacus is that nature is too abstract
to be dialectical with respect to time. Therefore, as S¢ren
Holm points out,

it is said in The Concept of Anxiety that

nature's "security (Tryghed) is caused by the fact that time
has no meaning for it. 1178
existence

and

hence

Although a plant does come into

partakes

of

time,

its

future

is

predestined unlike that of human beings who have alternative
choices and hence represent the only phenomena that are truly
dialectical (SV 6,70; PF, 76). Freedom for Climacus, however,
should not be understood as liberum arbitrium. Rather, human
beings are free to choose the good, and hence for Climacus it
is a relative freedom. In turn every relatively freely acting
cause points to an absolutely freely acting cause (Ibid). For

77

Climacus is perfectly aware of Hegel's conception of
the unfolding of the idea in history is temporal while its
unfolding in nature is spatial. Indeed, in the case of nature
he seems generally to agree with Hegel.
78

,
Op. Cit.
p. 38.

76

climacus

this

absolutely

freely

acting

cause

represents

necessity, that which eternally is, which undergoes no change,
which does not become in history.
Looking remarkably like Aristotle's first unmoved mover,
the absolutely freely acting cause constitutes "(n]ecessity
[which] stands all by itself" (SV 6,69; PF, 74) . 79 But if all
relatively freely acting causes point to necessity, does this
not negate the implicit human freedom?

In a

journal note

Kierkegaard anticipates the question:
The whole question about God's omnipotence [Almagt]
and the relationship of evil to goodness can perhaps
(instead of making the distinction that God effects
the good and simply allows evil) be solved quite
simply in the following way. The ultimate that can
altogether be done for a being, higher than what one
can make it into is to make it free. However, in
order to be able to do that, there needs to be
omnipotence.
This
seems
strange
inasmuch
as
omnipotence would seem to incur dependency. But if
one wants to think [through the quality of]
omnipotence, it becomes clear that precisely therein
there must in addition be that qualification of
being able in such a way to take oneself back again
in the expression of omnipotence. It is precisely
for that reason one human being cannot make another
free, because the one who has the power himself is
imprisoned in having it and therefore constantly
acquires a relationship to the one he wants to set
free. To this it must be added that in all finite
power (talent, etc.), there is a finite self-love.
Only omnipotence can take itself back while it
gives, and this relationship is precisely the
receiver's
independence.
God's omnipotence is
therefore his goodness. For goodness is to give
wholly, but in such a way that one by omnipotently
taking oneself back again makes the receiver

79 Cf. Metaphysics 1072b10.

77

independent. 80
However, the question of existential freedom is not even
relevant when the systematic becomes philosophy's approach.
Thus

Kierkegaard

in

another

journal

note

compares

the

aesthetic to the ethical. Those engaged in the former can live
a

whole

life

being

admired,

and

it

is merely

accidental

whether such a person is persecuted or mocked.
Each such a person is related as difference to the
generally human,
and his productions do not
essentially touch on Existents since it takes place
in the medium of the imagination. But an ethicist
must essentially be persecuted
or he is a
mediocre ethicist. An ethicist is related to the
generally human (consequently to every human being,
and equally. not as difference)~ and he is related
to human Existents as a demand.~ 1
We have engaged in this digression in order to underscore
Kierkegaard's

distancing

his

conception

of

history

from

historicism. Rather he joins Lessing in his conclusion that
"accidental truths of history can never become the proof of
necessary truths of reason," nor can they compel faith or
provide demonstrations that have the power of obligation. Only

so PAP VII 1 A 181. Reminiscences of Hegel's master-slave
theme is quite evident in this quotation, but it is obviously
used rather differently. As will become clear in chapters IV
and V, there is also a strong implication that human beings
cannot make other human beings free
something that
according to Kierkegaard modernity has misunderstood. Here we
should note that freedom, in any case, means something
entirely different for Kierkegaard than the concept we find
in, for example, natural rights theory. Indeed, these are the
misunderstandings that Kierkegaard set out to "correct."
81

PAP VIII 1 A 160, emphasis added.
78

the

teachings

themselves,

that

is,

faith

can

do

that. 82

climacus adds, that from this perspective the historian is a
"backwards prophet" inasmuch as the certainty of the past is
grounded in uncertainty (SV 6,73; PF,

80). Hence it is not

surprising or accidental that Climacus emphasizes striving as
the necessary ingredient for arriving at truth, a concept he
has inherited precisely from Lessing (SV 9,92; CUP, 98-9).
Climacus'
large degree,

epistemology thus

resembles

Lessing's

to a

and like him he also differentiates between

experience and historical evidence. Immediate sensation cannot
deceive insofar as the question of truth does not exist for
it.

There

skeptics
proverbial

is
who

a
in

stick

suspension of
this
in

the

way

judgment as with the Greek

avoided

water

that

being

deceived.

looks

broken

but

The
is

straight when taken out -- both sensations are (correct) until
consciousness makes a judgment about the truth or untruth of
this sense perception. Thus Climacus insists that the factual
cannot be known through pure reasoning but only by the act of
judgment following upon critical analysis. "Abstract reasoning
knows the necessary, but the historical is what has come into
existence and is therefore not necessary but contingent and
uncertain.

1183

82

Lessing's Theological Writings, ed. and tr. Henry
Chadwich (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956), pp. 535.
83

Eugene Webb, Philosophers of Consciousness {Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1988), p. 237.
79

We should note here, as Kresten Nordentoft suggests, that
climacus is not setting the stage for a "naively empirical
epistemology." Rather the opposite is true. "The problem of
correctness and the problem of actuality do not belong to
sensed phenomena or to sensation, but to the single self who
wishes to interpret what has been sensed.

1184

I:8

Interpretation may take many forms and clearly involves
risk. Climacus makes an historical argument suggesting that
what

for

modernity

the

Greek

skeptics

constituted

is clearly considered belief,

freedom or expression of will

( sv 6, 76;

knowledge,

in

indeed an act of
PF,

83) .

He then

connects belief and history drawing a definitive conclusion:
Now insofar as that which by belief becomes the
historical and as the historical becomes the object
of belief (the one corresponds to the other), does
exist immediately and is apprehended immediately,
it does not deceive. The contemporary, then, does
use his eyes, etc., but he must pay attention to the
conclusion, [and] . . . the conclusion of belief is
no
conclusion
(Slutning)
but
a
resolution
(Beslutning), and thus doubt is excluded (SV 6,76;
PF, 8 3-4) .
A careful reading of the text reveals that Climacus has made
a subtle move from conclusions of belief in the ordinary sense
to belief of an historical event

in the extraordinary or

eminent sense, which was his aim to begin with.

In either

84 Kierkegaard's Psychology,
tr.
Bruce H. Kirmmse
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1978), p. 333.
80

case,

it is important to understand that the

(historical)

conclusion is not cognitive, but rests with an existential,
decisive

act

of

will.

Therefore

we

get

an

emphasis

on

striving.
But

there

is

another

reason

for

this

open

ended

understanding of history. Climacus realizes that if history
is perceived deterministically and hence as necessary, there
can be no room for wonder.
Hegel,

following Descartes, claimed that "thought must

necessarily commence from itself.
philosophy must be set aside,

1185

This means all previous

as we have seen.

Descartes

doubted it away, and de omnibus dubitandum est represented for
him an absolute beginning. Hegel appears to be more creative
as he sets all previous philosophy aside only in order to use
it as elements of his foundational system.
For Climacus, however, philosophy must begin with wonder,
just as it did with the Greeks; it must have an experiential
ground. Thus he argues in Johannes Climacus that to dispense
with this experiential dimension may prove satisfactory, even
fruitful

in the case of mathematical theses.

These do not

require talent and their truths are inherently authoritative;
they merely need to be correctly enunciated. Or as Kierkegaard
puts

it

in

a

journal

notation,

85

II

there

can

be

ho

Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy. vol. 3,
tr. E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (New York: The
Humanities Press, 1955), p. 224.
81

conviction with respect to the mathematical; 11

for

such a

proposition there is proof which rules out all other claims
against it. 86 But, Climacus complains, such propositions are
not apt to generate character (PAP IV B 1 p.152; JC, 152). 87
That is to say, the personality of the discoverer of these
truths becomes a matter of indifference after the discovery
(Ibid) .
Climacus compares such theses with ethical and religious
theses which, in contrast, have existential significance: they
do not leave the knower untouched. Here we might think of such
principles as freedom and equality which are primary ethical
qualities in Kierkegaard's philosophy. Climacus' point is that
these latter theses require authority behind them in the form
of character or personality if they are to be accredited as
true,

"just

as

in

civil

life

anyone

may

formally

be

a

guarantor, and yet it makes an absolute difference who the
guarantor is" (Ibid).
or

philosophical

beginning,

meaning

discover them,

Such theses cannot claim mathematical

necessity.
those

They

who

are

must
to

they must have talent,

have

enunciate

subjective
them must

and they must have

authority; they require a person to be passionately interested
in existential participation, they require conviction (PAP IV

86

PAP VII 1 A 215 (JP 2296).

87

This text appears in the Danish only in S0ren
Kierkegaards Papirer. Only in this case will journal notes
appear within the text in parenthesis together with the
English language citation.
82

B 1

p.135;

"proofs''

JC,

153) . 88

(Modbevis)

Against

can

be

such

posited,

propositions
as

the

other

person

of

conviction is well aware of. "He knows very well what doubt
may have to say: contra. 1189
Moreover, Climacus continues, such knowledge necessitates
a beginning in wonder (Forundring - Beundring) 90 echoing both
Plato and Aristotle (PAP IV B 1 p.127; JC, 145). The problem
as he sees it with not beginning the philosophical enterprise
with wonder,
previous

but

instead with doubt

philosophy aside,

would

or

with

setting all

necessarily mean

to

cut

oneself off from classical Greek philosophy, and indeed from
the metaphysical tradition, and hence to cut oneself off from
the beginning. "Doubt is precisely a polemic against what went
before" (Ibid). That is to say, other forms of beginning are
discontinuous,

and in Climacus' opinion they are therefore

unsound.

88

Evans, Op. Cit. p. 132, has already noted that in this
regard Climacus's claims in the Postscript about the "role of
subjectivity
in
objective
knowledge
bear
a
striking
resemblance to the philosophy of science" developed by Michael
Polanyi and Thomas Kuhn. However, Evans does not note
Climacus' differentiation between mathematical knowledge and
ethical
and
religious
knowledge.
In
view
of
this
differentiation the comparison may not be entirely correct,
at least not with regard to Polanyi who believes scientific
knowledge also depends on existential commitment. See note 27
this chapter.
89
9

PAP VII 1 A 215 (JP 2296).

°

Kierkegaard throughout his authorship uses the two
meanings of "wonder" intermittently. It should be noted that
Beundring also means admiration.
83

with the pronouncement that all other beginnings, such
as oescartes' beginning with doubt, is discontinuous, Climacus
seems to say that if we are to make existence meaningful to
humanity, we must understand human experience of reality in
all its manifestations as well as their respective symbolic
expressions, and that would necessarily include the classical
Greek philosophical tradition. Hegel, in contrast, held that
philosophy had to raise itself above the experience of wonder
in order to allow for thought to begin from itself. 91 For
Climacus his philosophy must therefore also be characterized
as discontinuous.
Finally, in a rather heavy handed critique of analytical
thinking,

Climacus charges that doubt excludes the thinker

from the philosophical endeavor as such.
[W)hether it was assumed that philosophy actually
continued to endure even if the single individual
by means of his beginning excluded himself from it,
or whether it was assumed that this beginning
annihilated philosophy, [either way) one was thereby
prevented from entering into it (PAP IV B 1 p.138;
JC, 156).

I:9

Turning to wonder's connection to Climacus' conception
of history, it becomes quite clear that wonder and necessity
are

contradictory.

To

wonder

91

about

what

is

necessary

is

Hegel's Logic (Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the
Philosophical Sciences), tr. William Wallace {Oxford: At the
Clarendon Press, 1975), #12. Hereafter known as Ency.
84

absurd. But by positing the historical as accidental, "there
the uncertainty
existence)

(which

is the uncertainty of

of the most certain coming

coming

into

into existence can

express itself only in this passion worthy of and necessary
to the philosopher" (SV 6, 73; PF, 80) . 92 That is to say, the
historian can once again "stand by the past stirred by the
passion that is the passionate sense for becoming, that is
wonder (admiration)

(Beundring). If the philosopher wonders

over nothing . . . then he has eo ipso nothing to do with the
historical"

(Ibid).

Thus wonder

is

important

to

Climacus

precisely because it guarantees continuity (PAP IV B 1 p.127;
JC, 145) . 93 Discontinuity, in contrast, threatens to lock out
of philosophical thinking the one historical event to which
Kierkegaard is committed, and therefore he is compelled to
mount his attack on what in his opinion has
philosophical endeavor,

lessened the

lessened the task of thinking:

the

experience of absolute truth as he understands it. 94

92

Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), p. 143, has captured the
gist of Climacus' meaning: "Wonder is a pathos, something to
be suffered, not acted . . . . In other words, what sets men
wondering is something familiar and yet normally invisible,
and something men are forced to admire. The wonder that is the
starting point of thinking is neither puzzlement nor surprise
nor perplexity; it is an admiring wonder."
93

See also PAP VII 1 A 34: "That which stirs one to
begin is wonder (Forundring), that with which one begins is
a resolution (Beslutning).
94

The details of this experience will be delt with in
the last part of chapter two.
85

still,

Climacus

is

intrigued by the notion of doubt

precisely because he believes

it represents more than an

epistemological problem of discontinuity. The whole question
of doubt as such bothers him, and he proceeds to describe its
properties phenomenologically. 95
Climacus begins the analysis by asking what it means to
doubt

from

the

consciousness,"

perspective
realizing

of

that

its
an

"ideal

possibility

empirical

in

investigation

would lead nowhere (JC, 166). He orients himself by imagining
a consciousness without doubt. Such a consciousness would be
immediate or spontaneous, as in a child.

Immediacy in this

sense has the nature of indetermination, it is reality itself
in a spatial-temporal sense. A child does not have to make
major decisions but can remain

(spontaneously)

open to all

possibilities. For such a consciousness everything is true or
everything

is

untrue,

meaning

there

really

is

no

consciousness. The question of truth is suspended and only
emerges when consciousness

is

"brought into relation with

something else." That something else, mediacy, according to
Climacus,

is language, the expression of which constitutes

ideality.

Ideality,

in turn,

suspends

95

(h~ver)

immediacy or

According to Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 275 and
note, Kierkegaard explored the true dimensions of doubt more
honestly, adding that it is "perhaps still the deepest
interpretation of Cartesian doubt." Karl Lowith referred to
Climacus' analysis as a radicalization of Cartesian doubt.~
Cit., p. 126.
86

reality
reality

(PAP

IV B 1 p.146;
ideality

and

JC,

168).

consciousness

within

consciousness as a contradiction,
statement about reality,
what I

say is

ideali ty"

posits the contradiction,

This opposition of
defines

for the moment "I make a

the contradiction is present,
( Ibid) .
a

In other words,

for

language

contradiction that requires a

resolution. The implication is the possibility of doubt in
consciousness whose nature is contradiction -- or better,
dialectical. Climacus' point is that in reality or immediacy
as such, there is no doubt. Nor is doubt present in ideality.
It is consciousness that brings them into relationship with
each

other,

meaning

consciousness

indicates

a

state

of

conflict, a conflict that must be resolved in some way and can
be resolved by doubt, although not exclusively. For Climacus
there are other possibilities. Thus he insists the opposite
of doubt is faith, and faith itself implies wonder (SV 6,61;
PF,

65),

and the autopsy of faith is to see

(SV 6,92; PF,

102). 96

On

the

one

hand,

Climacus

has

been

talking

about

reflection, the categories of which are always dichotomous.
Reflection as such is the possibility of the relationship, but
essentially

it

is

disinterested

or

"without

interest

(interessel0s). Consciousness, on the other hand, is spirit,

96

As Eugene Webb, Op. Cit., p. 237, has interpreted the
Fragments, "wonder is the tension in subjectivity that moves
one to reach from uncertainty (doubt]
toward factual
knowledge." Cf. SV 6,73; PF 80.
87

the categories of which Climacus defines as trichotomous.
These categories constitute the relationship. Consciousness
thereby represents interest (as in the Latin interesse meaning
"being between") PAP IV B 1 p.148; JC, 170). Consciousness is
interested in the sense that it is situated between reality
and ideality, between the is and the ought, and a decision is
called for.
Now we can begin to see where Climacus is heading with
this

phenomenological

description

of

doubt,

for

it

is

reflection that deals with all disinterested knowledge such
as mathematics, aesthetics, or metaphysics, and therefore only
presupposes doubt. Doubt, consequently, cannot be overcome by
objective thinking inasmuch as objective thinking is always
already

qualified

by

it.

The

point

is,

doubt

expresses

something deeper, expresses interest (Ibid). That is to say,
neither Hegelian speculative philosophy nor the scientific
methodology can overcome doubt inasmuch as all
knowledge

is reflection,

and reflection

is

systematic

disinterested.

Therefore doubt presupposes consciousness, and consciousness
is interest. What we have learned is that Climacus has come
to understand what it means to doubt; it means to express an
interest (PAP IV B 1 p. 149; JC, 170).

It would
contradiction

seem Climacus

has

inasmuch

logical

as

a

caught

Hegel

system

in

a

self-

supposedly

is

neutral, unbiased, and hence unable to express something as
mundane as interest. Climacus chastises Hegel for not entirely
88

understanding the concept of doubt when he claimed it could
be overcome systematically (Ibid). Climacus would seem to have
shown that

either

speculative

philosophy

is

not

entirely

objective, or that it has essentially failed in its aim. We
can now understand why it is that Kierkegaard can make so much
fun of Hegel's claim to a presuppositionless philosophy. 97
Climacus (Kierkegaard) regrets learning about Descartes
through Hegel and wishes he had begun with the former. Whether
that would have changed anything is questionable. What is no
longer

questionable,

according

to

Climacus,

and

a

young

Climacus at that, is that to begin philosophy with doubt is
to express a conscious interest. 98 Then we might argue that
Descartes in "Discourse on Method" did not clear his mind of
the "deceiving senses" nor of the "thoughts and conceptions"
that were "no more true than the illusions of [his] dreams 1199

97

See
especially the
wonderful
little
anecdote
Kierkegaard concocted in which he has Socrates and Hegel
engaged in a dialogue in the underworld, PAP VI A 145.
98

This is also suggested by Feyerabend, Op. Cit. p. 36,
when he writes, "There is no one 'scientific method,' but
there is a great deal of opportunism; anything goes
anything, that is, that is liable to advance knowledge as
understood by a particular researcher or research tradition .
. . . What is exclusive is not science itself but an ideology
that isolates some of its parts and hardens them by prejudice
and
ignorance."
Eric Voegelin,
Science,
Politics and
Gnosticism {Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959), p. 42, understands
Hegel's, and by extension Descartes', systematic approaches
a little differently suggesting the leap into "the perfection
of actual knowledge" is not to advance philosophy, but to
abandon it in favor of becoming a gnostic.
99

Op. Cit. p. 101.
89

as well as he believed he had when he sat down to write a 'new
first philosophy.' The point is,
journal note,

as Kierkegaard added in a

"doubt is produced either by bringing reality

into relation with ideality [which] is the act of cognition

. . . or by bringing ideality into relation with reality [and]
this

is

myself. "

the

ethical:

that

in

which

I

am

interested

is

100

It now appears

clear that when doubt

and

scientific

methodology became embodied in philosophical inquiry human
beings were left to themselves in a world whose significance
had become increasingly reduced and man's place in it even
more so. History and any meaning it could produce, such as the
eschatological attempts especially by Hegel and Marx, took on,
major proportions for the purpose of relieving the consequent
anxiety that burdened modern existence, what Heidegger has

lOO PAP IV B 13:18

(JP 891). Also PF, 256.
90

characterized as the "thrownness" of Dasein. 101
From Kierkegaard's perspective, however, such fantastical
ideas constitute nothing more than illusions. These illusions
would ultimately deny human beings their true dialectical
nature

and

thus

would

end

up

deceiving

them.

But

has

Kierkegaard not made matters worse by offering a conception
of history grounded in freedom, a condition that would seem
only to increase anxiety, not decrease it?

After all, "the

objective reality of contingent fact is that which can be only
reasonably confirmed through attentive inquiry and critical
judgment, 11102

requiring substantial effort upon the part of

the concrete individual knower.
Kierkegaard is not unaware of this predicament and stands
ready, one might say all too ready, with the solution by which
he

will

also

address

the

common

101

sense

view

of

history

Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1962), H 136, pp.
175: "Factually, Dasein can, should, and must, through
knowledge and will, become master of its moods; in certain
possible ways of existing, this may signify a priority of
volition and cognition. Only we must not be misled by this
into denying that ontologically mood is a primordial kind of
Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior
to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of
disclosure . . . . Ontologically, we thus obtain as the first
essential characteristic of states-of-mind that they disclose
Dasein in its thrownness." (Heidegger's debt to Kierkegaard
appears self-evident when, in addition, we speculate . that
Heidegger's choice of Dasein perhaps also to some degree was
inspired by Kierkegaard's category of "the single self" (den
Enkelte) when we separate the word, not in the way it is
usually separated as Da-sein (there being), but as Das-ein.
102

Webb, p. 238.
91

discussed

above.

One

could

argue

that

his

conception

of

history is spuriously connected to his mission to revive a
waning Christianity,
care here.

although one has to proceed with some

Thus he claims there is an "organ

continually suspends

.

. which

( oph~ver as the German aufheben)

the

incertitude that corresponds to the uncertainty of coming into
existence," that is,

the uncertainty of history,

and this

organ he calls "belief" (Tro) in the ordinary sense (SV 6,74;
PF, 81). But that Climacus also has other than ordinary belief
in mind seems obvious from the following quotation where he
continues the characterization of belief.
Precisely belief is of such a quality, for in the
certainty of belief the uncertainty is continually
present as the suspended, which in every way
corresponds to that of coming into existence. Thus
faith [Tro) believes what it does not see; it does
not believe that the star exists, for this can be
seen, but it believes that the star came into
existence. The same holds true of an event. The
'what' of a happening may be immediately known, but
that it did happen, not at all, not even that it is
happening, even if it happens, as it is said, right
before our noses (SV 6,74; PF, 81-2).
His

point

is

that

"second

hand"

followers

of

"the

teacher" are no worse off than the "contemporary followers"
were. The Incarnation is equally an object of faith, not of
cognition. Thus Climacus reminds the reader that belief is not
an act of cognition, but an act of freedom, an expression of
will,

requiring

passionately

commitment,

engage

in

the

resolution,
act

of

and

judgment,

courage

to

engage

in

Existents. Such belief can suspend all doubt, not by way of

92

cognition, but by way of the will, and indeed constitutes the
very opposite of doubt.

That is to say,

they are opposite

passions, not cognitions.
Belief and doubt are not two forms of knowledge
which let themselves be qualified in continuity with
each other, for neither of them is an act of
knowing; they are opposite passions. Belief is a
sense for corning into existence and doubt is a
protest against every conclusion that wants to
transcend
immediate
sensation
and
immediate
knowledge (SV 6,77; PF, 84).
For Kierkegaard subjective commitment plays a significant
role

in theoretical

inquiry,

decisive role in action,

11103

but

it plays

an

"absolutely

action expressed as love of the

other, and hence expressed in the single self's comportment
toward the world. What has become clear is that the problem
of the mechanical approach of scientific methodology is not
an unsolvable problem;
order

not

only

to

therefore Kierkegaard pushes on in

attempt

to

restore

Christianity

and

transcendence to its "rightful" place in human existence, but
also to prepare every human individual self for his or her
possibilities which, indeed, if actualized, can mean genuine
human fulfillrnent.
103

104

Evans, Op. Cit. p. 133.

104

Karl Lowith, Op. Cit., p. 104, has captured most
poignantly the major points of Kierkegaard's critique of
rnoderni ty as laid out in this chapter: "Kierkegaard is
exclusively concerned with man's inner life. He resumes
Augustine's quest for the soul and its relation to God as the
only two things worth knowing. He thereby implicitly dismisses
the classical concern with the logos of the cosmos as a pagan
curiosity. A sentence like that of Anaxagoras, that the end
for which man is born is the contemplation of the sun, the
moon, and the sky, is utterly strange to Kierkegaard and his
93

Before the inquiry can progress to a discussion about
Kierkegaard's so called "corrective," it is helpful to come
to

an

understanding

of

the

symptomatic

effects

as

they

manifested themselves upon theoretical and practical thinking.
According to Kierkegaard these symptomatic effects were caused
by the scientific methodology adopted by philosophical inquiry
and by the consequent objective tendency, as laid out in this
chapter. As Climacus laments in the Postscript, "[t]he way of
objective reflection makes the subject accidental and thereby
transforms existence into something indifferent,

something

followers. It is equally strange to those of us who,
unencumbered by a god or a soul, but clothed in psychology and
psychoanalysis, are living on the capital of the Christian
concern for man's soul.
Confronted with the task of
recapturing a Christian existence according to the law of the
Gospel, Kierkegaard felt that he had to ignore the laws of
the cosmos and the modern discoveries of the telescope. If
Christ appeared today, he said, the Christian task of
appropriating His message would still be the same as it was
for the first generation of Christians. But the natural
scientist, and all those who believe in the truth of science
rather than of the Gospel, would demand an examination of
Christ's brain under a microscope to determine whether He is
the Son of God or a schizophrenic. Unfortunately for the
sciences, all the modern discoveries by telescope and
microscope are irrelevant for an understanding of the human
condition in its inwardness. A thoughtful person, according
to Kierkegaard, who wants to understand what it means to exist
as a self before God cannot be interested in natural science;
for it does not make any difference for man's moral choices
and religious decisions whether the moon is made of blue
cheese or something else. What is the use of explaining the
whole physical universe or world history if one does not
understand oneself, one's own single self?
As an existing
self, man is singled out from the physical cosmos and world
history and their deceptive greatness. To Kierkegaard the
concern with six thousand years of world history, or with some
billion years of cosmic history, is an escape from one's self
into an illusory importance."
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vanishing"

(SV

9,161;

tendency constitutes
scientific
suggests,

CUP,

a

negation

revolution
reflecting

"changed man's

ways

173).

originated

As

of

of

thinking,

the

Existents

in

Kierkegaard's

such

thought,
viewpoint

by

thinking,

objective

proper.
Hans

The

Jonas

wholly:
before

materially changed, even affected, his ways of living. 11105

105

,

Op. C1.t. p. 47.
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Chapter II
A SYMPTOMATIC EFFECT:
THE LOSS OF AUTHORITY IN THEORETICAL THINKING

To assert the supremacy of thought is gnosticism. 1
Christianity is not a doctrine, but expresses a
contradiction of Existents and is a communication
of Existents. 2
The most debilitating symptomatic effect to follow from
the

separation

diagnosed

as

of

the

knowledge
loss

of

and

experience

authority.

The

Kierkegaard

separation

of

knowledge and experience occurred when the scientific method
was imposed upon philosophical inquiry. Thereby the realm of
knowledge

became

circumscribed

limiting

the

inquiry

to

questions which could be answered only by appeals to rational
deduction or empirical

induction.

Neutrality was deemed a

paramount methodological requirement obviating all appeals to
existential experience, and thus the scientific method imposed
a fixed opposition between subject and object. The realm of
transcendent experience that had traditionally been the object
of theoretical investigation, was now considered beyond what
reason could explain or the scientist observe and measure. It

1 SV 10,44; CUP, 305.
2 SV 10,75-6; CUP, 339.

was

therefore

Kierkegaard

entirely

abandoned,

constituted

thinking had

lost

the

meaning

ultimate

its absolute

that

what

for

authority

for

all

loss,

he

legitimacy.

This

claimed, had pathologically affected individual consciousness
manifesting itself in the various realms of thought, whether
philosophical,

religious,

political,

or

psychological.

Although Kierkegaard was not to know perhaps the worst
perversions of authority as they unfolded in the twentieth
century with the totalitarian regimes of Nazism and Stalinism,
the

events

that

led

up

to

and

reached

their

explosive

consequences in 1848 dramatically influenced the direction of
this Danish author's writings. Thus he came to describe his
own age as one lacking foundation and therefore lost in an
unstoppable "vortex"
wanting a

(Hvirvel),

"a prey to the illusion of

fixed point ahead" when in actuality "the fixed

point lies behind. 113 The fixed point ahead refers to the
utopian theories fraught with eschatological overtones that
at this time flourished throughout Europe.
Kierkegaard became so preoccupied with analyzing and
explaining the effects of this disease that it would not be
inaccurate to characterize his authorship in the words of Eric
Voegelin as a "quest for truth . . . a movement of resistance
to the prevalent disorder.

3

114

Kierkegaard thus described his

Letters, #186, p. 262.

4

In Search of Order, vol. 5 of Order and History (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), p. 25.
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own time as "the age of dissolution"

(SV 18,163; POV, 130),

a dissolution that had manifested itself in the corruption of
individual consciousness,

and indeed a corruption that had

proved to be unmanageably contagious

(SV 12,77-8; WL,

85).

Kierkegaard can say this inasmuch as he considers the category
"the single self" (den Enkelte) to be a category of spirit and
of spiritual awakening which stands in sharp opposition to
what dominates the age, namely politics, meaning the worldly
(SV 18,165; POV, 132) . 5
This

corruption,

he

argued,

was

most

emphatically

expressed in theoretical gnosticism (SV 10,44; CUP 305) and
pragmatic

"witchcraft"

(Bedaarelse)

(SV 10,56;

CUP,

317),

Climacus' label for the politics of ideology. The former, by
which Climacus simply meant any assertion of the supremacy of
thought over all other attributes of consciousness, came to
dominate philosophical and theological inquiry. The latter,
by which he especially meant the problem of mass movements
with emphasis on the numerical, came to tyrannize political
and psychological experience. In both cases, there was a loss
of a fundamental ground of the human condition.
Every revolt in passion -- against discipline, every
5

It is interesting to note that Kierkegaard with his
analysis of the problem of the age and later the positing of
a therapeutic "corrective" conceives of this "corrective" as
a movement "from the philosophical, the systematic, to the
simple, that is, the existential," which has a political
dimension, as we shall see. Kierkegaard parallels this
movement to the one especially emphasized in Works of Love:
"from the poet to religious existence" ( SV 18, 164n; POV,
132n) .
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revolt in the social life -- against obedience,
every revolt in the political -- against secular
rule, is connected with and is derived from this
revolt of the human race against God ~ith respect
to Christianity (SV 18,165; POV, 133).
Kierkegaard's point is precisely that thought in general has
been caught up in the spreading disease unable to wrestle
itself free in order to obey the law's command for community
and hence unable to actualize freedom and equality. Instead
thought is entrapped in the web of numbers and mechanical
devices to which the age pays homage. The conflict facing the
dialectics of individual existence is thus manifold. In the
present chapter the loss of authority in theoretical thinking
will be dealt with, while the loss of authority in practical
thinking will be discussed in chapter three.

I:1:1

On a philosophical level we shall confine the analysis
to the problem that according to Climacus followed from "the
objective tendency"

of the age.

This tendency,

especially

mastered by Hegelian philosophy, had intellectualized ethical

6

It should be noted that Kierkegaard was an avid reader
of Ludwig Feuerbach considering him helpful inasmuch as he
performed what Kierkegaard considered an "indirect service to
Christianity as an offended individuality. The illusion it
takes in our age to become offended, since Christianity has
been made as mild as possible, as meaningless as the scrawl
a physician makes at the top of a prescription." PAP B 9.
Offence, as will be discussed later in this chapter, is, in
short, reason's unhappy reaction to reaching its limitation
and its realization of another dimension of knowledge in which
it cannot participate, SV 6,48-52; PF, 49-54.
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conduct

and

subordinated

Christian

life

to

speculative

philosophy which interpreted meaningfulness in terms of an
abstract absolute that negated concrete individual experience
(SV 9,110-13; CUP, 118-21). Climacus rejects this disposition
of

modern

philosophy

to

speculate

objectively on the truth of things,
projecting

them

as

indisputable

systematically

and

such as Christianity,

historical

phenomena

of

equivalent veracity. 7
According to Climacus such an approach to philosophical
inquiry was attempted by Hegel whose systematic approach was
intended

to

generate

identity

between

thought

and

being,

between subject and object. Hegel's speculative philosophy was
aimed at overcoming the tension of bifurcated experience so
provocatively delineated in Kantian philosophy. 8 It would do
so as stated early in the "Preface" to the Phenomenology of
Spirit by laying "aside the title 'love of knowing' and be

7

"People have become all too nimble in appropriating
Christianity without more ado as a part of world-history; they
have come to regard it as a matter of course that Christianity
is a stage in the development of the human race" (TC, 216).
As will become clear in chapter three, Kierkegaard can
demonstrate that the irruption of Christianity into the
ancient world represented a radical change in human experience
(SV 12,133-44; WL, 136-47 and PF, especially ch. 1). See also
Merold Westphal, History and Truth in Hegel's "Phenomenology."
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, Inc., 1978), p.
207.
8

"Therein lies actually the whole foundational confusion
of the modern age (which branches itself out in logic,
metaphysics, dogmatics, and the whole way of life of the age)
or the confusion lies foundationally in this: that the yawning
abyss of quality has been removed from the difference between
God and human being," PAP VIII 1 A 414.
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g9tual knowing. 119 This move by Hegel incorporated and thereby
discarded the existential dimension of knowing as discussed
in the previous chapter, and hence it discarded what Climacus
considered the necessary grounding for a meaningful truth.
Thereby it restricted the "being of world and ego . . . to the
knowledge of the immediate or existent," prohibiting questions
about

"the

context

knowledge occurs. 111

of

the

° From

order

of

being

in which

this

this, according to Climacus, there

followed severe ontological and epistemological consequences.
The systematic approach imposed logic on existence, by
which

Hegel

existential
rejection

only

confirmed

experiential
of

philosophy's

Hegel's
capacity

loss

existence. 11

thought
to

the

is

fully

particular concrete experience.

a

of

a

meaningful

Climacus'
rejection

capture

the

of

overall
modern

essence

of

Instead he wants to posit

Existents as that which separates thought and being and all

9 Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 3.
10 Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics and Gnosticism, p.
68. Echoing Kierkegaard, Voegelin has suggested that "while
there is indeed a progress in clarity and precision of
knowledge of the order of being, the leap over the bounds of
the finite into the perfection of actual knowledge is
impossible. If a thinker attempts it, he is not advancing
philosophy, but abandoning it to become a gnostic." (Ibid, p.
42). Cf. SV 10,44-6; CUP,
305-07.
11 "Existence constitutes the highest interest of the
existing individual, and his interest in his existence
constitutes his actuality. What actuality is, cannot be
expressed in the language of abstraction. Actuality is an
inter-esse between abstraction's hypothetical unity of thought
and being" (SV 10,21; CUP, 279).
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the other dichotomous pairs, not to imply that "Existents is
thoughtless" (SV 9,105; CUP, 112) or ontologically empty, but
to signify that it denotes more than knowledge. 12
To begin,

then, Kierkegaard posits "the leap" as "the

most decisive protest against the inverse procedure of the
method"

(SV 9,90;

CUP,

96,

emph.

added),

circular nature of speculative philosophy.

referring to the
It is a radical

opposition intended to clarify the contrary approaches to
philosophical inquiry and thereby reveal the weaknesses of the
one and the strengths of the other. Thus it is not accidental
that Climacus just before engaging in a discussion of the
problem of imposing logic onto existence contrasts Lessing's
emphasis on striving for the truth with the systematist's
claim to possess the truth by virtue of the system (SV 9,92;
CUP, 98-9) .
For this project their differences are of significant
interest. 13 We shall look at a few fundamental differences
12

"The way of objective reflection makes the subject
accidental, and thereby transforms existence into something
indifferent, something vanishing.
. But as Hamlet says,
existence and non-existence have only subjective significance"
(SV 9,161; CUP, 173).
13

This chapter shall not attempt to give a comprehensive
analysis of either approach, this has already been covered in
a variety of analyses. See, for example, Stephen Crites, In
the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs Kierkegaard on Faith and
History (Chambersburgh, PA: American Academy of Religion,
1972); C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard's "Fragments" and
"Postscript": The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983); Paul L.
Holmer, "Kierkegaard and Logic" in Kierkegaardiana 2 (1957),
pp. 25-42; Robert L. Perkins, "Kierkegaard and Hegel: The
Dialectical Structure of Kierkegaard's Ethical Thought." Ph.D.
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between them that will illustrate Kierkegaard's claim that
there has been a loss of authority within philosophy.

II:1:2

The

opposition

between

Hegelian

and

Kierkegaardian

philosophy is not accidental, nor is it merely one thinker's
negative reaction to another,

and

in this

case towering,

thinker's radical and influential philosophy. Their respective
understanding of the basis of philosophy differs fundamentally
as does their understanding of the object of philosophy. It
should therefore not be a surprise that their methodological
approaches would also differ. Perhaps it can even be argued
that their respective methodologies were "causally" connected
to how they perceived of the ground and purpose of philosophy.
The

first

problem lies

in how Hegel

and Kierkegaard

perceive of the beginning of philosophy and this beginning is
for

both

of

them

closely

connected

with

the

object

of

philosophy. In the case of Hegel the object of philosophy is
to unify rigid dichotomies, while for Kierkegaard it is to
accept

the

paradox

as

given.

Kierkegaard

states

their

different approaches succinctly:

dissertation (Indiana University, 1965); Dietrich Ritschl,
"Kierkegaards Kritik an Hegels Logik," in Theologische
Zeitschrift 11 (1955), pp. 437-465; Mark c. Taylor, Journeys
to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1980); Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaard's
Relation to Hegel, tr. George L. Stengren.
(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1980).
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"The systematic idea is the subject-object, is the
unity of thinking and being; Existents, on the
contrary, is precisely their separation. From this
it nowise follows that Existents is thoughtless,
but it has distanced and distances subject from
object, thought from being'' (SV 9,104; CUP, 112). ·
we shall begin with Hegel.
Following

Descartes,

Hegel

first

rejects

the

Greek

understanding of the beginning of philosophy as discussed in
chapter one. What generates the situation that calls forth
philosophy

is

(Entzweiung).

for
For

Hegel
him

the

problem

philosophy

is

a

of

bifurcation

response

to

the

emergence of rigid dichotomies in a given culture such as that
of

body

and

soul,

faith

and

reason,

subjectivity

and

objectivity, freedom and necessity. Hence philosophy arises
in response to rigid oppositions in order to restore unity,
a unity that has been disrupted by these rigid dichotomies. 14
Hegel stresses that philosophy does not simply dissolve the
opposition into a new unity. "The sole interest of Reason is
to suspend [aufheben] such rigid antitheses. But this does not
mean that Reason is altogether opposed to opposition." 15 That
is to say, it is to be a reunification in which opposition is
not

simply cancelled but

is preserved precisely

in being

surpassed (aufheben). What philosophy opposes is the absolute

14

The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System
of Philosophy, tr. H.S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1977), pp. 89-94.
15

Ibid, pp. 90-1.
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fixity the establishment gives to these dichotomies. 16 He
wants to make these oppositions more fluid.
In order for Hegelian speculative philosophy to come into
play,

even

the

deepest

opposition

must

established as with Greek philosophy.

first

have

been

In other words,

the

point of departure for philosophy is experience, but, and this
is what becomes problematic for Kierkegaard, it is a move away
from

experience,

experience

is

element. 1117

away
bound

from

the world

and

"into

According

to

of

its

Hegel,

senses

own

to which

unadulterated

philosophy

"owes

its

development to the empirical sciences." However, by removing
the

immediacy

of

scientific

materials

"a

development

of

thought out of itself" has at the same time been formed giving
to the content of the empirical sciences "the freedom of
thought" and hence an £ priori, meaning necessary character . 18
What

we

have,

then,

is

a

"System

implication of which is necessity.
The movement of

thought

of

Philosophy,"

the

19

in the

System of

Philosophy

follows the historical process as laid out in Lectures on the
History of Philosophy.

but it is

freed of the historical

externality. For Hegel, such a "genuine and self-supporting"

16

Ibid, p. 91.

17

Ency. #12.

18

Ibid.

19

See chapter I, p. ? and note.
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thought is in itself concrete and therefore must be an Idea. 20
His point is that the science of Idea is essentially system,
because the true as concrete is only as unfolding into itself
and as taking and holding together totality. Thought proper,
then,

the

Idea,

overreaching

is

only

(tibergreifen).

in

the

unfolding

character

of

It is the unfolding of thought

proper and hence a movement of thought that is intrinsically
systematic

and

standpoint that

therefore
appears

necessary. 21

to be

This

immediate must,

means

the

within the

science itself, be converted to a "result" in which science
again reaches its beginning. What is clear is that fundamental
to Hegel's systematic approach are the categories of movement
and necessity. These categories enable Hegel to make "fixed
thoughts fluid" thereby overcoming the "dead bones" of formal
logic. 22 He calls this a metaphysical or ontological logic
that necessarily seeks its fulfillment within its own selfmovement. Consequently the system of philosophy "exhibits the
appearance of a circle which closes within itself and has no

20 Ibid, #14.
21

Ency. #13-15.

22

Quoted in Robert Heiss, Hegel. Kierkegaard, Marx:
Three Great Philosophers Whose Ideas Changed the Course of
Civilization, tr. E.B. Garside (New York: Dell Publishing Co.,
Inc., 1975), pp. 56, 86.
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beginning in the same way as the other sciences have." 23
The points emphasized in this short survey of what the
post-Hegelians have referred to as the dialectic, are the very
points that become bothersome to Climacus. For him they can
be reduced to necessity, a necessity that has its ground in
the logical movement of the dialectic. 24
Necessity must be discussed by itself.
Only
confusion has been caused by the later speculative
thinking's importation of necessity into the
interpretation of world history,
whereby the
categories of possibility, actuality, and necessity
have become confused" {SV 10,45; CUP, 306-07).
For Climacus a logical movement can explain nothing about the
concrete existence of the single self, indeed it appears to
want to remove itself from it. Therefore it cannot do what in
Climacus' opinion is the task of philosophy. That is to say,
a logical movement, which to Climacus is a contradiction in
terms, cannot explain the meaningfulness of human existence
as

such,

a

meaningfulness

that

acquires

its

qualitative

distinction in the category of freedom. 25

23

Ency. #17. As will be discussed presently, it is not
really a circle, but a spiral, a fact that was not appreciated
by Climacus.
24

Phenomenology of Spirit, especially pp. 2-3, 17, 51.

25

It may be tempting to suggest that Climacus has not
grasped that Hegel in his logic is discussing "necessity" by
itself. But as was made clear in chapter one, what Climacus
means
by
necessity
differs
radically
from
Hegel's
understanding of this category.
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11:1:3

For Hegel the object of philosophy is the same as that
of religion which is the truth "in that supreme sense in which
God

and

God

philosophy

only

will

is

have

the

Truth.

to

show

1126

that

But

as

it

is

Hegel

adds,

capable

of

apprehending such truths unassisted, meaning reason will need
no help from religion. 27 Why would Hegel say that?

Hegel does

not want to be caught up in the dichotomous relationship of
reason and faith that plagued scholasticism. There, he says,
metaphysical thinking had turned

into dogmatism or unfree

thinking. As noted with irony in the zuzatze to #32 in the
Encyclopaedia, "Dogmatism may be most simply described as the
contrary of skepticism." Hegel's point is that he cannot allow
philosophy to be constrained by the Kantian dichotomy of
phenomenon and noumenon.
It is the problem of uncertainty that Hegel seeks to
overcome, inasmuch as uncertainty would prove an embarrassment
to

philosophy.

He

claims

to

overcome

this

problem

by

presupposing enough intelligence to know transcendent being
and its actuality. 28
This

actuality

is

"Transcendental Analytic"

26

Ency. #1.

27

Ibid, #4.

28

Ibid, #6.

what

Kant

referred

as the noumenon:
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to

in

the

that which the

understanding cannot know.
achieve g

"The most the understanding can

priori is to anticipate the form of a

possible

experience in general. 1129 But Hegel answers this claim of
uncertainty with a counterclaim,

namely that the object of

philosophy is the Idea, the noumenon of which phenomena are
only "the superficial outside'' such as political and social
organizational structures. 30 What concerns Hegel at this point
is the absolute truth, and such truth, he argues, can only be
known

through

thought

proper,

that

is,

through

free

and

genuine thought which is itself concrete. 31
Ordinarily, Hegel says, we take thoughts and the objects
of thought (universals) to be anything but concrete. We take
thought to be abstract.

We take there to be an opposition

between abstract thought (universals) and concrete individuals
(particulars). To say that thought as free and genuine thought
is concrete, is to dissolve and surpass this rigid opposition,
the very aim for which philosophy arose in the first place.
He goes on to promise that it will be shown that thought is
at

once

itself

and

its

other,

that

it

overreaches

(Ubergreifen) its other and lets nothing escape it.
Concrete thought is not merely opposed to the sensible
particular as its other, but it literally reaches over to that

29

Critique of Pure Reason,tr. Norman Kemp Smith (New
York: st. Martin's Press, 1929), B303.
30

Ency. #6.

31

Ibid, #14.
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other in such a way that the other, the particular, is drawn
into a higher unity. 32 In one move Hegel has overcome the
dichotomies that he believed tainted knowledge as uncertain,
and

in so doing he has assured philosophy the throne of

cognitive knowledge. 33 Thus the Idea, free concrete thought,
thought

proper,
it

overreaching,

only

is
is

only

in

overreaching by which unity
system.

It

is

an

the

in

intrinsically systematic.

its

is

unfolding

unfolding

of

character

development

achieved.
thought

It

is

proper

in

of

this

only the
that

is

As such it will eventually know

ultimate truth, it will become actual knowledge.
This proposition confronts Climacus with two problems.
The first is the givenness of the proposition and hence its
inherent necessity. As he sees it, with necessity there is no
need for authority as such. Indeed, authority (and its loss)
only makes sense in circumstances of liberty,

that is,

if

consciousness is truly free. For Climacus this means that the

32

Ibid, #20, #21. I am indebted to John Sallis' lectures
on Hegel's logic for this and other insights into this
difficult subject.
33

We see how Hegel works this out politically in his
Philosophy of Right where the individual gains a selfawareness of his necessary relationship to the whole. As
Steinberger, Op. Cit. p. 208, elaborates: "Reason prescribes
the nature of political society and the nature of the
individuals who comprise it; and each individual, as a
rational creature, has the capacity to recognize that which
reason prescribes. In fulfilling his capacity for reason, the
individual comes to see that his very individuality is
dependent upon society, and that only by being integrated into
the body politic can he affirm his subjectivity and his
freedom."
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movement toward truth is not one of choice made in freedom,
a

that

fact

for

him

de-authenticates

the

progress

of

consciousness toward its own completion. The second problem
is Hegel's arrogant claim that ultimate truth can be known
cognitively. That kind of claim finitizes ultimate truth which
to Climacus is the same as to negate the radical difference
between

the

human

and

the

divine

and

thus

to

reject

an

ultimate authority.
Although Climacus would agree with Hegel on an abstract
level, such abstractions he considers useless when it comes
to existential experience (SV 9,158; CUP, 176). In short, such
a presentation is to misrepresent truth and constitutes a
complete denial of the human condition proper. As Paul Holmer
explains,

Kierkegaard

( Climacus)

"denies that the relation

between discourse and the world discoursed about is itself a
logical relation. Meanings are logically inter-related, but
not meanings and the world.

1134

An existential system is not

possible precisely because the heterogeneity of existence and
the inner life cannot be reduced to a logical conclusion. This
is Climacus' point in "denying so candidly the Hegelian effort
to introduce movement (kinesis) into logic.

1135

"Logic cannot explain movement" Climacus says, meaning
anything that has "any relation to existence

34

"Kierkegaard and Logic" in Kierkegaardiana 2 (1957):

p. 29.
35

(Tilvil!relse),

Ibid, p. 41.
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which

is

not

indifferent

to

Existents.

[must

not]

be

incorporated in a logical system" ( SV 9, 94; CUP, 100) . But the
development and transformation of subjectivity constitutes
movement, the movement of intentional completion. Hence for
climacus logic and movement are mutually exclusive categories.
Logic is static and necessary, he insists, 36 whereas the
existential development and transformation represents movement
and

is

constitutive

of

an

act

of

freedom.

As

Climacus

expressed it in the Fragments as we have seen, all coming into
existence occurs in freedom, not by way of necessity {SV 6,71;
PF 77).

Therefore the application of a

logical

system to

explain the meaningfulness of human existence is nonsensical
to Climacus.

36

Holmer makes Kierkegaard's understanding of logic more
intelligible when he explains p. 2 7: "Logic is for Kierkegaard
the disciplined inquiry into the meaning structure and
principles of knowledge . . . . Logic is, by him, not conceived
to be immediately methodological nor a biological weapon.
Throughout his literature he seems to make clear, too, that
logic is a spectator science, it is broadly descriptive. But
the question is -- of what?
It is surely not ontological
description; for this is the almost constant criticism made
in the Postscript, and every other occasion permitting in the
literature, of the Hegelian philosophy.
Kierkegaard is a singular 'via media' thinker. Denying
that logic is ontological, or a science about being, does not
entail the affirmation that logic is an arbitrary invention,
or simply conventional, or only rules like those governing a
parlor game. He seems to be insisting that logic is a
descriptive science, but descriptive principally of the
structures implicit in the meaningful use of language. Logic
describes the idealities, rules and norms, principles and
criteria, in virtue of which meanings are communicated."
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one might well wonder why Climacus,

the rationalist,

could not, if not adopt Hegel's dialectic, at least recognize
the

obvious

movement

within

it,

a

movement

motivated

by

spirit's self-testing dimension embodied in consciousness, in
traditional terms, the quest for truth. 37 Indeed, he seems to
misread Hegel when he claims that "pure thought without ado
abrogates

(h~ve

=

oph~ve

like

the

German

aufheben)

all

movement, or meaninglessly imports it into logic" (SV 10,19;

37

Hegel's Science of Logic, p. 55. In a contrasting
interpretation of Hegel, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Op. Cit., pp. 178, suggests: "(T]he distance proper to theoria is that of
proximity and affinity. The primitive meaning of theoria is
participation in the delegation sent to the festival for the
sake of honoring the gods. The viewing of the divine
proceedings is no participationless establishing of some
neutral state of affairs or observation of some splendid
demonstration or show. Rather it is a genuine sharing in an
event, a real being present. Correspondingly the rationality
of being, this grand hypothesis of Greek philosophy, is not
first and foremost a property of human self-consciousness but
of being itself, which is the whole in such a way and appears
as the whole in such a way that human reason is far more
appropriately thought of as part of this rationality instead
of as the self-consciousness that knows itself over against
an external totality. There is, then, another way in which a
human heightening of awareness penetrates and discovers itself
-- not the way inward to which Augustine appealed but the way
of complete self-donation to what is outside in which the
seeker nevertheless finds himself. Hegel's greatness lies in
fact in that he did not suppose this way of the Greeks to be
a false way left behind in contrast to that modern mode of
reflection, but he acknowledged that way as a facet of being
itself. It was the magnificent achievement of his Logic to
have acknowledged precisely within the dimension of the
logical this ground that gathers in and underpins what points
in the opposite direction. Whether he named this nous or God,
either way it is ultimately what lies utterly outside us, just
as the mystical submersion of the Christians ultimately
attains inward reality."
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CUP 277), although he knows well the ambiguous nature of this
language.

The point is,

Hegel's logic is not circular,

as

climacus suggests, but spiral. But Climacus (and here we must
include Kierkegaard himself as well), is committed to formal
logic, to Aristotle's principle of contradiction. 38 It is a
position

that

untersuchungen

apparently

parallels

Trendleburg' s

Logische

which Climacus praises in the Postscript for

its proper understanding of movement as "the inexplainable
presupposition,

as

the

common

factor

wherein

thinking agree and as the continued reciprocity"

being

and

(SV 9,94;

CUP 100).
The curious problem is that Climacus sees no conflict
between a formal logic which consequently embodies no movement
and Aristotle's whole conception of kinesis, of teleological
movement,

especially as

we

find

it

in

the

Physics

Aristotle tells us a plant develops necessarily.

where

One might

even argue that in Aristotle's syllogism there is a kind of
metaphorical

movement

inasmuch

as

the

premise

suggests

a

conclusion. For the thinker this always represents a movement,
even though it was presupposed in the proposition. All of this
seems to be acknowledged by Climacus when he proclaims:
The transition from possibility to actuality is, as
Aristotle rightly teaches kinesis, a movement. This
cannot be expressed or understood in the language
38

Kierkegaard is especially clear and unambiguous on how
he understands the principle of contradiction and the
consequences of its mediation in Two Ages, as will be
discussed in chapter three. SV 14,88-94; TA, 97-103. Also SV
10,12-3; CUP, 270-71.
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of abstraction where movement cannot have assigned
to it either time or space which presupposes
movement or are presupposed by it (SV 10,45; CUP,
3 06) •

We must conclude that Climacus at best appears to be
inconsistent about the question of logic,

an inconsistency

perhaps propelled by his imposition of passion in order to
derive meaning from knowledge. That brings us to perhaps his
most important opposition to Hegel's logical system, namely
its claim to be able to know the absolute truth.

II:1:5

Climacus asks how it is possible to know the absolute
truth,
claim. 39

and

his

This

is

own

answer

not

to

is

say

a

clear

Climacus

rejection
is

unaware

of
of

this
the

attraction of gnostic thinking, but for him the enthusiasm of
claiming certainty,

even about the highest,

is essentially

nihilistic. 40 The absolute truth is not knowable because it
involves an absolute paradox as well as an ultimate paradox
for

thought

itself,

what

will

be

referred

to

as

the

39

"This impiety (the abolition of the relationship of
conscience) is the fundamental damage done by Hegelian
philosophy," PAP VIII 1 A 283 (JP 1613).
40

PAP II A 127. Compare with Eric Voegelin, The Ecumenic
Age, vol. 4 of Order and History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1974), pp. 27-8: "Gnosticism whether ancient
or modern, is a dead end. That of course is its attraction.
Magic pneumatism gives its addicts a sense of superiority over
the reality which does not conform . . . . (I]t is a dead end
inasmuch as it rejects the life of spirit and reason under the
conditions of the cosmos in which reality becomes luminous in
pneumatic and noetic consciousness."
115

intellectual paradox. In the chapter on the "Absolute Paradox"
in the Fragments, Climacus (always the heroic climber) urges
the reader to take the category of paradox seriously inasmuch
as it fundamentally connects the human subjectivity proper.
"One must not think ill of the paradox, because the paradox
is the passion of thought, and the thinker who is without the
paradox,

he

is

like the

lover who

is without passion,

a

mediocre customer" (SV 6,38; PF, 38) . 41
Paradox for Kierkegaard has two functions.

Inasmuch as

it is a category of thinking, it posits the limitations upon
what thinking as a cognitive effort can accomplish, that is,

41

In regard to paradox Eugene Webb in Philosophers of
Consciousness (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988),
p. 240, affirms the importance of this theme to Kierkegaard's
philosophy: "There are two reasons for the prominence of the
theme of paradox in Kierkegaard. One is that in trying to find
a way to speak of subjectivity in a milieu in which
philosophical language was oriented almost exclusively toward
the description of objects of perception or of intellection,
he was driven to use the currently available language of
philosophical discourse in ways it was not suited to. In this
respect, Kierkegaardian paradox is a function of the breakdown
of a language pushed beyond its capacity . . . . There is also
another type of paradox in Kierkegaard's thought, however, and
it is this Climacus refers to as "the source of the thinker's
passion." (Webb is relying on the older faulty translation of
the Fragments; it should read as quoted above: "the paradox
is the passion of thought."] This we might term "essential"
paradox -- essential in that it stems from the structure of
human consciousness itself so that there is no way it could
be resolved by reformulation in another language. The paradox
that is [the source of) the thinker's passion, as Climacus
goes on to explain, is the desire to attain what is truly
other than thought: "The supreme paradox of all thought is the
attempt to discover something that thought cannot think. This
passion is at bottom present in all thinking."
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what thinking can ultimately think. 42 The paradox also reveals
the difference between what can be known and what cannot be
known, a state of differentiated, and hence tension filled,
existence that Kierkegaard insists every concrete single self
,

occupies.

43

Here we might want to think about what paradox means. In
its very formulation paradox appears to be forbidding, indeed
we can say

it

is

self-concealing. 44

In that

sense

it

is

mysterious and ambiguous. But Kierkegaard chose the categories
with which Climacus operates very diligently,

and that is

especially true of the category of the intellectual paradox
which

in

its deepest most profound meaning

signifies the

absolute paradox, "the god, the eternal, as human in time" (SV
20,156).

42

"This, then, is thinking's highest paradox: to want to
discover something that it cannot itself think" (SV 6,38; PF,
37) .
43

SV 6,48-52; PF,
49-54. Also SV 9,70-74,
SV
10,3,18,75-6 and note,250-52; CUP, 75-79, 267, 276, 339 and
note, 518-19; SV 12,192-97; WL, 191-96; and SV 16,167; TC,
173.
44

According to Liddell and Scott the etymological origin
of paradox is Greek: paradoxos which means contrary to
opinion, incredible, contrary to expectation, marvelous. Jens
Himmelstrup (SV 20,152) has suggested its derivative meanings
as absurd or incongruous (urimelig) , but also contrary to
reason (fornuftstridig). But as the OED adds, "though on
investigation or when explained, it may prove to be wellfounded
(or, according to some, though it is essentially
true) . 11
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The ambiguity of the paradox lies in its ability to shed
light where only darkness would appear to be present. But for
light to appear we have to let

.9.Q

of ratiocination and leap

across "radical discontinuity" between thinking and that which
it cannot think: the paradox. "One 'leaps' by letting go,
by giving up any rational

instead

allow the

self

1145

explanations of the paradox and

to participate

in what

cannot

be

thought through enactment. The achievement is self-knowledge
( SV 6, 4 6; PF, 4 7) . Cl imacus suggests "one who does not pretend
to be a

Christian

(can best]

raise

the question of what

Christianity is" (SV 10,75; CUP, 338), and that someone, of
course, is himself.
We suggest that that is Climacus' ultimate purpose, and
we draw the conclusion that that was Kierkegaard's ultimate
purpose with this rational pseudonymous author.
Climacus, the rationalist,

is existentially willing to

recognize the limits of cognitive thinking and the possibility
of transcendence beyond these limits. He is open toward the
possibility

of

questioning

it,

the
and

absolute
hence

paradox,

he

is

yet

not

genuinely

afraid

open

to

of
the

possibility of an absolute authority, although he apparently
does

not

existentially

embrace

it.

For

that

we

need

progress in Kierkegaard's authorship to Anti-Climacus.

45

to
But

Louis Mackey, "A Ram in the Afternoon: Kierkegaard's
Discourse of the Other," Kierkegaard's Truth: The Disclosure
of the Self, ed. Joseph Smith, M. D. , Psychiatry and the
Humanities 5 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 202.
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Johannes Climacus' passion, which for him expresses itself in
thinking,

allows

him

to

envision

(imagine)

the

offense

(Forargelse) that "comes into existence with the paradox" (SV
6,50; PF, 51) . 46 Moreover, this passion allows him to envision

the possibilities of such an encounter between the paradox and
the understanding

(Forstaaelse)

and to characterize it as

being either happy or unhappy (SV 6,48; PF, 49).
Depending upon the intensity of the passion the "paradox
and

the

understanding

[Forstanden)

[may)

meet

in

mutual

understanding" ( sv 6, 48; PF, 49), thereby avoiding the offense
to the understanding, or they may not. 47 If they do not meet
in mutual understanding, that is,

if thinking cannot accept

its own limitation and think the paradox as such, thinking has
suffered

its

own

downfall,

and

for

Climacus

that

is

catastrophic. As Sl0k has pointed out, if Climacus' passion
cannot encompass the god who is the ground of all thinking,
of all that can be thought -- if you cannot think the ground,
you

cannot

think

at

all.

The

implication

is

that

self-

46

Mackey, "A Ram in the Afternoon: Kierkegaard's
Discourse of the Other," p. 193, perhaps says it better when
he suggests that because of the limitations of language "the
Fragments neither says nor shows but rather performs the
'absolute paradox':
that the
limit of
language,
its
irreducible other, is also its radical source."
47

Kierkegaard suggests the analogy of self-love which
also seeks its own downfall in love of the other. In chapters
four and five a detailed analysis of Kierkegaard's concept of
love will help us understand the possibility of a happy
encounter between thinking and paradox.
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knowledge, then, has broken down all together. 48
Climacus

by

maintaining

an

open

posture

toward

the

intellectual paradox, that paradox, as it were, opens itself
to him and unconceals or discloses the very essence of his
being, what Climacus understands as genuine subjectivity.
That intimated paradox of the understanding acts in
turn upon a person and upon his self-knowledge in
such a way that he who believed that he knew himself
now no longer knows with certainty whether he
perhaps is a more curiously complex animal than
Typhon or whether he has in his nature a gentler and
diviner part (SV 6,40; PF, 39).
The paradox reveals the intentional movement that it makes
possible, and thereby it defines what in the Postscript is
characterized

as

becoming

subject

in

truth.

As

such

the

paradox makes possible a genuine movement in freedom.
This development or transformation of subjectivity,
this its infinite concentration in itself over
against the representation of the highest good of
infinity . . . is the developed possibility of the
subjectivity's primary possibility (SV 9,108; CUP,
116) .

To the one who is open toward it, the paradox reveals the
two-dimensional structure of human consciousness, and hence
it

reveals

consciousness

essentially

48

as

intentional

and

Sl0k, Kierkegaard: humanismens t~nker (K0benhavn: Hans
Reitzel,
1978),
p.
118.
Climacus' discussion is very
reminiscent of Plato's inferred dialogue in the Republic
(475e-476b) between the philosophos who is "the man who loves
to look with admiration (philotheamones) at the . . . truth
of things . . . as that which they are in themselves" and the
philodoxos who can "see beauty only as it appears in the many
beautiful things, but [is] unable to see beauty 'in itself.'"
Eric Voegelin, Plato (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1966), pp. 65-6.
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therefore tension filled. 49 This bifurcated nature of concrete
experience,

as

Climacus has

reconciled in existence,

shown,

cannot

be mediated or

least of all by the imposition of

logic.

II:2:1

We

can

now

turn

scientific methodology

to
on

the

symptomatic

religious

thinking.

continues the attack on Hegel charging,
speculative

philosophy,

the

epiphany

effects

of

of

the

Kierkegaard

that by virtue of
Christ

has

been

transmuted into doctrine illicitly deduced from history. 50
The result is that Christianity has become the subject of
cognition, not of action. This is "Christendom's" misfortune,
Anti-Climacus laments, for by becoming an object of knowledge,
Christianity has lost all its "juice and energy" (SV 16,44-5;
TC, 37-8), meaning it has lost its efficaciousness.
But Kierkegaard is not only battling Hegel's claim that
we can have "absolute knowledge." His attack is also directed
at Enlightenment philosophy and especially at "the established
order"

of the orthodox church.

By immanentizing Christian

doctrine it accomodated the influential scientific requirement

49

By tension-filled we mean to say that a movement in
freedom is always perilous, requires risk taking inasmuch as
it does not contain the security of certainty that is
characteristic of a movement grounded in necessity.
50

"History makes out Christ to be another than he in
truth is" (SV 16,36; TC, 28).
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which insists we can only know by way of rational deduction
(Descartes)

or

empirical

induction

(Bacon).

This

is

how

"Christendom" emerges.
on the one hand, it meant that the tension of the paradox
of the Incarnation was relaxed, and becoming a Christian was
now as easily achieved as citizenship (SV 9,46-7; CUP, 49-50,
328 and SV 16,73; TC,
posing no "offense"

71)

requiring no special effort and

(Forargelse)

to reason. 51 On the other

hand, the relationship between philosophy and Christianity had
become confused inasmuch as "the problem of its truth . . .
becomes the problem of so interpenetrating it with thought,
that Christianity at last reveals itself as the eternal truth
. [and] is assumed as given" (SV 9,46; CUP, 49) . 52
Speculative philosophy has transformed Christianity into
a reflective objectivity aimed at transcending existential
uncertainty, and at the same time Christianity, by its embrace
of

worldly

aspirations,

has

jeopardized

its

mystical

authority, and thus it has deformed its own truth in the very

51

"The decisive in the Christian suffering is: the
volition and the possibility of offense for the suffering . .
. . For when I voluntarily give up everything, choose danger
and adversity, then it is impossible to avoid vexation
(Anf~gtelse) (which again especially belongs to the category
of the Christian, but which naturally has been abolished in
Christendom" (SV 16,109-10; TC, 111).
52

Also SV 10,66; CUP, 329.
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creation of "Christendom." 53
Christianity represented a paradox that for Kierkegaard
constituted an offense to reason. Christendom, in contrast,
is Christianity accommodated to the established secular order
where

the

tension

of

the

paradox

is

relaxed,

and

hence

essentially accommodated to speculative philosophy.
The consequences of such a union (of Christianity
and philosophy)
are seen by rationalism,
a
representation, of which the confusion of language
is a type, and just as it has been noticed that many
words reappear in the different languages, in the
same way the rationalists,
even though they
denigrate each other, have these words in common:
philosophically,
reasonable
Christianity
(Christendom and the whole presencing of Christ is
an -- accommodation) . 54
such an accomodation implied a

circumscription of reason,

meaning reason could no longer, like before the Enlightenment,
noetically

experience

transcendent

being.

The

scientific

method had dictated to philosophy what could be known and
experienced,

and the established order," which represented

Christianity, accommodated this demand.
If one were to describe the whole orthodoxapologetic striving in one single sentence, but also
with categorical precision, one would have to say:
the intent is to make Christianity plausible

53

"Christendom has abolished Christianity without itself
realizing it; the consequence is that if anything is to be
done, an attempt must be made once again to interpose
Christianity into Christendom" (SV 16,45; TC, 39).
54

PAP I A 98.
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(sandsynlig) . 55
This destructive turn of events for Christianity lead
both Anti-Climacus and Johannes Climacus to characterize the
circumstance of "Christendom" as the "way Christianity became
paganism"

16,45; TC,

(SV

38.

Also SV 10,66; CUP,

329).

It

meant the Christian experience had not only become confused,
but had also been negatively influenced by what Peter Gay,
echoing Kierkegaard but more likely thinking of John Locke,
has characterized as the Enlightenment's "appeal to reason and
reasonableness.

1156

What does it mean to make Christianity reasonable? Making
Christianity

reasonable

is

precisely

the

problem

for

Kierkegaard, who sees this movement as the world's imposition
of its principles on the domain of Christianity.

Although

these principles may be appropriate in secular affairs where
concern

is

about

relative goals,

they tend

to degenerate

Christianity. In Kierkegaard's opinion they deprive the human
individual of a higher form of life, which is precisely what
a Christian life makes possible and to which the human being
as he or she essentially is apparently aspires. He expresses

55

Nutidens Religieuse Forvirring. Bogen om Adler, p. 78;
OAR, 59. Kierkegaard chose the word sandsynlig with great
care, for literally it means "truly visible."
56

The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. The Rise of
Modern Paganism (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1966), p.
354. The work referred to by John Locke is The Reasonableness
of Christianity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958),
in passim.
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this

conviction

when

he

has

Climacus

pronounce

in

the

g_pstscript:
Here it is not asked whether Christianity is right,
but what Christianity is about. Speculative thought
leaves out this preliminary agreement, and therefore
it is successful with the mediation. Before it
mediates,
it has already mediated,
that is,
transformed Christianity into a
philosophical
doctrine (SV 10,75; CUP, 338).
To

ask

what

Christianity

is

about

is

precisely

to

question and thereby manifest the difference between what is
immanent

and

what

is

transcendent

for

Kierkegaard,

a

difference modern philosophy on a whole according to AntiClimacus, has attempted to deny deluding "us into the notion
that faith has an immanent quality, that it is immanency" (SV
16,136; TC, 140). 57 The point is, as Gregor Malantschuk has
noted, that Kierkegaard perceived of Hegel's philosophy as one
designed

to

engender

thought

about

57

immanence

as

absolute

Anti-Climacus is especially aiming at Schleiermacher
who in On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, tr.
John Oman (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1958)
insisted religion is natural to the human being (p. 9), is a
feeling or affection (pp. 36, 46, and especially 54) that
originates not in a pure impulse to know, but rather in how
human beings comport themselves toward the nature of things.
The
editors
of
the
Danish
edition
who
refer
to
Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre, 3rd edition, vol. I, P. 167ff,
also suggest the referral in PAP 1 A 273 to Hegel and
Hegelians appears to be incorrect. However, Anti-Climacus, as
well as Kierkegaard himself, could easily be drawn to this
conclusion, it would seem, from Hegel's lectures on faith in
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, one vol. ed. Peter c.
Hodgson "The Lectures of 1827," tr. R.F. Brown, P.C. Hodgson,
and J.M. Stewart (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1988), pp. 134-37. There Hegel pronounces that "faith --i.e.
certainty inasmuch as it is feeling and exists in feeling .
. . is certainty of God, immediate knowledge." (p. 134).
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within philosophy as well as within theology. But "if people
by

logical

thinking

can

manage

all

of

existence,

then

[Kierkegaard can only come to the conclusion that] there is
no room for transcendence. 1158 By rationalizing Christianity
Hegel makes it into something philosophically comprehensible,
that

is,

into doctrine.

Consequently

any

statement

about

Christianity can be reduced to an opinion about Christianity,
reduced to anybody's opinion about it.
"What modern philosophy understands as faith is
actually what is called an opinion [and this opinion
is] proclaimed [forkyndes] to a person, and he now
believes that it is so as the doctrine teaches. The
next stage therefore becomes to grasp [begribe] this
doctrine; this philosophy does" {SV 16, 136; TC,
140) .

58

"Begreberne Immanens og Transcendens hos S0ren
Kierkegaard"
in Frihed og Existens:
studier
i
S0ren
Kierkegaards t~nkning (K0benhavn: C.A. Reitzel, 1980), pp.
196-97. Malantschuk goes on to inform the reader that
Kierkegaard thought of these concepts as belonging strictly
to philosophy and theology and not to an upbuilding
literature. Therefore he never uses these concepts in the
upbuilding literature under his own name. There they instead
are referred to as time and eternity, world and God, while in
the pseudonymous literature the paradox or the absurd
sometimes is substituted for transcendence "inasmuch as the
oppositions these designations express would not appear
without a transcendence." (p. 200). Malantschuk continues with
an outline of Kierkegaard's two-tiered understanding of
transcendence that is helpful to the present project: "The one
designates transcendence as the fixed, unmovable point, the
other the human being's possible attempt to reach the
transcendental by negating the external reality as the ironist
does it, or . . . his own actuality, which happens if the
human being has reached further in his spiritual development.
Said in another way, we are here dealing with, on the one
hand, God as the transcendental and, on the other hand, the
human beings striving relation to transcendence." (p. 203).
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Christianity has been reduced to a truth on par with
other immanent truths,

and as such it has lost its divine

authority that has its ground in transcendence.
so,

then its truth can be proclaimed by a

If this is

genius who

is

qualitatively different from the apostle inasmuch as he is
what he is by virtue of what he is in himself. In contrast,
the apostle is what he is by virtue of divine authority. As
Kierkegaard puts it in Authority and Revelation:
The category of a genius lies within the immanent;
therefore the genius may well have something new to
bring forth, but it disappears again in a general
assimilation by the race, just as the difference
genius disappears as soon as one thinks the eternal.
The category apostle lies within the transcendent,
he has paradoxically something new to bring forth,
the newness of which remains constant precisely
because it is essentially paradoxical and not an
anticipation in connection with the development of
the race. An apostle remains eternally an apostle
and no eternity's immanence sets him on an
essentially equal level with all other human beings
because he is essentially paradoxically different
from all others. 59
Thus an apostle or a prophet gains his authority to make
proclamations from the transcendental. As Malantschuk adds,
"thereby Kierkegaard has strongly emphasized the authority
with which the transcendental can make itself manifest over
against all knowledge that human beings can achieve within
immanence.

1160

Speculative

59

philosophy

negates

difference

and

Nutidens Religieuse Forvirring: The Book on Adler, p.

139; OAR, 105.
6

this

° Frihed

og Eksistens, p. 222.
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thereby Christianity becomes something one learns -- by rote,
as Climacus laments.

If it is merely something one learns,

like algebra, then it is to be assumed that everyone learns
it,

that everyone is a Christian as a matter of course. 61

climacus

makes

an

ironic

comparison

that

has

significant

political overtones.
He compares speculative philosophy's understanding of
what it means to be a Christian to what it apparently means
to be Danish. It is something you become by birth -- or two
weeks later -- automatically.

Inasmuch as geography teaches

that the Lutheran-Christian religion governs in Denmark, it
follows one is not Jewish, nor Muslim,

but a Christian (SV

9,47; CUP 49). The problem is that being a Christian is not
a

scientific

question,

nor

is

it

a

legal

question.

The

community in which a single self resides does not make that
single self what he or she essentially is. That, for Climacus,

61

Gadamer, Op. Cit. p. 37, does not believe Hegel
forecasted the end of history, as suggested by Climacus, by
claiming that it is through Christianity and modern history
that we have arrived at the point where all are free. "The
principle of freedom is unimpugnable and irrevocable. It is
no longer possible for anyone still to affirm the unfreedom
of humanity. The principle that all are free never again can
be shaken. But does this mean that on account of this, history
has come to an end? Are all human beings actually free? Has
not history since then been a matter of just this, that the
historical conduct of man has to translate the principle of
freedom into reality? Obviously this points to the unending
march of world history into the openness of its future tasks
and gives no becalming assurance that everything is already
in order."
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is to be objective. 62 From this perspective it is simply in
bad taste not to be what everyone is -- as a matter of course.
The

conclusion

is

that

in

"Christendom"

{Christenheden)

Christianity has become a question of what is in fashion, what
dominates public opinion, and then it has lost its authority
in existential experience. 63
Of course,

being Danish is a

legal question,

but for

Kierkegaard it has stronger connotations, as it does to be
truly Christian. What he wants to show is that a personal
investment in the "idea of community" is imperative for its
actualization.

By

this

"idea

of

community"

he

dedication to solidary relations as presenced in

means
II

a

love of

62

"Objective thinking
is
wholly
indifferent to
subjectivity,
and
thereby
also
to
inwardness
and
appropriation; its mode of communication is therefore direct .
. . . It can be understood directly and be recited by rote.
Objective thinking is therefore conscious only of itself, and
is therefore not a communication" {SV 9,65; CUP, 70).
63

Chapter three will deal
explicitly with the
consequences of the loss of authority in existential
experience. But it is appropriate to note here that Climacus
almost wishes the situation back to those days when being a
Christian stood in stark contradiction to the surrounding
world both in an inward as well as an outward sense. Then
being a Christian was a dangerous, but also an heroic
undertaking. His point is that it was not difficult to know
when you were truly a Christian. In "Christendom, 11 on the
other hand, the external nuances may be diminutive confusing
the individual struggling to become a true Christian {SV
10,78; CUP, 341). Thus Climacus questions whether belonging
to the visible church is serious evidence for whether one is
actually a Christian suggesting "it is easier to become a
Christian if I am not a Christian, than it is to become a
Christian if I am that; and this decision is reserved for the
one who has been baptized as a child," sv 10,64; CUP, 327.
129

neighbor

as

oneself. 1164

This

concept

is

strictly

an

existential concept, and therefore it is not accidental that
climacus

in discussing

speculative

philosophy

immediately

turns to the one who does philosophy, to the thinker.

II:2:2

To discuss speculative philosophy without a consideration
of the philosopher engaged in this thinking is for Climacus
to set the cart before the horse,

or at

neglect,

important

perhaps

negate,

the

most

least

it

part

is to
of

the

equation.
As is well known, Socrates says that
fluteplaying, one must also assume a
and consequently if one assumes
philosophy, one must also assume
philosopher, or several speculative
{SV 9,48; CUP, 50}.

if one assumes
fluteplayer, 65
a speculative
a speculative
philosophers"

The question for Climacus is an existential question:
What does this mean to the one engaged in this activity?
Speculative philosophy, in contrast, "argues from the point
of

view

of

totality,

from

the

state,

from

the

'idea

of

community' {Samfundsideen), from the scientific standpoint of
geography to the single self."

It follows as a matter of

course that the single self is a faithful believer {SV 9,47;
CUP, 50). No effort is necessary. No commitment or dedication

64

The "idea of community" constitutes Kierkegaard's
"corrective." This will be worked out in detail in chapters
four and five.
65

Cf. Plato's Apology 27b.
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required

except

to

comply with

public

opinion.

And

most

important, no existential movement grounded in inwardness is
necessary. The single self merely assumes the posture of the
(natural or basic?}

self,

a being consumed with cognitive

intent: to know what is transcendent, an intentionality that
lacks all existential concern. This would not be problematic
if Christianity was something essentially objective. "But if
Christianity is essentially subjectivity, then it would be a
mistake if the observer is objective" (SV 9,49; CUP, 51}.
Climacus'
confusion,

category

of

subjectivity

especially when he claims

has

brought

much

"subjectivity is the

truth." The objective position is easy to comprehend.
truth

or

falsity

of

it

is

not

dependent

upon

The

subjective

conviction, is not dependent upon whether one is committed to
it

or

not.

To

state

the

objective

position

requires

no

existential effort upon the part of the one speaking. To state
the objective position

in this manner,

however,

helps to

clarify the subjective position.
In the subjective position the truth lies within the
relationship of the single self to it. The question is located
in the nature of that relationship:

whether it is one of

interest or disinterest. What Climacus is saying is that if
the nature of this relationship is one of disinterest, then
the truth is not for that single self. But if the relationship
can be characterized as interested, and by interest Climacus
means

passionately

interested,
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then

truth

is

precisely

expressed in that interest and is of decisive import to the
single self -- the truth is. We can say, then, that truth is
prescenced in how the single self comports itself toward the
world, the truth is subjectivity.
The double implication that Climacus makes is important.
He presents the point this way:
When the truth is questioned objectively, then the
truth is reflected upon objectively as an object
(Genstand], to which the knower is related. One does
not reflect on the relationship, but on whether it
is the truth, the true, he is related to. When this
to which he is related is only [blot] the truth,
the true, then the subject is in truth. When the
truth is questioned subjectively, then it is the
individual's
(Individ]
relationship
that
is
reflected upon; if only the how [Hvorledes] of this
relationship is in truth, then the individual is in
truth, even if it in this way was related to untruth
( SV 9 , 16 6 ;

CUP ,

178 ) •

In a footnote Climacus adds an important clause:
The reader will observe that what is spoken of here
is the essential truth, or about that truth which
is essentially related to Existents, and that it is
precisely in order to clarify it as inwardness or
as subjectivity, that this oppostion is shown
(Ibid).

II:2:3

What, we might well ask, is all the disagreement about?
The problem, according to Climacus, is that the question has
been posed incorrectly. It is really about how Christianity
is to be perceived without prejudice, which is the same as to
ask what Christianity is. Climacus warns that this question
must not be confused with the objective question about the
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truth

of

Christianity

existential question,

(SV

CUP,

10,68;

331).

It

is

an

meaning "Christianity essentially is

about Existents, and to become a Christian is the difficulty"
(Ibid). This means the question of Christianity significantly
entails the relation of the single self to the transcendent
being.

That in turn requires an explanation of how such a

metaphysical

concept

is

to

be

understood,

and

Climacus

accommodates this question.
Here we again find a stark opposition to Hegel who in
Climacus'

understanding transports all of the transcendent

realm into immanence,
heavenly

sub

as we have seen.

specie

~terni

the

11

In pure thinking's

distinction

is

suspended

(h~vet)" (SV 10,60; CUP, 323). The whole has been finitized
into one totality.
For

Climacus,

however,

the

metaphysical

or

the

ontological simply is (er), but it does not exist (er ikke
til).

There

can

be

no

totality,

at

least

not

a

unified

totality as Hegel wants it. "God does not think, he creates;
God does not exist, he is eternal," while it is the task of
the human being to think and to exist (SV 10,36; CUP, 296).
S0ren Holm elaborates:
As the one who is, God cannot be an object of faith,
but only one of assumption. "Eternally understood,
one does not believe that the god exists (er til],
even if one assumes that he exists, 11 because eternal
or pure being is simply a category of essence
(V~sen] and not a category of being within the realm
of factual being. In contrast, faith claims that the
god has come into existence (er blevet til] within
the realm of historical being whereby his eternal
essence is inflected into the dialectical categories
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of becoming [Tilblivelse].
In this historical
factuality, meanwhile, the god must be said to have
come into existence, because we are now outside pure
timeless being. 66
Climacus' point is that faith concerns itself with·being
(V~ren) rather than with essence (V~sen). The object of faith
is the

Incarnation,

became

the

the god who became human and thereby

ultimate

standard

for

human

existence

manifesting the di vine dimension in the human species.

by
As

such, Christianity is a question not of the understanding, but
of action, and therefore it is a question of Existents.
Religious thinking is for Climacus a question of how a
single self is to comport him- or herself before the paradox
of the epiphany and about the authority that paradox imposes
on the life of that single self in this world. That is to say,
by coming into existence, by showing itself, the eternal gains
a

sovereignty

existence

over

because

the
by

so

historical's
doing

it

claim

on

individual

introduces

the

divine

much

speculative

dimension of being human.
Climacus

will

concede

this

to

philosophy, that if Christianity is to be a teaching, then,
it is the kind of teaching that is to be understood as one
that teaches that the task is to exist in it. Moreover, it is
to be understood as that which teaches how difficult it is to
exist in it,

"what an enormous existential task (Existents-

Opgave) this teaching posits for the learner" (SV 10,75n; CUP,

66

Op. Cit. p. 27-8.
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339n) .
This proposition that Christianity is an existential task
would seem to clarify Kierkegaard's indirect approach in these
pseudonymous writings as an advocacy for enactment rather than
a positing of doctrinaire information to supply cognitive
skills.

They

are

not

meant

to

be

the

subject

of

fact

gathering. Rather they represent an indirect appeal to the
reader not to read the text as an accomplishment in and of
itself,

but

to

"Christianity

urge

is

a

not

new
a

beginning.

doctrine,

In

but

other

an

words,

existential

communication expressing an existential contradiction"

(SV

10,75-6; CUP, 339) that cannot be mediated, but only endured.
To understand this is for Climacus to understand Christianity
proper,

and

if personally appropriated,

Christian in the most genuine sense.

to have become a

As such Christianity

distances itself from the (easy) requirement of Christendom
which from Kierkegaard's perspective stands as a pathology of
consciousness and hence as detrimental to Existents.
It

is

from

this

point

of

view

that

Kierkegaard's

pseudonymous writings can be characterized as a dialogue with
the

reader,

a

dialogue

that

reflects

more

than

what

is

immediately available in the text. 67 This dialogue continues
in Two Ages and Works of Love.
engages

67

in

direct

Here,

communication

as

however,
he

Kierkegaard

discusses

the

I am grateful to Adriaan Peperzak for this insight.
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problematic of the symptomatic effects on practical thinking,
a thinking that manifests itself on a political as well as on
a psychological level.
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Chapter III
A SYMPTOMATIC EFFECT:
THE LOSS OF AUTHORITY IN PRACTICAL THINKING

Since every development . . . is finished only with
its own parody, it will become apparent that the
political is the parodic in the world's development
-- first the actual mythological (the God side),
next the human mythological (the human side), and
then the realization of the world's purpose in the
world (as the highest), a sort of Chiliasm, which
nevertheless brings the individual politicians,
animated by abstract ideas, into contradiction with
themselves. 1
If humanity had not with the speed of several
hundred years and then by the passion of habit got
stuck in the fixed idea that a tyrant is a single
human being, it would be easy to recognize that to
be pursued by the crowd is the most burdensome of
all, because the crowd, after all, is the sum of
individuals, so that each individual adds his little
part, while the individual does not think of how
much it amounts to when all individuals do it. 2
Let us now turn to the problem of the symptomatic effects
on practical thinking that
knowledge

and

experience,

follow
a

from the

separation

separation of

brought

philosophy's adaptation of scientific methodology.
theoretical thinking,

about

by

As with

the problem manifested itself in the

"objective tendency," that in the case of practical thinking

1

PAP VI A 26 (JP 4108).

2

PAP VIII 1 A 123 (JP 4118).

was expressed numerically.

That is to say,

on a political

1evel the focus turns from theoretical concerns to the problem
of ideology.

III:1:1

Ideology

for

Kierkegaard

has

mostly

to

do

with

a

consciousness directed at totality, with encompassing everyone
in mass movements that appear to swallow up individual human
beings and all but annihilate any existential initiative. 3
This problem he treats extensively in Two Ages, but where Marx
views mass society as epiphenomena! of economic structures,
Kierkegaard (and Nietzsche) view their own time as engaged in
a life-or-death struggle that is epiphenomena! of a spiritual
condition. Merold Westphal suggests that this event of mass
society is for Kierkegaard "intimately related to a parallel
'religious'

event,

the death of God,

or,

in Kierkegaard's

language, the disappearance of Christianity from Christendom.
The

massification

of

society

is

the

flip

side

of

its

secularization. 114

3

"In the midst of all the exultation over our age and
the nineteenth century concealed there sounds a hidden
contempt for being human; in the midst of the self-importance
of the generation there is a despair over that of being human.
Everything,
everything wants to attach itself; worldhistorically one wants to bewitch oneself in the totality.
Nobody wants to be an individual existing human being" SV
10,55-6; CUP, 317.
4

"Kierkegaard's Sociology" in Kierkegaard's Critique of
Reason and Society (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1987),
p. 43.
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Here again the overall problem remains the same: the lack
of a foundational ground and hence the loss of authority. Any
authority that may exist is wholly relative and grounded in
human

consensus

whether

achieved

democratically

or

in

authoritarian ways. Indeed the concept of ideology as we have
come to understand it would seem to imply just such a lack of
absolute authority. 5 This

is no more evident than

in the

liberal state that inevitably emerged as a consequence of the
French Revolution 6 and which, for all intents and purposes,
Kierkegaard accepted albeit with severe qualifications.

In

that political system as well as in those others of a more
socialist nature that were being promoted at the time,
strongly

rejected

what

he

called

principle of sociality [which]

"the

deified

he

positive

in our age is precisely the

consuming, the demoralizing principle that in the thralldom
of reflection transforms even virtues into vitia splendida"

5

See James Wiser's discussion of Karl Mannheim's
Ideology and Utopia in Political Theory: A Thematic Inquiry
(Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986), pp. 36-41. Wiser argues that
since all ideological thinking according to Mannheim is
basically opinion, there is no objective truth against which
"the opinions in question may be tested. The ability of reason
to do this [as in Plato] however, is precisely what Mannheim
denied. Given this, it may appear that Mannheim's sociology
of knowledge necessarily leads to a radical relativism." (p.
40) .
6

For a discussion of Kierkegaard's view of the emergence
of liberal democracy in Denmark see chapter IV.
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(SV 14,79; TA 86) .

Before

we

7

begin

to

unravel

this

statement

a

few

preliminary comments on Kierkegaard's disposition toward the
relationship between the single self (den Enkelte) and society
seem appropriate. It is a relationship, as was noted in the
introductory chapter, that has often been misinterpreted as
non-existent.

Many

readings

of

Kierkegaard

interpret

his

concept of the single self as other-worldly, removed from all
political concerns.

But to so understand Kierkegaard is to

understand his concept of the single self abstractly,

and

hence to misunderstand it.
Johannes Sl0k is correct when he states: "The point of
departure for Kierkegaard is that there exists simultaneously
a primary and dialectical relationship between the individual
and society. 118 It is meaningless to understand the single self
apart

from

society

and

equally meaningless

to

understand

society apart from the single selves that make it up. That
Kierkegaard analyzes one element of this unity separately, or
almost separately, in much of his pseudonymous literature is
merely a methodological question. It should not be construed

7

Westphal, "Kierkegaard's Sociology," p. 4 6, reminds the
reader reflection here signifies the attempt of thought to
free itself from the idea of community. In other words, it is
reflection "cut off from passion."
8

Da Kierkegaard tav: Fra forfatterskab til kirkestorm
(K¢benhavn: Hans Reitzel, 1980), p. 11.
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as a conception of the single self as apolitical or asocial. 9
But Kierkegaard,

as we shall see in chapters four and

five, does not understand this relationship between the single
self and society in terms of external conditions such as those
understood by consent theory. 10 Nor does he understand this
relationship in terms of human law such as
measures,

constitutional

although law as such plays a major role in his

therapeutic "corrective." Indeed, Kierkegaard says somewhere
he did not believe political authority or government should
legislate moral behavior. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, then,
he

rejects

the

idea

of

the

regime

as

an

educational

institution, and thereby he confirms his modern heritage. Nor
does he present a theory of state that outlines the framework
for

how the wants

of

citizens

are

to

be

satisfied by

a

regulating state. To Kierkegaard, all such external concerns
are ultimately arranged through policy decisions that speak
only to material phenomena. Rather, he insists,
tension-filled

dimension

of

the

the actual

primary

unity

"individual/community" originates in consciousness and must
therefore

first

be

worked

out

in

consciousness.

As

Sl0k

9

It is difficult to resist quoting Aristotle who said in
the Politics 1253a3: "He who is without a city through nature
rather than chance is either a mean sort or superior to man."
10

See Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal
State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Richard E.
Flathman, Political Obligation (New York: Atheneum, 1972);
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State. and Utopia (New York: Basic
Books, Inc., Publishers, 1974); John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
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interprets

him,

"the

socially

qualified

conscious of himself." 11 That is to say,

individual

is

human beings are

conscious of themselves as social beings, they are conscious
of their need of society. This need is not to satisfy material
concerns such as property or money, 12 but rather to enable
each individual human being to actualize his or her potential
as a socially qualified being. Kierkegaard makes this explicit
in Works of Love when he acknowledges the universal claim that
11

[a]ll through the ages everyone who has thought deeply over

the

nature

of

community"

(SV

man

has

12,150;

recognized

in

WL,

This

153).

him

this

need

qualification

for
is

manifested in the existential requirement "You shall love the
neighbor as yourself."
For Kierkegaard this natural relationship of the single
self

to

his

departure,
work,

or

her

but indeed,

community

is

not

only

the

point

of

from the perspective of the present

the raison d'etre of what is held to constitute his

11

Sl0k, Da Kierkegaard tav, p. 13.

12

"Alas, many believe that the eternal is imaginary,
money reality: in regard to eternity and truth it is precisely
money that is the imaginary . . . . What is the earnestness of
life? If in truth you have considered this serious question,
then remember how you answered it to yourself; or let me
remind you how you answered it. Earnestness is a human being's
relationship to God; everywhere the thought of God accompanies
what a human being does, thinks, and says, earnestness is
present; therein lies earnestness. But money is the world's
god; therefore it believes that everything which has to do
with money or has a relationship to money is earnestness," SV
12,306; WL, 295-96.
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philosophy of political consciousness. 13 The aim is to become
the right sort of single self.
Every serious person who has an eye for the
conditions of this age will easily perceive how
important it is, foundationally and in obedience to
every consequence and under the weight of an
enormous responsibility but also extended to every
true extreme, boldly to oppose an immoral confusion
that
philosophically
and
socially
wants
to
demoralize "single selves" ["de Enkelte") with the
help
of
"humanity"
or
imaginary
societal
qualifications. It is a confusion that wants to
teach ungodly contempt for the primary condition of
everything religious: to be a single human being (SV
18,161; POV, 126-27).
The category of the single self therefore needs to be worked
through, and this is especially true under the conditions of
a social system that tends to ignore the social aspects of
this category and consequently tends to ignore the single
self's need for community. That is to say, "the present age"
needs to be problematized from just this perspective. It is
this task Kierkegaard set for himself.

13

Sl0k is correct when he emphasizes that the relation
to "the world" is in this sense constitutive, that it is
inherent to the unity which is the unavoidable point of
departure: individual/community. The relation to God is
constitutive in another sense, "that it is the presupposition
for the mentioned point of departure, but a presupposition of
the remarkable structure that one cannot begin in it. One has
to arrive at it; one must in the establishing movement of
existence collide with it [st0de@ den), but collide with it
as something that in the same moment presupposes itself." Da
Kierkegaard tav, p. 30.
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111:1:2

Let us now look at the actual circumstances of liberal
society that Kierkegaard considered problematic and in need
of

a

"corrective."

politics

On the

had produced

one hand,

"the

illusion

he
of

insisted
perfect

liberal

equality"

conjured up by "the false prophets of secularism in the name
of Christianity" (SV 12,74; WL, 81). On the other hand, there
was the obsessive preoccupation with worldly things generated
by

"the

present

materialism.

age"

and

its

unquestioned

The combination of

adherence

to

calculative reflection,

a

trend toward numerical equality, and the primary ranking of
economic security,

Kierkegaard feared could only result in

envy becoming "the negatively unifying principle" (SV 14,75;
TA 81). That is to say, envy would bring "people together on
the basis of what they are against,

rather than what they

support. " 14
To

Kierkegaard

envy

and

its

consequences

meant

the

emergence of the principle of characterlessness, a pathology
that will

be

discussed

in detail

later

in this

chapter.

Essentially characterlessness expresses itself in the absence
of genuine action or decision thereby numbing the need for
societal relations and producing events that exude an air of
artificiality (SV 14,66-7; TA, 71-2). As Kierkegaard laments,
there was a general inability to translate the considerations

14

Merold Westphal, p. 57.
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of

reflection

and

observation

into

deed.

Insofar

as

the

ethical can only express itself in action, this all important
category of the human condition was negated and in its stead
the principle of comparison was

engendered.

In turn,

the

principle of comparison is what generated envy.
Although

there

was

nothing

new

about

envy,

here

in

modernity Kierkegaard believed it had taken on a different
face.

Where

admiration,

before

envy

implying a

had

traditionally

tended

recognition of excellence,

toward
in "the

present age," he lamented, envy had turned toward leveling,
a condition which "stifles and impedes; it levels" (SV 14,77;
TA,

84) .

Substantively

the

ingredients

that

make

up

the

framework holding society together may be the same, but they
point in different directions, have taken on new colors, or
more

appropriately,

colors.

Thus

they

leveling

have

renders

lost

their

differentiating

individuals

uniform,

yet

atomized, isolated, and impotent at a marginal distance from
the relational core of human existence.
Under the sway of the leveling process the single self
is

left

unconnected

to

fellow

human

beings

and

to

the

community as a whole 15 engrossed with computing the problems
of the political relationship, but never actively engaging in

15

As Tocqueville described in Democracy in America, tr.
George Lawrence, ed. J.P. Mayer (Garden City, NY: Doubleday
& Company, Inc., 1969), p. 508: The individual is "forever
thrown back on himself alone . . . shut up in the solitude of
his own heart."
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it,

never

process

actively

expressing

initiates

what

citizenship.

might

be

called

The

leveling

a

negative

intentionality that contradicts Kierkegaard's conception of
human nature proper.
The leveling process is the counterfeit anticipation
of eternal life, which has been abolished as otherworldly and now is to be realized here in abstracto.
If everyone, each one separately, essentially is in
the
divine
totality,
then
equality
is
the
consumation. But if the dialectic turns away from
inwardness and wants to restore equality by the
negative principle that they who separately are not
essential are equal in the union of externality,
then this is the leveling process. 16
When, in addition, human consensus is now seen to determine
the relationship between the single self and the state, Karl
Lowith may be correct when he suggests Kierkegaard agreed with
Marx that the modern human being as bourgeois is not a zoon
politikon; "as a citizen he is abstracted from himself as a
private individual." 17
The focus from the political perspective will first be
on

the problem of

externality

and

its

connection to

the

leveling process and the latter's eager promoter according to
Kierkegaard:

public

opinion

(Publikum).

Secondly,

the

dissertation will discuss the political consequences of this

16

PAP VII 1 B 135:15, emphasis added. For a sympathetic
understanding of the leveling process around this same time
see Tocqueville, Op. Cit. vol. II, part III, especially
chapters 19 and 21. Kierkegaard was apparently not familiar
with this greatest work of Tocqueville's.
17

From Hegel to Nietzsche (Garden City, NY: Doubleday &
Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 242-43.
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pathological relationship.
Kierkegaard's major point, which contradicts the leading
political theories of his day, is that the idea of sociality,
to distinguish it from his "idea of community," is not what
can save the age. A number of things appear to be happening
simultaneously here. The two concepts appear to be alike, and
that is precisely the problem as Kierkegaard sees it. They
have been confused with one another; their differences have
not

been discerned.

But

their

differences

are

essential,

because the idea of sociality expresses quantitative measures,
what

Kierkegaard

sometimes

scathingly

refers

to

as

the

"numerical" (SV 14,96; TA, 106). He concedes that this form
of

"association-principle"

has

its

validity

in

terms

of

material interests, meaning for decisions on policy and the
distribution of goods this principle will do. But these items
are not the object of his discourse. In contrast, the ''idea
of community" expresses a qualitative measure, an experience
of consciousness that allows the single self the benefits of
community without the loss of its self-defining nature
14, 58;

TA,

62) . 18 Kierkegaard

illustrates this

idea by an

astronomical analogy and then compares the two.
"The harmony of the spheres is the unity of each
planet relating to itself and to the whole. Take
away one of the relations, and there will be chaos.
But in the world of individuals the relation is not
the only constituting factor, and therefore there
are two forms. Remove the relation to oneself, and
we have the tumultuous self-relating of the mass to
18

See introductory quotation to chapter IV.
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(SV

an idea; but remove this as well,
brutality (SV 14,58; TA, 63).
While

the

latter

is

the

then we have

solution to

the

problem of

modernity as will be shown in the following chapters,

the

former Kierkegaard perceived as the major ideological problem
of modernity.

But ingeniously he also recognizes it as an

instrument of skepticism necessary for the right development
of selfhood (SV 14,96; TA, 106). The idea of sociality serves
a purpose, but ultimately it is negative inasmuch as in "the
present age" it serves as entertainment, as an escape, or as
an illusion; it does not fulfill a genuine need. Modern man
has developed a series of artificial wants which he believes
the numerical association can fulfill. Its dialectic is that
as it strengthens individuals it enervates them; it
strengthens by the numerical in the union, but this
is ethically a weakening. Only if the single self
despite the whole world has won an ethical
disposition in himself, only then can there be talk
of in truth uniting (SV 14,96-7; TA, 106).
There is a strong implication here that the single self
who belongs to a group,

or to "the many" whom Kierkegaard

admits is his polemical aim,

19

is somehow different from the

person who remains his own self.

In that sense it could be

argued that Kierkegaard sees a regressive movement to the
animal stage on the part of the modern single self who adheres
to

the

idea

concerns.

19

In

of

sociality

and

its

The

Sickness

Unto

Death

PAP VIII 1 A 23 (JP 5979).
148

emphasis
this

on

external

impression

is

strengthened by the following claim:
[T]he concept judgment corresponds to the single
self; judgment is not made en masse. People can be
put to death en masse, can be sprayed en masse, can
be flattered en masse, in short in many ways they
can be treated as cattle, but people cannot be
judged as cattle, for cattle cannot come under
judgment. No matter how many are judged, if the
judging is to have any earnestness and truth, then
each single self is judged (SV 15,172; SUD, 123).
The regression to the animal stage is problematic inasmuch as
for Kierkegaard human beings are by nature both animal and
spirit.

Any attempt to examine the single self

perspective

Kierkegaard

Westphal has pointed out,

would

consider

from that

reductionist.

As

the discussion is not about an

evolutionary movement still to be completed. Rather,
to become a herd is to sink, to fall below what one
already is. But since we are spirit by nature we
cannot become simply or merely animal, and the human
herd will always be distinctively human.
It
presupposes, for example, envy which the animal herd
lacks . . . . Mass society is a flight from spirit.
It is a state in which those who are a polar tension
of nature and spirit play the role of the animals
they can never be. It is the shared bad faith by
which individuals help each other sustain the
illusion that they can shirk their spiritual destiny
by joining the public. 20
People find solace and power in numbers,

but it is a

power that can only satisfy their animal nature, and hence
they

are

left

individually

incomplete.

As

Kierkegaard

concludes this argument with scathing irony, "As long as we
are many about it, then there is no wrong. It is nonsense and

20

Westphal,
"Kierkegaard's Sociology,"
pp.
48-9.
References are to PAP XI 2 A 88 (JP 2986) and SV 14,75-7; TA
81-4.
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an antiquated notion that the many can do wrong" (SV 15,172;
SUD, 123). Such is the wisdom of an age that determines all
values by consent.
It

is

that,

clear

inasmuch

as

the

unity

"individual/community" is the point of departure, Kierkegaard
at least has certain requirements, if not an entire theory of
state,

for

appropriate

how

that

subtitle

community
for

should

the work

be

structured.

on which

much

of

An
this

section is based, Two Ages: A literary Review, would be "the
impotence of politics." In this review of a novella of the
same name Kierkegaard juxtaposes the two foremost political
structures of modernity, that of revolution to win individual
freedoms and the leveling process to assure equality both of
which resulted in the loss of political authority. In the case
of the former,

the French Revolution had led to violence,

anarchy, and riotousness (SV 14,58; TA 63), and in the case
of

the

latter,

the

demand

for

equality had

produced

the

leveling process. Both events happened, Kierkegaard claims,
as the result of abuse of political power, and hence political
authority had brought this nemesis of its own demise upon
itself (SV 14,98; TA, 108).
This development meant that all relationships, be they
political,
equivocated,

social,
i.e.

or
the

familial
natural

in

nature,

(conventional?)

had

been

authority

inherent to such relations had eroded. It had eroded because
the essential third factor, the idea, had dissipated and there
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was no longer an object to which the parties could commit
themselves. All points of direction had simply become blurred
and unfocused leaving the relations intact but essentially
meaningless.
If the essential passion is taken away, the one
consideration, everything becomes an insignificant
externality without character. Then the flow of the
spring of ideality is stopped,
life together
(Samlivet] becomes stagnant water, and this is
crudeness.
The coiled springs of liferelationships, which are what they are only because
of qualitatively distinguishing passion, lose their
resilience; the distance of the differentiated from
its difference in the expression of the qualitative
is not the law for the relation of inwardness to
each other in the relation. Inwardness is lacking,
and to that extent the relation does not exist, or
the relation is an inert cohesion (SV 14,58,72; TA,
62, 78) . 21
The loss of the idea in the political relationship means
that

the

role

of

the

citizen

changes.

Where

before

participation was the defining characteristic, spectatorship
now characterizes the citizen. Kierkegaard says the citizen
has become a third person (Trediemand},
with the idea or "the third factor},
belongs in the relation.

(not to be confused

meaning he no longer

That is to say,

the single self

21 It is unfortunate that the new edition of Two Ages
translates det Forskjelliges Fjernhed fra sit Forskjellige as
"difference between opposites." Being different does not mean
being opposites, and "distance" has a meaning other than
"difference." The possessive sit is important inasmuch as it
implies an underlying assumption of these different entities
essentially belonging together. That is the whole point of the
third factor. They belong together in the idea. Thus by
invoking the third factor, Kierkegaard has avoided questions
regarding the type of relationship between the entities and
thereby avoided such Hegelian prototypes as the "Master-Slave"
pair.
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stands outside the relationship and becomes alienated toward
itself.
The role of citizenship has been marginalized by the
cautious

(prudent)

preoccupation

with

calculating

the

particulars of the relationship, and the political authority
has been reduced to meaningless procedural manipulation (SV
14,73; TA, 79). The citizen no longer recognizes the bond to
the political authority, a bond Kierkegaard says is natural
(he uses the analogy of father and son (Ibid)), reminding us
of his claim in Works of Love about the need of community
natural to human beings. 22 If the naturalness of the political
relation

is

unrecognizable

to

the

single

self,

then

the

necessity for existential commitment to the political is also
unrecognizable.
Kierkegaard is here pointing to the major problem of
liberal

theory,

its

inability

to

engender

moral

fervor

especially toward any notion of the good of the whole. This
is important to Kierkegaard inasmuch as this concern for the
whole, this good is constitutive of his "idea of community."

22

Kierkegaard
emphasizes
this
bond
between the
individual and the state when he comments in a journal note
that the political relationship must engage each individual
separately. "The excellent of Plato's Republic is precisely
that he does not make the state higher than the individual.
. In order to describe the individual he describes the
state; he describes a democrat, and in order to do that he
describes democracy. He constructs a state for the individual,
unum nor is omnes
this is the proper human ideali ty;
otherwise we get the confusion about the many manifesting
something entirely different by being many, than what each is
separately." PAP VII 1 A 70 (JP 3327).
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aut in liberal theory such concern for the whole has been
sacrificed for the sake of individual self-satisfaction,

a

satisfaction grounded in the rights to property and hence in
externality. As Locke himself concedes, reason, by which he
meant

something

like

community

or

"natural

love

amongst

men, 1123 has been sacrificed on the altar of self-interest. 24
In such a move the single self from Kierkegaard's perspective
has paradoxically isolated itself from the shared morality
that

constitutes

community.

The

single

self

has

isolated

itself from itself, inasmuch as it by nature needs community
but instead sought refuge in the bosom of the crowd. "While
both

love

of

the

ideal

and

the

love

of

neighbor

place

constraints on self-love, there is a love that does not, and

23

The Second Treatise of Government, #5.

24

Ibid, #124 and #181. Also Sheldon Wolin, Politics and
Vision (Boston: Litttle, Brown and Company, 1960), p. 332; and
James L. Wiser, Political Philosophy: A History of the Search
for Order (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983),
p. 222. Of course, one should be careful not to exaggerate the
reality of a natural community in Locke. It is possible to
read it as Locke's moral promise as we have done here and as
is the tendency,
for example, with Thomas Jefferson's
"Declaration of Independence." However, M. Seliger, The
Liberal Politics of John Locke (London: George Allen & Unwin,
Ltd., 1968), p. 92, is right to point out that reason does
have a role in creating an "artificial" but real or rational
society when he argues that "(w)hat is political and nonpolitical [the state of nature) are comparable because a state
of war exists wherever force is used without right whether
there is, or is not, a common judge. What is political and
non-political remains distinguished because the concerted
appeal to heaven is occasioned by and directed against
government, whereas in the hypothetical state of nature
everybody is judged between himself and others. Herein lies
the most important practical difference: political society
minimizes the use of force."
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thUS can be easily put in the service of pure self-interest.
That is the love of the crowd.

1125

Although he does not specifically say so,
that

Kierkegaard

distances

himself

from

it is clear

liberal

theory's

appeal to the most basic human instincts and instead wants to
appeal to what is best in human nature. 26 He insists all human
beings possess

a

higher nature

that

has

the

capacity to

transcend the givenness of mundane existence,

and if they

choose to activate this "second nature," in freedom, then the
distances between the differentiated and its difference is
fundamentally

narrowed

passionately.

That

is

to
to

where
say,

the

the

relation

tension

of

can

exist

the

unity

"individual/community" has regained its elasticity and hence
its positive mode where self-identification becomes possible,

25

Westphal, "Kierkegaard's Sociology," p. 57. References
are to PAP X 3 A 509 (JP 1789); PAP X 4 A 344 (JP 1799); and
SV 18,156-57; POV, 118. As Kierkegaard suggests in a journal
note, historical categories change and now the crowd has
become the tyrant, PAP VIII 1 A 123 (JP 4118). For more on the
relationship of the single self and the crowd see PAP VII 1
A 176 (JP 5948).
26

Moreover, Kierkegaard who was an avid reader of
Aristotle cannot have avoided Aristotle's reminder in the
Politics 1254a35-1254bl about who is under consideration: "It
is in things whose condition is according to nature that one
ought particularly to investigate what is by nature, not in
things that are defective. Thus the human being to be studied
is one whose state is best both in body and in soul -- in him
this is clear; for in the case of the depraved, or those in
a depraved condition, the body is often held to rule the soul
on account of their being in a condition that is bad and
unnatural." In chapters IV and V it will be shown how
Kierkegaard applies this Aristotelian approach to analysis and
appeals to what is best in human beings.
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that is, self-identification as a socially qualified single
self

"who

accepts

what

through

the

differentiation

is

transparent." 27

III:1:3

What has been said of the political relationship is to
a

large

degree

true

of

the

social

and

the

familial

relationships. Kierkegaard compares the meaninglessness of all
these relationships including the political relationship, in
"the present age"

to a

grandfather clock that

instead of

striking the correct hour simply strikes once every hour. The
clock works, as it were, yet it does not work. It expresses
its function, yet its function is faulty for it does not give
the correct time.
And so it is in an enervating tension: the
relationship exists (bestaae); with an abstract
uninterruptedness that prevents the breakdown,
something expresses itself that may be called the
manifestations of the relations, and yet the
relations are not only indicated imprecisely but
almost meaninglessly {SV 14,74; TA, 80).
By not engaging actively in the political relationship,
or in the other relationships that according to Kierkegaard
are natural to the human condition, there is a breakdown in
the unity "individual/community" which consequently loses its
meaningfulness. Inasmuch as the purpose of the relationship,
the third factor (the "idea of community"), the good, as it

27

Sl0k, Da Kierkegaard tav, p. 18.
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were,

that

individuals

outside
to

the

each

self

which

other

was

while

supposed

to

maintaining

bind
their

individuality, their differences, that has ceased to exist.

on

the one hand, human individuals have lost sight of their

true selves as social beings in need of community.

On the

other hand, they have lost sight of the moral dimension that
expresses their "second nature," they have lost sight of the
ethical,

of

the

good.

Kierkegaard to be

in a

To

lose

sight of

the

good

is

for

state of passionlessness which he

insists is a state that lacks the ''investments of enthusiasm
and inwardness in the political and the religious" {SV 14,69;
TA,

74).

With this pronouncement Kierkegaard has finally revealed
that he considers the political and the religious to be the
essential structures of the unity individual/community. But
he is careful to add that this is not because the religious,
i.e. Christianity, needs the political. Rather the political,
i.e. the state, needs the religious, needs Christianity.
Guizot says, the only politics for the state is
indifference toward all religion.
That suffices for the old Christianity which said,
Christianity is indifferent toward any state
constitution, can live equally well under all of
them.
Alas, but this inversion that it is now the state
that wants to play the superior as if it did not
need religion -- while it is religion that does not
need the state. 28
As Sl0k explains, the aim of Christianity is to proclaim the

28 PAP X 3 A 679.
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God-relation

as

the

only

justification

for

authentic

existence. But inasmuch as that message in and of itself is
incommensurable with the requirements of worldly existence,
Christianity is indifferent to the constitution of any state.
Although Christianity may establish itself as a state church
which is an economic advantage as well as an advantage for its
need for security, in its essence, in performing its duties,
it does not really need such assistance. 29 Still, Kierkegaard
is adamant

in

his

stance

against

the

call

for

religious

tolerance which he regards as religious indifference. From his
perspective there was only one god, the Christian God of the
Incarnation, which he considered an historical concept making
Christianity different from all other religions. 30 Therefore
toleration would amount at best to disinterest and at worst
to heresy. 31
Christianity must proclaim its essence as the truth, but
precisely for this reason neither can the state be tolerant
toward religion, because it depends on it. That is to say,
according to Kierkegaard religion performs an indispensable

29 Da Kierkegaard tav, pp. 42-3.
3

o PAP IX A 264. Also Sl0k, Da Kierkegaard tav, p. 45.

31

"Christianity has never been tolerant to the point
where it would allow other people to be pagans or perish. No,
it has been intolerant to the point where the Apostle would
rather lose his life in order to proclaim Christianity to
them. One forgets that intolerance is perhaps to want to rule
over others, but that it certainly is not intolerance to want
to suffer to help others. 11 PAP VIII A 591.
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function in society. This function is not just on par with
other institutions and organizations. It is not just a service
rendered to those citizens who are especially religiously
interested.

"Christianity represents the new and undeniable

condition of life . . . on the basis of which a human being
can become an authentic and serious human being.

1132

Sl0k concludes Kierkegaard's thought on the subject of
the relation between the church and the state with a claim
bears

that

unmistakable

resemblance

to

Tocqueville's

description of this relationship. 33 "The state . . . needs the
church, and it is only in the church the procedure is carried
out which sends the human being back into life in society as
"good"

citizens.

position

1134

different

In other words,
from

and

the church occupies a

higher

than

other

social

institutions inasmuch as its function does not have a specific
purpose. As Kierkegaard emphasizes in a journal note,
While the church actually represents "becoming"
(Vorden], the state represents existence [bestaaen].
Therefore it is so dangerous when state and church
grow together and are identified . . . . When it [the
state] is an existence (et Bestaaende], one has to
be very careful about abolishing it precisely
because the "state" is in the idea "the established"
( "det Bestaaende"]; and perhaps one is better served
by energetically maintaining a less successful
establishment
(Bestaaende]
than reforming too

32

Sl0k, Da Kierkegaard tav, pp. 43, 46. Also PAP III A

33

Op. Cit. vol. I, pp. 287-301.

34

Sl0k, Da Kierkegaard tav, p. 46.

216.
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early. 35
precisely because Christianity looks to the future, it exists
in order to provide the authenticity that makes it possible
for human beings to develop their existence in the various
institutions of the state. That is to say, it makes political
life

in

the

state

humanly

worthy. 36

Christianity

thereby

posits merely two obligations on the single self: to humble
oneself before the requirements of the ideal, and "then for
the rest" to be a good (Christian) citizen (SV 16,73; TC, 71).

III:2:1

The desire for immortality that has plagued the human
disposition since time immemorial in its attempt to attain a
godlike happiness is for Kierkegaard nothing but a prideful
experiment in self-deification. It is an endeavor to negate
what

human

beings

are,

mortal,

and

therefore

imperfect.

Because human beings can think the perfect, however,

their

existence is necessarily a struggle to reach perfection and
suffering at

not being able to complete the struggle.

As

Michael Henry suggests,

"the self-deifying self is somewhat

aware,

be

the

demand

to

everything

is

a

sign,

not

of

superiority but of inferiority, for such a self actually lacks

35

PAP X 1 A 552.

36

Sl0k, Da Kierkegaard tav, p. 46.
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the strength and the courage to live with imperfection and
existential

tensions." 37

Kierkegaard

insists

existence

rendering

Hence

negative

on

a

psychological

categories

impotent human

dominate

beings

the

level,

everyday

victims

of

"externality."
Public opinion plagues the human condition as the self
has become defined
superficial

in terms

consciousness

of

of

its public role based on

social

differentiations

{SV

12,88-91; WL, 95-7) . 38 It is because of this superficial level
of consciousness that the leveling process becomes possible
when

envy

engages

the

single

self's

imagination

and

in

Kierkegaard's opinion apparently dominates it.
A state of envy is an alienated state,

quantitatively

justified, that implicitly denies all qualitative categories
of community (SV 14,69; TA, 74). The consequence is abstract
subjectivism which

expresses

itself

in

an

atomization

of

individuals. In such separated individuals "the political and
religious bonds, which . . . invisibly and spiritually hold
states together, have been dissolved or weakened" resulting

37

Michael Henry, "The Dostoyevskian Psyche and the Total
Critique" in The Good Man in Society: Active Contemplation.
Essays in Honor of Gerhart Niemeyer, eds. John A. Gueguen,
Michael Henry, and James Rhodes (Lanham, MD: University Press
of America, 1989), p. 133.
38

Kresten Nordentoft, Kierkegaard's Psychology, trans.
Bruce Kirmmse (Pittsburgh: Dusquesne University Press, 1972),
p. 244, explains: "In Works of Love social identity is
discussed as 'the outer garments of differentiation,' which
the individual binds firmly about himself and in which he
mimics all his life, like an actor in his costume."
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in isolation and hence a concentration on narrowly conceived
. t eres t s. 39
self-in

compares

According

to

Nordentoft,

Kierkegaard

this development to the transition of the Gree.k city

state from a cosmological civilization permeated by the "Godconsciousness," to an anthropological culture representing
"the modern reflective and individualistic consciousness." 40
Kierkegaard

suggests

in

his

dissertation

that

this

is

symbolized by Socrates' lone voice of warning "which never
concerns itself with the substantive interests of the life of
the state. " 41
Kierkegaard diagnosed this illness of modern society as
a pathology of consciousness, and inherent to this pathology
is a denial of human nature proper.
condition

as

spiritlessness

He characterized this

(Aandl0shed)

which

is

best

described by what he called its philistine-bourgeois mentality
(Spidsborgerlighed) lacking all potentiality, or possibility,

39 Ibid,

p. 245. Nordentoft is quoting from Either/Or,
vol. I, pub. Victor Eremita, trans. David F. and Lillian
Marvin Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944
and 1959), p. 139.
40

Ibid.

41 The Concept of Irony with continual Reference to
Socrates, trans. Lee M. Capel (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1965), p. 188 (SV 1,195), hereafter known as CI. It
should be noted that Kierkegaard here in his dissertation
refers strictly to Plato's Apology and relies far too much on
Hegel for his interpretation.
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as Kierkegaard prefers (SV

15,97; SUD, 41) . 42 This pathology

bad resulted in a life "of meaningless externality devoid of
character"

(SV

(Lidenskab),
short,

without

human

necessary

14,

for

58;

62),

earnestness,

existence
the

TA,

had

"idea

lost

of

42

a

life

without
its

without

inwardness.

fundamental

community."

passion

This

In

ground

loss

was

As we saw in chapter one, Kierkegaard embraces
Aristotelian teleology with the categories of possibility and
actuality, and underscores that it is a movement (kinesis) in
the language of existence, not of abstraction (SV 10,45; CUP,
306). Both presuppose the presence of spirit: "Man is a
synthesis of the psychical and the physical; however, a
synthesis is unthinkable if the two are not united in a third.
This third is spirit," SV 6,137; CA, 43. On the meaning of
spirit see The Sickness Unto Death where Kierkegaard gives a
profound characterization of spirit and simultaneously
explains the meaning of "spiritlessness": "Every human
existence that is not conscious of itself as spirit or
personally conscious before God as spirit, every human
existence that does not rest transparently in God but vaguely
rests in and merges in some abstract universality (state,
nation, etc.) or, in the dark about his self, regards his
capacities merely as powers to produce without becoming deeply
aware of their source, regards his self, if it is to have
intrinsic meaning, as an indefinable something -- every such
existence, whatever it achieves, be it most amazing, however
intensively it enjoys life aesthetically
every such
existence is nevertheless despair," SV 6,102; SUD, 46.
Spiritlessness, then, constitutes denial of one's nature
properly speaking, meaning there is not even consciousness of
potentiality, or to use Kierkegaard's (infamous) phrase, there
is not even consciousness of the "possibility of possibility,"
SV 6,136; CA, 42.
Eugene Webb in Philosophers of Consciousness (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1988), p. 270, has suggested
this movement (in the Aristotelian sense from potentiality to
actuality) is a "process of actualization, of coming into
existence in the proper sense, " a metaphoric image Kierkegaard
favored. As such it "has the advantage of emphasizing the
dynamism of the actual rather than the stasis of the ideal"
as is "the tendency of Voegelin' s favored Metaxy metaphor
[which) image[s) human existence as an inevitable deficiency
longing for an unattainable sufficiency."
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substituted with what he called a "dyspeptic, abnormal common
sense"

which has

focuses

exclusively

reflection.
essential

its ground
on

summarily,
dimension

in

public

opinion

self-interested,

and which
calculative

human experience had lost

as

a

"tension

of

its most

reflection

transformed the whole of existence into an equivocation, that
in its facticity is.
dialectical fraud,

while privatization [privatissime),

a

surreptitiously inserts a secret way of

reading -- that it is not" {SV 14,71-2; TA, 77). 43

III:2:2

In a

double sense Kierkegaard teaches that the true

nature of the single self has been corrupted both in terms of
what

it

naturally

is

and

what

is

ethically

possible

or

desirable. On the one hand, all individual judgment has been
relinquished to public opinion,

to group interests,

to an

aggregation of uniform beings. Then the single self stands in
contradiction to its natural self as it acts prudentially in
order

to

conform

to

the

public's

conception

of

what

is

sensible. It is a condition that expresses itself in endless
computations that signify a general disinterestedness -- the

43

It is unfortunate that the new translation of Two Ages
misreads this ingenious conceptualization by Kierkegaard and
consequently mistranslates the latter part of this quotation.
The dialectical fraud is not that the individual in the
privacy of his own heart reads or reflects in secret ways that
are unreal in some way, but that he understands his
dialectical existence as a public/private bifurcation rather
than as a transcendent/immanent differentiation.
163

very

requirement

of

scientific methodology.

From this

it

follows that the problem has been transformed from one of
existential qualities to one of abstract formulations,
doctrine,
negating

or ideology,
a

as

it were.

differentiated

self

i.e.

On the other hand,

that

has

its

ground

by
in

transcendence, values have been equivocated as the distinction
between good and evil loses its requirement for decisiveness.
From Kierkegaard's perspective this equivocation means
the

ethical

demand

of

human

existence,

that

necessarily

follows from the proper conception of human nature, has been
abandoned. In other words, there has been a loss of character
in the sense that qualities like inwardness and commitment to
the common good have come to be considered imprudent.

The

problem with prudential calculations is that they necessarily
lead

to

comparisons

and

are

ultimately

skeptical

as

the

question of either-or is incessantly asked, and only answered
with another either-or.

The question of pleasure dominates

these calculations, and since pleasure cannot be measured and
certainly cannot be measured in terms of the pleasure of
others,

indecision

is

necessarily

the

result.

But

human

imagination, being what it is, will always believe the other's
pleasure is greater, and this is how Kierkegaard envisions the
single self becomes entrapped in the condition of envy and
uncertainty, its own and that of others (SV 14,75; TA, 81).
From this perspective it sounds like Kierkegaard believed
the modern single self has never grown up, has never reached
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the maturity of being truthful to the self in the sense that
self-awareness is attained without the aid of comparison. In
the Kierkegaardian vernacular, the modern single self has not
learned to choose itself as is the obligation of each single
self, has not asked the Socratic question of itself. Instead
we live a philistine existence of superficiality as a product
of what the given society and its culture inescapably will
make a person into given his predisposition. As Johannes Sl0k
has so aptly interpreted Kierkegaard, a philistine lives in
the illusion that he has freely made the principal decisions
for his life which in reality external anonymous forces have
made on his behalf. 44
When uncertainty has taken this strong a hold of the
single

self,

Kierkegaard

the
insists,

decisions
we

are

of

life

then

no

become
longer

dictated;
capable

of

recognizing excellence, no longer capable of admiring it and
evaluating it for its significance to society -- imitation is
no longer a possibility for ordering society,

learning by

example is no longer an option.
The present age tends toward mathematical equality
44

Kierkegaards univers:
En ny guide til geniet
(K¢benhavn: Centrum, 1983), p. 28. Sl0k brings out a point
about the philistine bourgeois that would seem to indicate
that Kierkegaard in fact had four major spheres of "existence"
even though he did not have a fictitious author to describe
and analyse this existence-sphere. The reason for that is, of
course, obvious inasmuch as a philistine bourgeois would not
be able to explain his own condition. Once a philistine
bourgeois becomes aware of his own condition and what it
means, he is immediately transformed into an aesthete -- "in
Kierkegaard's specific meaning of the word." Ibid, p. 28-9.
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so that almost equally through all classes so many
make one individual [Individ) {SV 14,78; TA, 85).
It is the age of the ascendency of the category of "generation
over the category of individuality"
this is true,

( sv 14, 7 8; TA,

84·) • If

it is also true that the single self suffers

from a disinterest in self-improvement and a disinterest in
the betterment of the community. To Kierkegaard this spells
both ethical and political impotence, and he considers such
a condition utterly irrational.
The pathology is completed when envy, the consequence of
uncertainty, instead begins to degrade excellence, to minimize
its significance, until it actually is no longer excellence.
Then "envy directs itself against the excellence that is, and
against that which will

come"

{SV 14,77;

TA,

84). 45

Envy

establishes itself as an instrument of leveling, and from this
nothing excellent can arise.

The

leveling process

is thus

impotent as it stifles and impedes initiative and is for that
reason "abstraction's victory over indi victuals" ( SV 14, 78; TA,
84). Then the leveling process is maximized, the bottom of the
abyss,

which

Kierkegaard

likens

to

"deathly

silence,"

is

reached. Out of this "deathly silence" nothing can rise, and
powerlessness {Afmregtighed) reigns {SV 14,77; TA, 84).

45

In the Danish text no i talization appears
short sentence as it does in the translation.
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in this

III:2:3

The

juxtapositioning

of

excellence

and

leveling

is

deliberate on Kierkegaard's part. He wants to emphasize how
the latter negates the former and, by so doing, negates human
nature

proper

as

intentionally

oriented. 46

He

defines

graphically the emergence of this contradiction over time
borrowing without blushing from Hegel's methodology.
The dialectic of antiquity oriented toward excellence,
he says, implied a single great individual actively and hence
interestedly participating in the affairs of the city and
thereby fulfilling the requirements of his social nature.
still, Kierkegaard reminds the reader, there were many such
as the slaves for whom this was not a possibility. Nor was it
an alternative for women, something Kierkegaard omits from his
consideration. The next step is the dialectic of Christianity
oriented toward representation which

implied the majority

seeing itself in the representative and "liberated in the
consciousness that it is them he represents,
self-consciousness"

(SV 14,78;

TA,

84).

in a sort of

The participatory

element has already been drastically reduced, which means the
depravation of the single self has begun. 47 Finally, we have
46

Here we should understand the intentional orientation
to refer especially to the participatory aspect of human
experience, a requirement of possessing a social nature.
47 One might wonder whether Kierkegaard really means to

say that the emergence of institutionalized Christianity is
in fact the beginning of the individual's downfall. If so,
that may indeed be the reason he places so much emphasis on
achieving contemporaneity with the first generation which
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the dialectic of "the present age" which is oriented toward
equality. At this level the participatory element of the human
condition has been completely numbed by the leveling process
which Kierkegaard insists is the logical implication of the
generation's dominance over single indi victuals.
concrete

participation

we

get

the

abstraction

Instead of
of

public

opinion which tends to dictate human experience.
As a member of the public, Kierkegaard explains that the
single self remains an observer of existence,
engage in it.

but does not

Public opinion is incapable of establishing

community because its members lack contemporaneity, they lack
presence. They lack the engaged non-spectator presence of the
active

person

of

inwardness

who,

for

example,

form

the

membership of majorities and minorities. While the latter are
accountable to their membership, this is not true of public
opinion which therefore lacks all integrity. Yet, it remains
a dominant force upon the psyche of its members, even under
the worst circumstances because public

opinion

can do

no

wrong. Public opinion is always "right," or it is not at all.
In contrast, majorities may well lose their power if their
membership lose interest (SV 14,84; TA, 92).

passionately participated in the life of Jesus. See SV 6,5398; PF, 55-110.
For a parallel argument see Eric Voegelin, The New
Science of Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1952), p. 123: "The more people are drawn or pressured into
the Christian orbit, the greater will be the number among them
who do not have the spiritual stamina for the heroic adventure
of the soul that is Christianity."
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Kierkegaard suggests that the phantom of the public and
the all pervasive power of public opinion emerges only in the
absence of a strong communal life which gives substance to the
historical

single

self's

existential

experience.

What

is

lacking in modern society is such a strong communal life,
precisely

because

substituted by

the

participatory

an emphasis

interests of the self.

on

the

self

element
and

has

the

been

external

Kierkegaard is drawing the obvious

conclusion that also occurred to Tocqueville, 48 namely that
only

through

the

act

of

participation

can

single

selves

transcend their private reality in a concern for the good of
the whole.

Lacking this element of existence,

people will

suffer from the loss of a concrete foundation that reinforces
and upbuilds the single self through experience, yet without
shaping it in any determined sense.

The result are single

selves who have turned into anonymous uniform beings that lack
all

distinction. 49

48

Finally,

membership

in

the

public

is

Op. Cit. vol. II, pp. 509-13.

49

As Hannah Arendt would argue, it is only through
participation in the political that the individual can
distinguish himself, an axiom Kierkegaard apparently also
subscribes to. The Human Condition, (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 30-7. Also Glenn Tinder, Against
Fate: An Essay on Personal Dignity (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1981}, p. 36.
In a parallel description of public opinion Tocqueville
phrases it well when he says in Democracy in America, p. 435:
"The nearer men are to a common level of uniformity, the less
are they inclined to believe blindly in any man or any class.
But they are readier to trust the mass, and public opinion
becomes more and more mistress of the world."
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demoralizing. While there are responsibilities connected with
membership

in

the

race,

or

citizenship

in

a

state

or

community, none are needed for membership in the public. The
public retains its status, for good or for bad, and requires
nothing from its membership.

Thus membership in the public

dulls the people's sense of citizenship and community to the
point where both are all but forgotten. To Kierkegaard such
a state of mind constitutes a pathology of consciousness.
At this pathological stage public opinion has entirely
corrupted individual rationality.

Moreover,

insofar as the

single self's desire for applying the extreme formulation of
the concept of equality, the leveling principle, to personal
existence, it also signifies the downfall of the single self.
It is thus an age of complete skepticism which apparently
cannot be halted,
process

because any attempt to halt the leveling

exemplifies

the

very

principle

of

leveling.

Kierkegaard refers to this as the "spontaneous combustion of
the human race {SV 14,80; TA, 87), a pregnant phrase he also
uses in Works of Love.

III:2:4

What we need to ask is what constitutes the underlying
cause for this pathological condition, and Kierkegaard is very
forthcoming
describes

and unambiguous
the

problem

as

on that point.
one
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of

the

In general he
world's

self-

. . t'ion. so
ae1f1ca

Self-deification

removes

element of transcendence and renders

the

authoritative

the world without a

standard (Maalestok) by which to measure itself. One might ask
whether

standards

must

necessarily

have

a

transcendent

dimension. Nevertheless, for Kierkegaard, the lack of such a
measure results in ambiguity and equivocation in existence,
a condition that is especially articulated in the voluntary
mediation of the principle of contradiction between good and
evil.
For

Kierkegaard

the

principle

of

contradiction

constituted an axiom of existence. "To suspend [ha:?ve = opha:?ve

=

the German aufheben) the principle of contradiction is the

existential

expression

for

being

in

contradiction

with

oneself" (SV 14,88; TA, 97). And to be in contradiction with
oneself is to be separated from the idea the framework for
which is the essential distinction between good and evil in

so "If order is to be maintained in existence -- and God
does want that, for he is not a God of confusion -- then the
first and foremost thing to keep in mind is that every human
being is an individual (enkelt) human being, becomes selfconscious of being an individual human being. If human beings
are first permitted to run together in what Aristotle calls
the animal category [Politics 128la40-43 and 128lbl5-20) -the multitude -- then this abstraction instead of being less
than nothing, less than the most insignificant individual
human being comes to be regarded as being something -- then
it does not take long before this abstraction becomes God,"
SV 15,167; SUD, 117-18.
The editors of the English translation are correct in
suggesting that II if this is the portion [ in Ar is tot le' s
Politics) to which Kierkegaard refers, he makes selective use
of it, for Aristotle argues both sides of the mass/individualexpert issue," SUD, 180, note 65.
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action

and decision

(SV

14,61;

TA,

66).

To

suspend this

essential distinction is to be nothing at all. Or to put it
in positive terms,

it means that to be existentially,

and

hence to acknowledge the distinction, is to be in harmony with
oneself, with who one is. It is to be at home with the self.
The principle of contradiction strengthens the
individual [Individ] in faithfulness to itself, so
that he, like that steadfast number three Socrates
speaks of so beautifully, will rather endure
everything than become a number four or even become
a very large even number. He will rather be
something small in faithfulness to himself than all
sorts of things in contradiction with himself" (SV
14,89; TA, 97) . 51
Not to be faithful to oneself or not to be in harmony with
oneself expresses itself in a number of debilitating ways that
are all grounded in the original suspension of the principle

51

Kierkegaard is, of course, referring to Plato's Phaedo
104c. But more importantly, he is also referring to the
Gorgias 482c where Socrates says to Callicles: "It would be
better for me that my lyre or a chorus I directed should be
out of tune and loud with discord, and that multitudes of men
should disagree with me rather than that I, being one, should
be out of harmony with myself and contradict me." The
translation is Hannah Arendt's, The Life of the Mind (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), p. 181. She emphasizes
"being one" claiming it is frequently left out in translation.
What is of particular interest in regard to this quotation is
its relationship in the dialogue to philosophy's capacity to
engender community as opposed to the efforts of rhetoric. As
Socrates insists, "philosophy speaks always the same'' (482b)
while rhetoric caters to the people's divergent interests,
not to their needs, which always are the same. Thus Plato
performs a double move inasmuch as Socrates' love of
philosophy not only creates harmony in his soul but also in
the city. For Kierkegaard, to speak always the same is to
acknowledge the principle of contradiction in its broadest
implication. It means to be in character with oneself and to
remain so, and hence to be faithful to oneself. Only by being
in harmony with oneself is community possible.
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of contradiction. But common to them all is that they sharply
differentiate between externality, a materialistic category
that in Kierkegaard's opinion preoccupies ''the present age,"
and inwardness, a passionate category he claims characterizes
the age of revolution (SV 14,57-62; TA, 61-6).
To clarify this claim it is helpful to place the examples
Kierkegaard

uses

in

two

columns,

one

that

belongs

to

inwardness and one that belongs to externality, and then to
name and describe what mediates

and hence

obscures their

distinctiveness.

inwardness

speaking
public
matter
externality
disclosedness
dissolute
objectivity

being silent
private
form
hiddenness
loving
subjectivity

The "disjunction" between the first pair, being silent
vs

speaking,

is

suspended

by

chatter.

To

chatter

is

for

Kierkegaard pathological inasmuch as he believes silence is
inwardness.

Without silence,

speech

action

and

becomes

without

inwardness,

impossible.

Here

it

essential
should

be

remembered that Kierkegaard by essential means passionate
political and religious inwardness.

It is essential speech

and action grounded in thoughtful silence that characterizes
human beings as human,

he says,

action

the

that

provides

but it is also speech and

framework
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for

community.

Thus

Kierkegaard speaks about "the more a person has ideality and
ideas in silence,

the more he will be able

in his daily

associations to regenerate [gjenf0de] his daily life and the
daily life of other people." In contrast, chatter can only
expose

emptiness

as

a

ground

and

hence

produce

nothing

essential, only thoughtlessness (SV 14,89-90; TA, 98-9). By
chatter

Kierkegaard,

of

course,

means

gossip

considers all the more prevalent because

which

he

"ambiguity is a

titillating incitement and entirely differently verbose than
the joy over the good and the abhorrence of evil" (SV 14,72;
TA, 78). 52
Chatter also suspends the distinction between public and
private, and as a result we get a public whose only interest
is what is most private (SV 14,91; TA, 100) . 53 Kierkegaard is
not so much concerned about a public/private distinction as
such, as noted above. It is, nevertheless, a popular subject
among contemporary political theorists who do not acknowledge
the

transcendent/immanent

distinction

which

Kierkegaard

52

The new translation at this point takes what would
seem to be unnecessary freedoms.
Apparently the word
"equivocation" does not appear in the Danish text. We say
apparently, because only one Danish edition of Two Ages has
been available for this project. However, several English
translations have been consulted from which it would seem an
addition has indeed been made.
53

Kierkegaard's analysis of the present age has an
immediate bearing on contemporary times, and agreement with
Westphal is easy when he suggests "Kierkegaard offers us a
shoe that fits embarrassingly well. At times it appears that
he knows us better than we know ourselves." "Kierkegaard's
Sociology," p. 44.
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considers a much more fundamental distinction. His concern is
with the pathological consciousness of the single self. He
suggests that with the creation of public opinion, a creation
he

insists

can

happen

only

in

the

absence

of

a

strong

communal life, nothing is sacred, everything is disclosed. 54
Mediating the principle of
forth

contradiction also brings

formlessness which suspends

the distinction between

what is referred to as form and matter [Indhold]. 55 That is
to say,

according to his philosophical anthropology human

beings are constituted by soul and body,

but it is spirit

that qualifies them {SV 6,138; CA, 44) . 56 With formlessness,
however,

what is inner and what is outer becomes confused

(ambiguous)

and the principle of action becomes externally

qualified.

Then

human

beings

principle"

(SV 14,92; TA,

101).

begin

to

act

strictly

"on

To posit the principle of

action or moral conscience externally,

in the majority, as

54

We might speculate that inasmuch as Kierkegaard
himself was the object of much gossip or "chatter," it is not
unlikely that a very personal feeling is emerging here. On the
other hand, the tabloids of contemporary society had their
equivalent in Kierkegaard's days (cf. The Corsair Affair, ed.
and tr. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1982), and hence Kierkegaard's proposition
cannot simply be dismissed as sour grapes.
55

Strictly speaking, Indhold means content, but I
believe Kierkegaard is taking his clue from Aristotle's
formulation in De Anima 412a where he defines the body as
matter and the soul as form, the actuality of the body.
56

In his "Historical Introduction" to The Concept of
Anxiety, p. xiv Reidar Thomte clarifies how Kierkegaard's
philosophical anthropology should be understood. See chapter
IV, p. 172, note 65.
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for example in Locke's theory of state, 57 or in accordance
the

with

"Greatest

Happiness

Principle"

as

in

utilitarianism, 58 for the sake of supporting, on principle,
the

demand

of

the

age,

disregard of the needs

is

to

act

of the whole

calculatingly
community.

It

and

in

is to

render the single self undifferentiated and hence without
personal responsibility,

and that is essentially to act in

contradiction with the genuine self and therefore to act
disharmoniously in regard to the self {SV 14,92-3; TA, 10102) . 59
57

Second Treatise of Government, ##95, 127-31.

58

John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (New
American Library, 1962), p. 319 and in passim.
59

York:

New

Cf. Sheldon Wolin , Op. Cit. p. 338: "As Locke's
argument reveals,
the growing distrust
of
conscience
stimulated the search for a new kind of conscience, social
rather than individual, one that would be an internalized
expression of external rules rather than the externalized
expression of internal convictions . . . to protect what a
growing secular society most treasured; namely weal th and
status, or more briefly, "interests."
It is also possible that Kierkegaard is referring to Kant
in regard to the formless tendency of acting "on principle."
Kant says in Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1959):
"An action performed from duty does not have its moral worth
in the purpose which is to be achieved through it but in the
maxim by which it is determined . . . . Duty is the necessity
of an action executed from respect for law" (p. 16) . He
continues, "Law alone implies the concept of an unconditional
and objective and hence universally valid necessity" (p. 34,
emphasis added). Inasmuch as the categorical imperative
"contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxim
should accord with this law . . . there is nothing remaining
in it except the universality of law as such to which the
maxim of the action should conform . . . . There is, therefore,
only one categorical imperative. It is: Act only according to
that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it
should become a universal law" (pp. 38-9, emphasis added). The
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To

be

without
is

Kierkegaard,
suspends

the

disclosedness.
appearance

to

of

personal
be

responsibility,

superficial,
between

distinction
Inasmuch
being

as

and

according

superficiality

hiddenness

"superficiality

anything

and

to

and

gives

everything,"

what

the
is

essential is not allowed to be thought through in hiddenness,
and thoughtful intention is not allowed to emerge. Everything
is hurriedly forced to the surface, undeliberated, and what
is

disclosed

is

characterized

emptiness which Kierkegaard says

as

emptiness.

It

is

an

"nevertheless extensively

wins the disappointing advantage of delusion over essential

point for Kierkegaard is that one's duty in this case is to
universal law and hence to something external to one's self.
Duty is not to the good, not to the neighbor, not to God. It
is to an abstract principle the goodness of which cannot be
guaranteed, or at least is not guaranteed by Kant. As he says
a little later, "A thing has no worth other than that
determined for it by the law" (p. 54). Although this
legislation which "determines all worth must therefore have
a dignity, i.e. , unconditional and incomparable worth" to
which a rational being can have nothing but "respect" (p. 54),
Kant also concerns himself very little about the effects of
such a principle on the individual human being except, of
course, to secure his autonomy. One could perhaps even argue
Wolin's characterization would be accurate in the case of the
categorical imperative as well.
For Kierkegaard, in contrast, "principium, as the word
says, is the primary, that is, the substantial, the idea in
the unopened form of feeling and inspiration that impels the
individual by its inner drive" {SV 14,92; TA, 101). In other
words, principle is what develops the concrete individual from
within, forms character by its passionate inwardness, and
moves the individual to do the good. For more on doing the
good, or as Kierkegaard puts it, "willing one thing" see
Purity of Heart, tr. Douglas Steere, (New York: Harper &
Brothers Publishers, 1956) in passim, and Jeremy Walker's
excellent interpretation To Will One Thing: Reflections on
Kierkegaard's PURITY OF HEART (Montreal: Mc Gill-Queen's
University Press, 1972).
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disclosedness
deepening"

which

(SV

transparency,

has

14,93;
this

the
TA,

form

homogeneous
102).

of

essentiality

Rather

disclosedness

than

of

achieving

only

uncovers

appearances. That is to say, psychologically, the single self
is not tending to personal development in terms of its nature
as essentially spirit.
When

a

person

is

caught

in

this

publicness

of

disclosedness, he will instead resort to flattery (Leflerie)
which

suspends

the

distinction

between

loving

and

being

dissolute or debauched (udsv~vende). Flattery in this sense
indulges

in

tangentially

daring

to

touch

evil

and

hence

avoids realizing the good (SV 14,93-4; TA, 103). Kierkegaard
must have in mind the Don Juan (Don Giovanni) of Either/Or,
vol. I, whom he calls the incarnation of sensuousness. His
character falls entirely outside of ethical categories and
hence he is an actor of ultimate deception (SV 2,93-6; EO I,
98-102) .

While you can

love only one person essentially,

"what is a joy for the poet to hear and celebrate," flattery
can be extended to many. While loving indicates a being for
the other, the object of the love, flattery is extended to as
many as possible in order to satisfy only the self. 60 To
satisfy

6

oneself

necessitates

°

prudent

calculation

and

a

Kierkegaard is anything but clear on this subject of
loving just one. In a journal notation he seems to say that
loving just one is essentially self-love, what he calls the
"satisfaction of being-in-love (Forelskelse) and preference
but basically also of self-love," PAP VIII 2 B 71:6.
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rationalization of one's externalized existence. Or to put it
in negative terms,

"the aesthetic single self never has the

dialectical within him but outside of him, or the single self
is outwardly changed,

but remains inwardly unchanged"

(SV

10,121; CUP, 387).
All the distinctions between inwardness and exteriority
that have been mediated by the act at raisonere (to reflect
in a special way), at least in its Danish use. 61 To reflect
in this sense, which Kierkegaard underscores by using this
untranslatable word rather than "reflection," which is used
throughout most of Two Ages, is to emphasize the Hegelian use
as

in

speculative

ultimately
subjectivity

reasoning.

suspends
and

"the

This

kind

passionate

objectivity,"

of

disjunction

two

103).

Here

the

reader

should

be

between

categories

essentially encompass the pairs discussed above
TA,

reflection

that

(SV 14,94;

careful

not

to

misunderstand Kierkegaard. In the realm of pure thought and
pure being,

he agrees with Hegel that there is no either-

61

Alexander Dru in The Present Age and Of the Difference
Between a Genius and an Apostle (New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1962), p. 76, has translated this word as
"reasoning." The Hongs in Two Ages, which is being used in the
present project, translates raisonere as being ''loquacious."
It is unclear why Kierkegaard would suddenly use a different
word than the one he had been using generally although in a
variety of forms throughout this work (see especially p. 88),
inasmuch as that word, Reflexionen, translated as reflection
at least in this work embodies all the connotations of the
verb at raisonere. In the following we shall maintain the verb
"to reflect."
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or,.62

the

mediation

(reconciliation)

is

applicable.

To

abstract from concrete existence, however, as the speculative
philosopher does,

is for Kierkegaard a misfortune for the

human race, because it means to lose out on (gaae Glip af)
the

essential categories of existence,

to

be deprived of

political (ethical) and religious life (SV 10,14; CUP, 272).
To think of Existents in the language of abstraction is to
objectify what constitutes humanness. It means to ignore the
difficulty inherent to Existents, that is, the difficulty of
thinking

the

eternal

as

a

process

of

becoming

(Verden) ,

something one must necessarily do inasmuch as the thinker is,
by the very act of thinking, in the process of becoming. In
the present age, therefore,
life's existential tasks have lost the interest of
actuality, no illusion preserves the divine growth
of inwardness that matures to decision. There is a
mutual inquisitiveness; everyone waits unresolved
and experienced in evasions for someone to come
along who wills something -- in order then to bet
his hand (SV 14,96; TA, 105) . 63

62

"The either-or of contradiction is ipso facto
suspended when it is lifted out of the sphere of the
existential and introduced into the eternity of abstract
thought" (SV 10,13; CUP, 271).
63

"To bet his hand" may be a little difficult to
interpret without the advantage of the text that precedes this
quotation. The Danish text reads: "parere hans Haand. 11 It
could also be translated as "toe his line," or "obey his
signs." The implication then becomes clear that Kierkegaard
means to say that the present age expects to be led by some
charismatic figure such as a prophet as the text following the
quotation indicates.
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To wait unresolved, to live without decision, in the hope
that someone special, perhaps an outsider, 64 will appear is
precisely where the inconsistency of the age becomes glaring.
How should a charismatic leader be able to emerge within a
society where the leveling process is at work.
Kierkegaard warns,
multitude,

Therefore,

if a prophet should be hidden within the

he must be careful not to distinguish himself.

Where prophets of olden days would be in danger if they lost
their distinctiveness, the prophet of the present age would
be in danger if he should become distinguishable among the
indistinguishable many. In other words, the present age waits
for something impossible.
Kierkegaard (the prophet?) is telling the reader that in
a self-deified social system which negates anyone who sets
himself above society and yet does not call himself god, the
problem must be engaged by the single self itself. This is
emphasized by his

insistence

that

political

authority

or

government ought not engage in the moral education of its
citizens.

Consequently

the

cure

for

the

pathology

of

consciousness lies within the single self, not outside of it.
Kierkegaard's genius becomes apparent when he makes the
very problem of the age an instrument of its cure. Thus he
takes the

leveling process which he believes

64

is about to

It is odd (or maybe not so odd) that Kierkegaard does
not think of the possibility of an outsider of some sort.
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destroy humankind and, so to speak, stands it on its head by
turning it into a didactic taskmaster. He suggests that a deep
analysis of the phenomenon of leveling may indeed educate the
single self to inwardness and hence to genuine self-awareness
of the deeper meaning of

leveling.

The deeper meaning of

leveling is, of course, the principle of equality {SV 14,81;
TA,

88) .

That

is

to

say,

the

single

self

must

gain

an

awareness that an existential act is necessary, and that in
turn

necessitates

a

separation

from

the

group,

from

the

superficial idea of sociality.
The

single

characteristic,

self

must

penetrate

its need for community.

to

its

most

basic

The call is for a

courageous act, a leap of faith literally, and it is a heroic
leap in the sense that it involves the risk of the world's
displeasure. It is something the single self must risk on its
own, precisely because it must learn to be satisfied with who
it is, "satisfied with ruling over itself instead of over the
world." In other words, the single self must learn to express
"its equality with all human beings" {SV 14,81; TA, 89).
Without this kind of faithfulness to oneself, the "idea
of community," which we are reminded is "the individual's
telos and duty,

1165

is not possible inasmuch as it requires a

transcendence of one's basic nature to a

higher state of

being, a "second nature." On this level of consciousness, the

65

Westphal, "Kierkegaard's Sociology," pp. 46-7.
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single self can concern itself with the idea.

As a group

member and hence as part of the dreaded numerical, I am but
an animal who functions according to my instincts, but as a
single self, self-directed in inwardness and hence defined as
spirit in nature,

I

can live

for

the

idea,

an

idea that

according to Kierkegaard "makes unconditional and ultimate
of

demands

our

existence. 1166

The

aim

is

political

consciousness, for without such a healthy state of mind, no
"idea of community" can be actualized.

Throughout the last two chapters we have seen Kierkegaard
contrast a thinking grounded in an authoritative truth that
allows for existential transparency (Gjennemsigtighed) with
a thinking qualified by mediation. The latter fails to explain
existence and instead emphasizes abstractions that objectify
categorical
meaningless
Mediation,

distinctions
relativities
therefore,

and

thereby

reduce

which

prohibit

decisive

them

action.

constitutes a thinking entrenched in

concealment or obscurity (Uklarhed)

(SV 12,344; WL 332). As

Kierkegaard puts it,
It is, after all, one thing to think in such a way
that one's attentiveness constantly is merely
directed outward, in the direction of the object
which is something external; it is something else
to be turned in thinking in such a way that
constantly at every moment one becomes conscious of
one's self, conscious of one's own condition during
the process of thinking, or how it is with oneself
during the process of thinking. But only the latter
66

to

Westphal, "Kierkegaard's Sociology," p. 47.
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is
essentially
to
think,
it
is
precisely
transparency. The former is an unclear thinking that
suffers from the contradiction: that which in
thinking
clarifies
something
else
is
itself
basically unclear. Such a thinker explains by his
thinking something else, and see, he does not
understand himself; externally in the direction of
the object he perhaps makes a profound use of his
natural talents, but in the inward direction he is
very superficial, and therefore all his thinking,
however fundamental it seems to be, is still
basically superficial {SV 12,344; WL, 331-32).
Socratic teaching,

as we saw earlier in this chapter,

helps to establish the untruth of the human condition through
self-examination. Thereby the door is opened to an even more
fundamental teaching, namely the equality of all human beings
achieved in freedom. It is this teaching that is constitutive
of what here is called Kierkegaard's therapeutic "corrective."
It makes the "idea of community" possible, an idea that will
be explored in chapters four and five,

and which expresses

itself in the unconditional yet rational demand "You shall
love the neighbor as yourself."
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Chapter IV
A THERAPEUTIC "CORRECTIVE":
THE AUTHENTIC SINGLE SELF AND THE "IDEA OF COMMUNITY"

When
single
selves
(each
one
individually)
essentially in passion relate themselves to an idea
and thereupon in unity essentially relate themselves
to the same idea: then the relation is the perfected
and
the
standard.
Individually the relation
separates them (each one has himself for himself)
and ideally it unites them. 1
Although impractical,
still the religious is
eternity's transfigured representation of the
political's most beautiful dream. 2
In

the

last

two

symptomatic

effects

experience

negatively

practical

thinking.

Kierkegaard's

chapters

of

the

modern

had

have

separation

influenced

The

opinion

we

both

shown

of

how

the

knowledge

and

theoretical

consciousness,

suffered

from

an

which,

and
in

interminable

pathology because of this separation, was in serious need of
a cure. The aim of this and the following chapter, and indeed

1
2

SV 14,58; TA, 62.

sv 18,149; POV, 107. Apparently Kierkegaard was an avid
reader of Cicero who in On the Commonweal th, trs. George
Holland Sabine and Stanley Barney Smith (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill Educational Publishing, 1976), p. 112, made the
following comment, "There is, indeed, nothing in which human
excellence can more nearly approximate the divine than in the
foundation of new states or in the preservation of states
already founded."

of the whole project,

is to demonstrate that Kierkegaard

provided such a cure in the form of a therapeutic "corrective"
-- albeit one entirely neglected by contemporary philosophers,
political

and

otherwise.

This

therapeutic

"corrective"

constitutes what in this project is called a philosophy of
political consciousness.
But first it seems appropriate to explain what is meant
by political consciousness. We do not seek a particular label
by which to denote this concept such as patriotism or the
like. Neither are we looking for ideological orientations such
as

liberal

Kierkegaard's

or

conservative.
political

characterizations.

We

want

philosophy

Rather the

intent

to

argue

that

transcends
is to

such

lay bare from

Kierkegaard's writings a particular human attitude expressed
in his concept of Existents: the comportment of the single
self (den Enkelte) toward the other and toward the world. The
aim is to understand the relationship of the single self to
the other and to its community and to understand the inherent
responsibilities of such relationships which, by their very
nature, are ethical and/or political. Said in another way, and
emphasizing a more phenomenological aspect of Kierkegaard's
theory of the single self,

it is our aim to understand the

relationship of a concrete consciousness to the world in which
it happens to find itself.
The

parameters

of

this

relationship

insofar

as

it

pertains to Kierkegaard's "idea of community" we understand
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as citizenship, and the requirements for there to be what we
would consider citizenship are all grounded in existential
character or in personality. Unlike the emphasis on rights in
liberal theory as we understand it from Locke, Kierkegaard's
political philosophy of citizenship and character emphasizes
obligations,

that

is,

the obligations of the relationship

between the single self and the community -- not a particular
geographical community, but any community constituted by human
beings.

As

application,

such

Kierkegaard's

although,

"corrective"

has

as his categories show,

universal

it is quite

clear that they are thoroughly and exclusively grounded in
western thought.

IV:1

To begin, Kierkegaard is eager to avoid misunderstandings
in terms of his approach. In an accompanying paper to a short
account of his authorship 3 he comments on his methodological
approach to a critique of "the established order. 114 There he

3

"About my work as an Author" was published in 1851 but,
according to the editors of S0ren Kierkegaard's Samlede
V~rker, was written in March 1849 as a precursor to the larger
essay, The Point of View for my Work as an Author: A Report
to History (POV) (published posthumously by Kierkegaard's
brother Peter Christian Kierkegaard in 1859) which was of a
much more personal character than the shorter account.
4 The reader should understand that Kierkegaard by" the
established order" is referring to both the ecclesiastical as
well as the political leadership. He can address the two
together because the Danish Lutheran Church was and is a state
church ultimately governed by the political regime.
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insists that his calculation

(Bestik)

has considered "the

single self with polemical aim at the numerical, crowd, and
the like"

(SV 18,75; POV,156), all of which had produced a

depersonalized single self and a disorderly society. still,
he insists his methodology has not been to attack, since his
aim was never to have been in or conjoined with the opposition
that wanted to do away with "government" (Regjering) • 5 Rather
his approach was to deliver a therapeutic "corrective" which
implores that rulership be
therefore

presumably

dogmatically,

left to those called upon and

best

"that they,

suited

fearing

believing,

God,

would

somewhat

stand

fast,

willing only one thing, the Good" (SV 18,76; POV,156).
The successful implementation of the "corrective" depends
to a large degree on the present political system remaining
intact. Only then will the therapy have its desired effect
which is to engender healthy single selves whose character
express the conscious "idea of community"

(the Good) . 6 In

other words, Kierkegaard does not believe in radical surgery
as in revolution, but rather adheres to a medicinal approach

5

"Instead of all these hypotheses about the origin of
the state, etc., one should occupy oneself more with the
question: given an established order, how can new points of
departure be provided religiously." PAP X 4 A 72 (JP 4205).
6 In a footnote, Kierkegaard demonstrates that he is
operating on several levels while writing when he insists that
it cannot be directly affirmed that this is a defense of the
established order inasmuch as the form of the communication
is doubly reflected which makes contrary interpretations
equally possible. Kierkegaard concludes that the one judging
will be revealed by his judgment (SV 18,76; POV,156).
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as in a reformative process from within the political order.
As

early as

in 1835 Kierkegaard

in a

speech

in the

student Union in Copenhagen elaborated on this view claiming
that political development must embody continuity, and that
the

importation

Revolution)

is

of

foreign

unhealthy.

revolutions
Indeed,

(e.g.

the

Kierkegaard's

French
speech

demonstrates that he is opposed to any political leaps whether
backwards or forwards. Echoing Edmund Burke, 7 he insists that
natural developments do not happen by leaps and bounds, and
that "life's earnestness will judge any such move ironic even
if it is momentarily successful.
In

this

speech

118

Kierkegaard

is

concerned

about

the

"aesthetic" jockeying for position by the liberal leaders.
They appear to him to be more concerned about the personal
advantages this political development has to offer, meaning
their attitude demonstrates superficiality where earnestness
is needed. His critique of the liberal leadership was directed

7

Reflections on the Revolution in France (New York:
Penguin Books, 1969), especially pp. 92-3, 119-125, 152-154,
194-95.
8

PAP I B 2, p. 172 (JP 5116). See also Frithiof Brandt,
Den Unge S0ren Kierkegaard (K0benhavn: Levin & Munksgaards
Forlag, 1929), pp. 54-5. Here Brandt suggests the author
Henrik Hertz in his novel Stemninger og Tilstande (Moods and
States) (1839) has captured Kierkegaard's attitude quite
correctly when he has "the translator" (Kierkegaard) say:
"When it is demanded that Denmark follows the rest of Europe
in the struggle for the new liberal ideas, I completely agree.
But this struggle must develop out of the given, out of the
way in which we so far have been governed, out of the spirit
that has animated the people under this government."
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at their apparent lack of concern for the political future of
the Danish people.
concerns with
evident

to

Instead they manifested their personal

image.

everyone,

development was a

That history was

in

the making was

including Kierkegaard,

for

whom the

development of consciousness. 9 But,

and

again he echoes Edmund Burke, 10 the natural historical step
forward had been seduced by the aspirations for practical
consistency

with

theoretical

principles,

forgetting

the

tendency of the practical to become extreme when transformed
without modification. Consequently the original idea had been
lost sight of. The mediator, through which we come to have the
idea, that is, ideology, had grown too powerful, and this is
what in Kierkegaard's opinion "in the political world produces
revolutions 1111

--

the tail is wagging the dog rather than vice

versa. The fact that the eventual transition from an absolute
monarchy to a constitutional monarchy {for all intents and
purposes, a liberal democracy) took place without violence,
in what

Hannah Arendt would

characterize

movement of reason, 12 would seem to

as

a

political

justify Kierkegaard's

claim. Had the monarch been completely opposed to the liberal
developments of his time, it seems reasonable to argue that
9 PAP X 3 A 527.
10 Burke, pp.
11 PAP I

89-90.

B 2, p. 172.

12

On Revolution {New York: Penguin Books, 1965), p. 95
and in passim.
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some blood would necessarily have been shed. By initiating the
change

from within government

Kierkegaard,
change,

he

perceived the
understands

itself which,

need

the

for

social

emergence

of

according to
and

political

liberalism

as

a

natural development that underscores the continuity of Danish
political history.
This

historical

digression

assists

in

the

general

understanding of Kierkegaard's choice of methodology which he
refers to as a therapeutic "corrective." It is intended to
address not a local condition, but rather the entire European
situation as he understood it. The principles that follow from
this "corrective" are meant to embody a universality that
renders them respectable.
Kierkegaard, like any serious political philosopher draws
on personal experience to formulate the necessary steps to
correct what in this case represents a

diseased political

society, 13 namely liberal democracy. He embraces a naturally
developed liberal democratic form of government ( SV 9, 10; CUP,
4)

with certain qualifications.

Immediately,

however,

and

before this new form of regime is historically in place within
his own sphere of existence, he has some reservations about
its various aspects (as was shown in the previous chapter).
For

this

complex

reason

it

13

is

important

to

understand

For an analogous approach see Plato, The Seventh
Letter, tr. Walter Hamilton (New York: Penguin Books, 1973),
325d-326a.
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precisely what Kierkegaard means by "corrective." The reader
is assisted in this understanding by several notations in
Kierkegaard's journal wherein he comments on this particular
approach to a critique of "the established order."
First it should be noted that Kierkegaard everywhere
chooses a spelling of the word "corrective" (Correctiv) which
is not properly Danish. He substitutes the letter "C" for the
letter "K" twice, a substitution that lends a Latin sort of
legitimacy to the word thereby underscoring the significance
of this word to Kierkegaard. 14 Here it is interesting to note
that in the Danish spelling, Korrektiv according to the Danish
dictionary

means

to

"improve

(forbedre),

to

rectify

(berigtige), or correct something else, especially: a guiding
addition. 1115 According to the Oxford English Dictionary a
second meaning of "corrective" reads as follows:

"Something

that tends to set right what is wrong, to remove or counter
an

evil."

Kierkegaard

appears

to

have

all

of

the

above

mentioned meanings in mind when he uses the word "corrective."
In

a

journal

note

from

1849

which

is

entitled

"My

productivity regarded as 'the corrective' of the established, 11
the determination "corrective" is considered as a reflective
determination that has to indicate the weak points of the

14 I am indebted to John Llewelyn for this insight.
15

Ordbog over det danske Sprog,
(K0benhavn: Gyldendal, 1929).
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ed.

Verner Dahlerup

established order and "onesidedly posit the opposite." 16 In
positing

the

"corrective,"

the

one

doing

so,

Kierkegaard

concedes, must adopt an attitude of resignation inasmuch as
the "corrective," as soon as somebody else posits another
corrective,

the

first

corrective

becomes

part

of

the

established. The implications of this statement are twofold.
on the one hand, it could indicate on the part of Kierkegaard
that

he

has

therapeutic

no

illusions

"corrective."

about
Indeed,

the
he

longevity
would

of

seem

confirming the general weakness of correctives,

to

his
be

especially

those that address a pathology of consciousness in an age
spellbound by material concerns. On the other hand, by showing
that another corrective would locate the initial corrective
within the

established,

Kierkegaard has

demonstrated that

reform indeed emerges from within the governing order. The
point is, Kierkegaard did not see the role of his "corrective"
as a destroyer of the political and ecclesiastical order, but
as one "constantly to inspire it with inwardness." 17 And what
the age of speculation needs according to Kierkegaard is a
dose

of

Socratic

Christianity,

and

ignorance
that,

modified

he

insists,

in

the
would

spirit

of

represent

maturity . 18 Thus he distinguishes between what the age demands

16 PAP X 1 A 640 and X 3 A 527.
17

PAP X 2 A 193.

18 PAP X 1 A 679.
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and what it needs.
The misfortune of our time is just this that it has
become simply nothing else but "time," a temporality
which is impatient of hearinv anything about
eternity (SV 18,150; POV, 108). 1
From all these observations about Kierkegaard's approach
to a critique of the new political order it seems reasonable
to conclude:

first,

that he accepts the liberal democratic

form of government arrived at through natural means,

and

second,

(as

that

it

suffers

from

a

variety

of

defects

elaborated above in chapters two and three) that need to be
amended. The "corrective" is thus intended to improve upon the
new

form

of

political

society

by

reintroducing

ethical

(political) categories and thereby provide a higher quality
of life for the single self as well as a more permanent social
order. In so doing, Kierkegaard will dispel a few illusions
that liberal theory has operated under. By dispelling these
illusions, however, he does not intend to undermine liberal
theory, but rather to strengthen it. Hence the reader should
not

think

of

opposition to

Kierkegaard's

"corrective"

as

standing

in

liberal theory, but as a mending of it, as a

"corrective."

19

For an excellent discussion of Kierkegaard's concept
of time, temporality, and eternity see Johannes Sl0k,
Kierkegaard: humanismens tamker (K0benhavn: Hans Reitzel,
19 7 8 ) , ch . 5 .
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IV:2

Kierkegaard's "corrective" consists in all its simplicity
of his "idea of community" expressed in recognition of the
law's demand to love the neighbor as oneself. In the following
this concept and its political implications will be analyzed
in

terms

of

individually,

its

constitutive

elements

which,

taken

express the developmental particulars of the

formation of character, and taken in its totality express the
manifestation of political consciousness, what the title of
this project also refers to as citizenship.
The "corrective" focuses primarily on two concerns that
in Kierkegaard's opinion has led liberal theory astray. On the
one hand, liberal theory insists on collapsing the realms of
the religious and the political, or, in more abstract terms,
liberal theory has conjoined the divine and the human when it
claims
origin,

to

"deduct"

from

nature's

law which

a condition of freedom and equality. 2

is

°

of

di vine

Kierkegaard

objects, insisting
No politics has been able to, no politics can, no
worldliness has been able to, no worldliness can,
think through to its last consequence or realize
this thought: human equality (Menneske-Lighed) (SV
18,149; POV, 107).
On the other hand,
transcendent,

time

in so conjoining the immanent with the
and

eternity

has

become

one,

what

Kierkegaard refers to as temporality, which dominates human

20 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Ch. 2, #4
and #8.
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existence. By making the eternal immediately present, it is
not at all.
dimension

Instead it has been subsumed by the temporal

(SV

18,150;

POV,108)

thereby

denying

what

for

Kierkegaard is essential: a differentiated human experience,
but also denying what the world is demanding, namely genuine
equality.
The horizon of a one-dimensional existence is time, and
such an existence will necessarily concentrate on the desire
for pleasure, a desire that can only be satisfied by private
property,

which

sanctioned. 21

liberal

But

Kierkegaard,

what

is eternity.

theory
the

intimates

age

needs,

is

divinely

according

to

The age needs to emphasize the

activity of consciousness, or said more bluntly, it needs to
focus on essential thinking, expressed in pursuit of the good.
Such thinking expresses the "idea of community" or the good
of the whole. As such it constitutes what will restore health
to concrete consciousness, and hence restore authenticity to
the

single

self.

The

irony

is

that

community

as

such,

presupposes that the other is perceived as equal, what the
world demanded,
experience of

but to do that necessitates precisely an
transcendence,

what

the world

rejected.

By

taking back what the world needs, namely consciousness of the
eternal,

it

can

acquire

what

it

demands,

equality.

In

Kierkegaard's opinion, then, it is only through transcendent

21

Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. 5, #25-6,
#32 and #34.
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experience

human

equality

be

achieved,

in

a

manner

of

speaking.
It is clear to

Kierkegaard that by nature human beings

are not equal (in spite of what liberal theory insists). But
because he
demands,

is more than willing to provide what the age

though

not

in

an

illusory

form,

he

posits

the

therapeutic "corrective." It teaches that "the di vine,

the

essential, the non-worldly, the true (is] the only possible
human equality" (SV 18, 150; POV, 108). In other words, human
beings, who by nature according to this "corrective" exist in
untruth, regard each other in apparent terms only and hence
as differentiated or unequal.

For that reason,

Kierkegaard

says, they are unable to set themselves free, meaning they are
unable to see each other as they truly are in their essential
constitutive structure.
In order to rectify this problem of being in untruth,
human beings must turn to the teacher who alone can provide
the condition

(Betingelsen)

and hence enable the truth of

their essential being to reveal itself (SV 6,19-20; PF, 145).

By undergoing this conversion experience

(Overgang)

in

freedom, a move Kierkegaard refers to as rebirth (Gjenf0delse)
(SV 6,23; PF, 19), they literally untie themselves from the
naturally

given,

remove

themselves

from

or

overcome

the

exclusion from the truth that all human beings are essentially
equal. As will become clear, to love the other is to see the
other as essentially equal, and only the works of love, that
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is, God's works, can occasion this condition.
Kierkegaard thus
dimension

which

was

infuses liberal theory with a moral
always

implied,

but

obscured by the adage of property as a

which

had

been

natural right.

By

making property a natural right, liberal theory removed the
whole idea of freedom and equality to an empirical dimension
that on a theoretical level occasioned skepticism about the
moral grounding of these principles. 22
Therefore what perhaps is of most interest to political
science is that Kierkegaard takes exception to the general
assumption that the cherished tenets of Liberalism, freedom
and

equality,

significance

have
(SV

political

12,43;

WL,

rather

53) . 23

For

than

existential

Kierkegaard

such

22

As David Hume noted, "A man's property is some object
related to him. This relation is not natural but moral, and
founded on justice. It is very preposterous, therefore, to
imagine that we can have any idea of property without fully
comprehending the nature of justice, and showing its origin
in the artifice and contrivance of men. The origin of justice
explains that of property." "Treatise of Human Nature" in
Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy. ed. Henry D. Aiken (New
York: Hafner Press, 1948), p. 60.
23

Also PAP VIII 1 A 598 (JP 4131). For a parallel
argument see Kresten Nordentoft, "Hvad Siger Brand-Majoren?"
Kierkegaards Opg0r med sin Samtid (K0benhavn: G.E.C.Gad,
1973), 93; hereafter known as Brand-Majoren. Nordentoft does
not emphasize this novel interpretation of freedom and
equality but merely sees it as a further indication of
Kierkegaard's absolutist conception of the state. Interpreting
Kierkegaard he says: "The state can and ought only give
individuals freedom in the negative sense that it must secure
them against encroachment from other sides. But legal security
is not the same as freedom. Freedom cannot be imposed by
decree personally. Politics and freedom have nothing to do
with each other in a positive sense, but certainly in a
negative, inasmuch as by imposing a free cons ti tut ion the
people can be made to believe that they possess freedom, that
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declarations

underscore

revolutionary

aspect

of

precisely
the

the

liberal

or

unnatural

development.

It

is

unnatural not only because it is practically disruptive, but,
more importantly, because it posits a form of society where
the truth

of matters

is

concealed by an

accumulation of

(scientific) knowledge that has the stamp of human approval
as Rousseau, for example, suggested, when he spoke of human
equality. 24

The

problem

for

Kierkegaard

is

that

such

determinations make these rights political in form, when in
fact they are ethical in an existential sense.
The ethical for Kierkegaard defines how the single self
comports

itself

in

action

and

in

its

relationships,

its

character, its willingness to commit itself in freedom to the
other as equal, to the whole, to the good. What that means is
that my good is inherently bound up with the good of the other
as

well

as

with

the

good

of

the

community.

From

this

perspective Kierkegaard's ethical dimension can be understood
to have political meaning.

is, made to forget that they do not possess it." Nordentoft's
reading of Kierkegaard on the state appears very mechanical
and tends to contradict what Kierkegaard is attempting to
achieve, namely the individual's passionate appropriation of
Christianity and thereby community. This chapter expects to
demonstrate that Kierkegaard's conception of freedom and
equality is not as apolitical as Nordentoft wants to argue.
24

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and
Foundations of Inequality among Men," The First and Second
Discourses. trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 92. Also "Discourse on the
Sciences and Arts," Ibid, in passim.
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Here we must caution that Kierkegaard himself understood
the political more in terms of "politics" by which he meant
institutional structures as well as collective movements. In
his own mind he is thus mired in the modern tradition that,
unlike

classical

Greek philosophy,

tends

to

separate the

ethical from the political precisely because the political had
been submitted to ideological infusion and thus had lost its
essentially moral dimension. But in spite of Kierkegaard's own
understanding of "the political," his "idea of community" is
ethical inasmuch as it embodies the relationship to the other.
It is political because in this relationship to the other is
reflected a

relationship to all human beings and hence a

political consciousness that engenders action in a concern for
the good of the whole. 25
To continue, then, Kierkegaard argues that freedom and
equality

are

principles

that

are

ethical

in

nature,

and

therefore they represent something to be achieved -- not just
once and for all as with Plato's caveman who undergoes the
periagoge,

the turning around experience,

only once, 26 but

25

In support of this claim we refer to such compelling
sources as Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics
{Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952) in passim,
as well as to his Anamnesis, tr. Gerhart Niemeyer (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1978) in passim. For a rather
different conception of the political, yet exalted as in our
perception, see Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, especially
chapter 5: "Action."
26

•

Plato, The Republic, 515c-d, 518d, 521c.
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with a

constant vigilance.

They are tasks

{Opgaver) 27 the

single self, not the state, must undertake in order to fulfill
who it is by nature,

that is,

by its "second nature," and

thereby realize the "idea of community" {SV 12,43; WL, 53).
This interpretation of the categories of freedom and
equality posits

no direct

demands

for

specific political

circumstances such as is the case with rights perceived as
political.
political

On

the

other

circumstances

hand,
that

it

necessarily

allow

for

such

requires
individual

pursuits. Kierkegaard's approach in the form of a "corrective"
would appear to coincide with the requirement of a liberal
state,

albeit

one

modified

to

admit

the

impetus

for

an

existence that includes an ethico-religious dimension. Thus
he shows prudence by referring to his interpretation of these
tenets as a "corrective."
Generally speaking, the "corrective" understood as the
"idea

of

community,

community"

differs

from

other

conceptions

of

such as the visions of socialist collectivities

that were flourishing throughout Europe at this time. 28

By

27

• As will become clear below, the dual meaning of the
Danish word Opgave (task) is significant here, because it also
denotes a "problem," as in something which needs to be worked
out.

28

Kierkegaard was familiar with socialist movements and
ideology only through newspapers according to the editors of
the Danish edition of Works of Love. They also note the
interesting coincidence that Marx's Communist Manifesto was
published in February 1848 and hence just four months after
the publication of Works of Love. In Kierkegaard's journals
there is a notation to ch. VII of Works of Love that explains
that the concept of mercifulness is "rightly turned" against
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insisting on a third element that unites and separates single
selves in the relation,

individual integrity is maintained,

while at the same time the benefits of solidarity are enjoyed
(SV 14,58-9; TA 62-3).
When
single
selves
( each
one
individually)
essentially in passion relate themselves to an idea
and thereupon in unity essentially relate themselves
to the same idea: then the relation is the perfected
and
the
standard.
Individually
the
relation
separates them (each one has himself for him!elf
and ideally it unites them (SV 14,58; TA, 62). 9
In other words, for Kierkegaard it is important that the
desire for unity does not gain the upper hand, for that would
compromise the uniqueness of every single self. How he works
this out will become clear in the following, but in a journal
note he ponders the

idea as he attempts

to differentiate

between an aggregate of people which he refers to as a crowd
(M~ngde)

or the (spectator) public (Publikum) and community

(Menighed), which, strictly speaking, means "congregation".
In the (spectator) public and the like the single
self is nothing, there is no single self, the
Communism and toward a Christian understanding. PAP VIII 1 A
299.
29

Compare Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 52: "To
live together in the world means essentially that a world of
things is between those who have it in common, as a table is
located between those who sit around it; the world, like every
in-between, relates and separates men at the same time. The
public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet
prevents our falling over each other, so to speak. What makes
mass society so difficult to bear is not the number of people
involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that the
world between them has lost its power to gather them together,
to relate and to separate them." It is uncanny how Arendt has
captured Kierkegaard's meaning of the "idea of community"
whether intentional or not.
202

numerical is the constitutive and the law for coming
into
existence
(Tilblivelse)
of
a
generatio
aeguivoca; detached from the public the single self
is nothing, and as part of the public, he is, more
basically understood, actually nothing either.
In community the single self is; the single
self is dialectically decisive as the presupposition
for forming community, and in community the single
self is qualitatively something essential and can
at any moment also become higher than "community,"
especially as soon as "the others" fall away from
the idea. The cohesiveness of community consists of
each one being a single self and then the idea; the
connectedness of a public, or its looseness consists
of the numerical being everything. Every single self
in community :ff,uarantees the community; the public
is a chimera.
To freely enter into such a concrete relation as community is
for Kierkegaard the ethical task,

the goal of which is to

establish one's equality with every other human being on a
conscious level. 31 It means the single self has chosen him or
herself (in freedom) as an essential self and thereby gained
identity. 32 Kierkegaard insists this is possible for every
human being, because every human being is precisely equal in

3 o PAP X 2 A 390 (JP 2952).
31

For a contrary understanding of Kierkegaard see
Alastair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 41.
MacIntyre interprets Kierkegaard to say that we develop the
ethical for no reason.
32

the person who chooses himself ethically
chooses himself concretely as this particular individual . .
. [who] becomes selfconscious (sig bevidst) as this particular
individual with these talents, these inclinations, these
drives, these passions, influenced by this particular social
milieu,
as
this
particular
product
of
a
particular
environment. But when he becomes self-conscious in this way,
he takes upon himself responsibility for it all (SV 3,232; EO
II, 250-51).
11
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the capacity to be ethical.
Although at this stage equality is strictly formal, it
nevertheless has an anthropological characteristic as pointed
out by Kresten Nordentoft. He argues
the task could not be set were it not possible for
human beings to realize it . . . . [Thus] every human
being becomes conscious of himself in concern for
himself, because his existence takes place upon
conditions of ambiguity, in time, in hope or fear. 33
The possibility of equality,

then,

lies precisely in this

awareness of one's position in a contingent world, and from
it derives the condition of possibility for authentic selfhood
or self-actualization. The trick is not to be caught up in
this

contingency,

community,"

that

but
is,

to

transcend

allow

it

qua

the

transcendence

to

"idea

of

interact

dialectically with one's experience in the world. To do that
is for Kierkegaard to be in Existents.

IV:3

Kierkegaard argues in Works of Love that when worldly
wisdom deemed it desirable that all men be freed from the
"abominable" bonds of serfdom, this craving for freedom and
equality not

only manifested

itself

physically,

but also

consciously.
Just as nowadays attempts are made in so many ways
to emancipate the people from all bonds, also
beneficial ones, so also attempts are made to
33

Kierkegaard's
Psychology,
tr.
Bruce
Kirmmse
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1978), p. 77.
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emancipate the emotional relationship between human
beings from the bond that binds one to God and binds
one in everythingj in every expression of life (SV
12,115; WL, 119). 4
It is a freedom that is without divinity in the world (Ibid).
The bond to transcendent experience has become inconvenient
for the modern single self. Instead it has been dethroned as
the

focus

of

human

existence

and

replaced

by

the

self-

deification of humanity, and the consequence is the obviation
of all authority. It meant, according to Kierkegaard, that the
rights of man (Menneskets Rettigheder) were misconstrued as
rights given to man by man, when in truth they were already
divinely granted (SV 12,115; WL, 119). The problem as he sees
it,

is

that

man

has

imposed

himself

upon

the

domain

of

transcendence "transforming all existence into doubt or into
a vortex," meaning into an unstoppable confusion (SV 12,115;
WL, 120) • 35
34 Kierkegaard puts it more bluntly in his journal and
gives the argument a slightly different turn when he notes
that the idea of genuine equality, that is, essential
equality, which he in Works of Loves insists has always been
present, has now been abandoned. Instead equality has become
a political question discussed throughout Europe where it has
engendered a new form of tyranny, what we today refer to as
totalitarianism, what Kierkegaard aptly labels the tyranny of
"people-fear" (Menneske-Frygt).
35

In Letters and Documents, p. 262, Kierkegaard has
commented on the meaning of this vortex in a letter to
Kolderup-Rosenvinge. Therein he explains how he sees what is
happening in Europe as a vortex that is spinning out of
control. But, he says in the letter, where there is motion,
the category of stoppage belongs. The problem lies in how the
ground of this stoppage is perceived. For Kierkegaard it is
a teleological argument. It is commonly believed, he explains,
that if one has a fixed point for a goal, the movement toward
it is not out of control. In that case the movement is not
205

But the transcendent dimension is necessary because only
it possesses the true standard

(Maalestok),

a

standard by

which Kierkegaard believes political movements must measure
their aims.

Thus he asks,

if man has become deified,

who

defines the law's demand that "You shall love the neighbor as
yourself?" (SV 12,23; WL, 34) . 36 Kierkegaard does not believe
this

question,

which

emerges

out

of

revelation

with

its

assumed to be an unstoppable vortex. Kierkegaard questions
this assumption suggesting that the fixed point must lie
behind the movement in order to control or steer it, in order
to integrate the motion. He is distinguishing between a purely
political movement such as the ideological movements that were
sweeping Europe at the time and a religious movement whose
teleological aim is safely posited before the fact, so to
speak. The problem with a political movement that entirely
lacks a religious dimension, he argues, is that it has posited
the goal in the future -- the secularized eschatological
expectation. In that case there is no control over the means
to achieve this end. (No doubt Kierkegaard has the "Reign of
Terror" in mind and by implication totalitarian systems in
general). Kierkegaard goes on to suggest such a movement
eventually will come to realize its need for religion as the
only way to stop the vortex, will need a Socratic gadfly, (and
here we may speculate), will need a Kierkegaard. {According
to the editors of Letters and Documents, Kierkegaard is
playing on the Danish word for gadfly, Bremse, which means
both a "brake" or "to brake," as well as a gadfly or botfly).
The religious movement Kierkegaard has in mind is very much
one of his own development but with close similarities to the
simplistic form of Christianity of Pauline teaching. Thus his
understanding of a religious movement should not be confused
with the religious movements described by Norman Cohn in his
Pursuit of the Millenium (New York: Oxford University Press,
1961, 1970) where he makes it quite clear that even political
movements with a religious dimension, what he refers to as
"revolutionary millenarianism" presumably with a fixed point
controlling its movement, have flourished throughout Western
history, but especially during the dark Middle Ages, spreading
much violence in pursuit most often of some ideal conception
of social reform (p. 284 and in passim).
36

Kierkegaard is quoting Matthew, 22:39.
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11

divine origin" (SV 12,30; WL, 41) can be settled by decree

or by human consensus
order

of

the

world

(SV 12,115; WL,
leaves

human

120). Since the new

beings

as

essentially

responsible for their own selves and in that sense equal, the
answer would be left to arbitrary determinations that in an
attempt to compete,

and as

in political campaigns

"win a

following for it" (WL, 120; SV 12,115), would compromise the
law's demand. In other words, revelation would be subjected
to willful interpretations with ideological overtones,

just

as the single self's decision with whom to side would be
dictated by arbitrary self-interest.
The upshot of Kierkegaard's argument is that the form of
the action by the single self, that is, how the law's demand
would be interpreted, would be dependent upon the historical
circumstances
authority

of

implied

relativized,

his
in

time.
the

Consequently

law's

demand

the

would

be

universal
entirely

because temporality now dominates the life of

such a single self and hence would dominate its actions. In
other

words,

to

love

the

neighbor

as

oneself

would

be

historicized and would soon lose its effectiveness.
The relativization of the law's demand and hence its
essential weakening is precisely what happens to this ethicoreligious and rational criterion in liberal theory where it
plays a central role in the fictitious but rational state of
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nature, 37

but gives way to material

self-interest

in the

theory of political society, and in fact entirely disappears.
It is this form of an ethically undirected existence that
Kierkegaard in his critique of modernity (above in chapter
III)

diagnosed

as

a

"philistine-bourgeois

mentality"

(SV

15,97; SUD, 41) . 38 It is this falling away of the law's demand
that he attempts to restore with his therapeutic "corrective."

IV:4

The law's demand must have a transcendent ground and
thereby gain unconditional authority and hence universality.
By grounding it beyond the realm of human decision-making
capabilities, the command "to love your neighbor as yourself"
gains the respectability of being universally applicable and
of

being

generally

known

and

appropriable

by

anyone who

chooses to act according to its precepts. Works of Love thus
posits

the

category

existentially chosen,

of

freedom

as

something

not as something granted.

to

be

Either the

single self chooses to become a philistine bourgeois or it

37

Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Ch. 2, #5.

38

Johannes Sl0k, Kierkegaard's Univers: Enny guide til
geniet (Centrum, 1983), p. 28, in this introductory reading
to Kierkegaard's works has accurately described the philistine
bourgeois
as
someone
who
"without
reservation
and
exhaustively, but without any inkling of this, is a product
of what the given society and its culture invariably will make
a person into given his presuppositions. A bourgeois
philistine lives in the illusion that he has freely made the
decisions that in actuality anonymous forces have made on his
behalf.
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chooses to become a person of character, which for Kierkegaard
is to chose to become a Christian.
It is from the perspective of this conception _of the
grounding of the law's demand that Kierkegaard's

"idea of

community" becomes comprehensible. In turn, it is from this
understanding of the "idea of community" that we derive his
conceptualization of freedom and equality. These, then, cannot
be viewed as political rights,

but must be understood as

existential obligations to the law to which every single self
can and must respond.
views as rights,

In other words,

what liberal theory

the fulfillment of which is expressed in

terms of material acquisitiveness, 39 Kierkegaard perceives as
duties that essentially engage each

in a

common purpose

without suppressing "the original individuation idea. 1140
What Kierkegaard objects to

is the givenness of the

natural rights of freedom and equality that liberal theory
posits. 41 Instead he wants to distinguish between what Isaiah

39

John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Ch. 5, #25,

40

Nordentoft, Brand-Majoren, p. 50.

26.

41 Locke,

Second Treatise of Government, Ch. 1, #4 and
#5. Also Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and
Foundation of Inequality of Men, Preface, and "On the Social
Contract" in The Basic Political Writings, ed. and trans.
Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
Inc., 1987), Bk. I, chs. 1-2.
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Berlin has differentiated as negative and positive freedom. 42
But Kierkegaard goes further, meaning he finds it necessary
to transcend the human realm in order to properly ground
social existence. To put your faith in the "great, matchless
common undertaking, the great achievement of the human race,"
as he sarcastically remarks, is to make the category of the
others capricious.
If what the law demands is merely a human
determination of what the law demands (but not by
the individual human being, because we thereby
become
involved
in
pure
arbitrariness,
as
indicated) , how then can the individual come to
begin to act, or is it not left to chance to decide
where he happens to begin instead of everyone having
to begin at the beginning? (SV 12,115-16; WL, 120).
Thus Kierkegaard even rejects an interpretation of the
law's

demand

Rousseau's

by

society

"general

will.

as

a

whole

"Inasmuch

as,
as

for
the

example,
law's

in

demand

constitutes a universal claim, Kierkegaard is concerned about
the human inferences made from it in accordance with some
collective determination. His fear is that by so deifying the
others, the ethical has become "an accidental matter" allowing
the wrong to possibly be right (SV 12,117; WL, 121). 43

42

Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1969), ch. III. Berlin's essay "Two Concepts of
Liberty" is helpful in understanding the direction of
Kierkegaard's thought.
43

Also SV 16,88-95; TC, 86-95.
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IV:5

The fixed point of departure is still on Kierkegaard's
mind.

At the same time something else is revealed.

Where

others have interpreted Kierkegaard to require the single self
to withdraw or "die away" from the world, 44 in Works of Love
the dialectic of human existence and hence Kierkegaard's true
intentions become evident. On the one hand, the single self
is

required

to

sharply

differentiate

between

the

finite

worldly and the infinitely eternal. Yet, on the other hand,
his

life

in

temporal

existence

must

be

governed

by

transcendent standards that unarguably require him to attend
to obligations that embody authoritative claims.

Thus when

Kierkegaard makes the infamous claim that the single self must
"renounce the worldly," he does not mean for the single self
to withdraw to a cloister, a solution he sharply distances
himself from (SV 12,141; WL, 144). Rather, his point is that
the single self must not succumb to the temptation of worldly
distinctions. To do so would mean to emphasize differences and
thereby reject true equality.
To reject what Kierkegaard considers the only possible
form of equality is also to reject the movement of freedom
required to achieve this state of equality, and hence it is
to reject not only the authentic self but also the very

44

For a discussion of this perception of Kierkegaard and
references see "Introduction," p. xxii and note 18.
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foundation of the "idea of community." 45 From this rigorous
perspective, freedom and equality become ethical categories
to

which

the

recapitulate,

single

self

is

existentially

related.

To

to be existentially related meant the single

self does not merely stand in a cognitive relationship to
these ethical categories. Rather he passionately relates to
them, meaning he expresses a dynamic personal interest. 46 It
is what Kierkegaard means by inwardness. In other words, the
self is a relating self, 47 and not, as David Burrell reminds
us, the relation which relates. The choice is in the acting
self to become the authentic self he or she is. "Each one of
us can only do this himself." Such a person feels and is felt
to be "at home with himself.

1148

For this self-directed single self the choice in which
the ethical is expressed is two-dimensional. As in Sophocles'

45

The movement of freedom will be further delineated

below.
46

Cf. Plato's Theaetetus, tr. Francis MacDonald Cornford
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1957), 152b-c,
where Socrates pronounces that no truth can be reached
independently of its relation with the perceiving subject.
Also Eric Voegelin, The World of the Polis, vol. II of Order
and History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1956), p. 298.
47

The ideal position is that where despair has been
rooted out: "[R]elating itself to itself and in willing to be
itself, the self rests transparently in the power that posited
it" (SV 15,74; SUD, 14).
48

"Kierkegaard: Language of Spirit," Exercises in
Religious Understanding (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1974), pp. 165-66.
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Antigone 49

the

single

self

is

confronted with

a

dilemma.

Antigone either buries her brother and thereby conforms to the
unwritten

laws of the gods,

a

choice that will make her

subject to the king's punishment; or she refrains from burying
him and conforms to the laws of the city as defined by the
king, a choice that will make her subject to the wrath of the
gods. Interpreting Kierkegaard, Johannes Sl0k has suggested
that

Antigone's

dilemma

expresses

the

seriousness

of

existence: the definite meaning of the choice and the absolute
incommensurability between the opposite possibilities,

the

either/or of the economy of life. Thus Kierkegaard subscribes
to the principle of contradiction between good and evil as the
foundation of thinking (SV 14,88ff; TA, 97ff) a principle that
formulates a philosophy of life. As we saw above in chapter
three, this philosophy of life constitutes the standard by
which a person of self-conscious awareness chooses his or her
existence (Tilv~relse).
When Antigone chooses either to bury her brother or
not, then it is not merely this single isolated act
she either chooses or not chooses; she chooses those
principles that legitimate either the one or the
other possibility, she chooses -- as Kierkegaard
would express it -- her idea or that category under
which she will live her life, the mode of her
existence, the standard, finite or infinite, she
wishes to establish.so

49

Either/Or, pp. 137-64.

so Sl0k, Kierkegaard: humanismens t~nker, p. 81.
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In the very choice to bury her brother Antigone embraced the
principle that defined her as an authentic self and defined
her action in accordance with Kierkegaard's understanding of
Existents.
In the same manner, Kierkegaard insists each single self
must

choose

freedom

and

equality

and

thereby

choose

the

standard for its existence. Each must personally embrace or
appropriate these categories in the actions it undertakes,
inasmuch as those very categories express genuine humanity and
thereby authenticate the single self. The opposite kind of
existence is that of the philistine-bourgeois, whose life is
not even governed by aesthetic concerns, although one would
have to say that such a life is governed by the desire for
pleasure. That life, therefore,
fate.

It

is

the

kind

of

is ultimately influenced by

life

where

the

contrasting

possibilities and their analogous consequences make choice
impossible. When choice becomes impossible skepticism has done
its work and nihilism makes its presence in what Kierkegaard
characterizes as a meaningless form of existence. 51
51

"Marry, and you will regret it. Do not marry, and you
will also regret it. Marry or do not marry, you will regret
it either way. Whether you marry or you do not marry, you will
regret it either way. Laugh at the stupidities of the world,
and you will regret it; weep over them, and you will also
regret it. Laugh at the stupidities of the world or weep over
them, you will regret it either way. Whether you laugh at the
stupidities of the world or you weep over them, you will
regret it either way. Trust a girl, and you will regret it.
Do not trust her, and you will also regret it. Trust a girl
or do not trust her, you will regret it either way. Whether
you trust a girl or do not trust her, you will regret it
either way. Hang yourself, and you will regret it. Do not hang
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What

must

now

be

determined,

therefore,

is

whether

Kierkegaard defines the categories of freedom and equality
strictly in ethical terms and hence as distinct from political
meaning

in

categories

the way modernity has
of

human

existence, 52

come
or

to

separate these

whether

indeed

his

therapeutic "corrective" aims at reforming, if not politics,
then at least the single self's relationship to the political.
The latter would result in what is here referred to as a
condition of political consciousness. What we are looking for,
then, is the single self's disposition or comportment toward
the world. To make this determination, we have to analyze the
movement
undertake.

Kierkegaard's
It

is,

single

self

significantly,

a

(den

Enkelte)

movement

of

must

love

as

indicated in the law's demand.

IV:6

Love, the most fundamental human characteristic according
to Kierkegaard

(WL,

153; SV 12,150),

is the dynamic force

underlying the essential experience of achieving freedom and
equality and hence community (WL, 53; sv 12,43). Love exists,
before it is practiced, because love is the presupposition.

yourself and you will also regret it. Hang yourself or do not
hang yourself, you will regret it either way. Whether you hang
yourself or do not hang yourself, you will regret it either
way. This, gentlemen, is the quintessence of all the wisdom
of life." Either/Or, vol. I, pp. 38-9.
52

Cf. Nordentoft in Brand-Maioren.
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Love is the essence of the single self, indeed is being itself
in an ontological

sense

(SV 12,150-51;

WL,

This

153-54).

condition defines the single self in its natural state in
which the human being exists and which it can only avoid if
it ceases to exist as a human being. 53
Kierkegaard

can

make

the

claim

that

love

is

a

presupposition inasmuch as he acknowledges the sociability of
human beings, their inherent need for community as attested
to throughout the ages. He expresses this fundamental need in
the profound words of wonder which introduce the obligation
of every single self to love the person he sees: "How deeply
indeed is the need for love grounded in human nature!"
12,150; WL,

in

this

(SV

153). The whole "idea of community" is embedded

sentence

which

accidental happening,

emphasizes

that

love

is

not

an

something that may or may not have

significance. Love is precisely grounded so deeply in human
nature that the single self can be defined by it. As Sl0k
interprets,

"Man

is qualified

passionately as

love

[and]

therefore this passion expresses itself entirely elementary
and irrefutably in a need for companionship." 54 Kierkegaard
continues,

"throughout all ages anyone,

therefore, who has

thought deeply about human nature has acknowledged this need
for companionship" (SV 12,150; WL, 153).

53

Johannes Sl0k,

54

Ibid, p. 139.

Kierkegaard: humanismen's t~nker, p.

138.
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From

this

characteristic

perspective
of

human

of

nature,

love
it

as

an

follows

inherent
that

for

Kierkegaard human nature is given, its constitutive element
is fundamental and permanent. It is also the faculty of human
nature that expresses the eternal dimension, but only in its
acquired form.
The concealed life of love is in its most inward
state unfathomable, and still, in turn, is in an
unfathomable coherence with all of existence .
. In this way the life of love is concealed, but its
concealed life is in itself a movement and has the
eternal within itself (SV 12,15-6; WL, 27).
This thesis of love as the dominant element of human nature
pervades the discourse which can be characterized by the often
repeated sentence, "So deeply is this need grounded in human
nature, and so essentially does it belong to being human" (SV
12,150; WL, 153).

The form of love that Kierkegaard promotes in Works of
Love is love transformed in the Christian sense of the word.
But love as such is a passion that can take many forms.

55

In

this work Kierkegaard emphasizes the distinction between the
two higher forms of passion (Lidenskab), between erotic love

55

on the title page of Either/Or, vol. I, there is a
quotation from Edward Young, The Complaint or Night-Thoughts
on Life. Death. and Immortality, that indicates Kierkegaard's
readiness to do battle with the Enlightenment as well as with
speculative philosophy and install passion as a legitimate
function of the human condition. This, of course, will
necessitate a redefinition of passion as well as of its place
and function,
and consequently it will necessitate a
redefinition of the human individual. (Sl0k, Kierkegaard:
humanismens tamker, p. 97). The quotation asks, "Is reason
then alone baptized, are the passions pagans?"
217

(Elskov)

or

friendship

both

of

which

he

refers

to

as

spontaneous (umiddelbar) or preferential love (Forkjerlighed) ,
and love (Kjerlighed) as expressed in love of neighbor. Erotic
love as in eros is characterized as an appetite, a yearning
desire, which is aroused by the attractive qualities of its
object.

Here the prime example would be Plato's "heavenly

Eros. 1156 In Kierkegaard's configuration, this form of love is
aesthetic.

In his earlier pseudonymous authorship and most

especially in Either/Or, vol. I, Kierkegaard referred to the
lower form of this passion as a desire for pleasure. He called
it pure sexuality as with Don Juan (SV 2,83-98; EO,I, 87-103),
or simply self-interest as with Johannes
2,279-410; EO,I,

the

Seducer

(SV

301-445). 57 In Works of Love, however,

all

the latter seem to be integrated into his conception of erotic
love or friendship both of which are bound by the rules of the
worldly, and both of which have preference as the middle term
(SV 12,62; WL, 70). Love as in Kjerlighed or love of neighbor
also has a middle term,

namely transcendence,

but it is a

56

"Translator's Preface" to Anders Nygren, Agape and
Eros, tr. Philip s. Watson (Philadelphia: The Westminster
Press, 1953), p. viii.
57

For an
informative chart of
these different
manifestations of the passion of love see Sl0k, Kierkegaard:
humanismens t~nker, p. 140. It is important to note that these
several forms of the passion of love do not annul previous
forms as will be discussed below. In other words, they are not
mutually exclusive.
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response to a commandment, and hence it is controlled. 58
The

worldly

rules

that

are

especially

offensive

to

Kierkegaard's project are those that promote differentiation
between people which

necessarily

leads

to

comparison

and

competition. 59 The categories of comparison and competition
necessarily express a concern with the self that can never
overcome the distinctions between human beings in order to
love the neighbor as oneself. Moreover, spontaneous love and
friendship have a tendency to change because of their inherent
dependency on external objects and hence on fortune (SV 12,36;
WL, 46). Significant to this change is what Kierkegaard refers
to as "spontaneous combustion" which can be easily ignited by
comparison and competition (SV 12,40; WL, 50). The point is
that spontaneous love can turn into its opposite, hate, or

58

This form of love has some affinity with Anders
Nygren' s conception of agape when he says that "neighborly
love loses its specifically Christian character if it is taken
out of context of fellowship with God," meaning it cannot be
reduced to a simple ethics. QJ2. cit., pp. 95-6. Nygren goes
on to say neighborly love is only genuine when it "springs
from the same root as love for God -- that is, from.
experience of God's agape (p. 75). To some degree, then, human
beings can learn to love as in agape. But their concepts
differ when Nygren characterizes agape as "spontaneous and
unmotivated." For Kierkegaard love of God is a duty, and must
be a duty so as not to be dependent upon accident. It is a
response to a commandment that requires obedience. In that
sense love cannot be characterized as spontaneous.
59

"It is unbelievable how tragic and weakening the
change that takes place in a human being as soon as he has
included comparison in the economy of life. Comparison is a
damned guest whom no one can fulfill, because it craves more
and more, and takes food from the children. Comparison is an
unruly dweller in what before was a calm house; comparison
sleeps neither night nor day." PAP VIII 2 B 37:5.
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into

jealousy,

or

it can simply turn sluggish and become

"exhausted in the lukewarmness and indifference of habit" (SV
12,41; WL, 50). In other words, spontaneous love can turn into
something by which it becomes unrecognizable as love. The fact
that it is spontaneous means that it can turn off just as
suddenly as it had turned on,
still

unable

to

explain,

something we,
but

which

of course, are

is

an

important

consideration for Kierkegaard's conception of genuine love.
What bothers Kierkegaard is spontaneous love's capacity
for

change

circumstance,

and

hence

he notes,

its

unreliability.

This

is

a

that even the worldly rules have

attempted to overcome by eliciting promises from the partners
in love or by the partners constantly testing each other (SV
12,38; WL, 48). The problem is that spontaneous love is not
consciously grounded

in

transcendence,

it

has

no

ethical

dimension. 60 Although its dependency on fortune -- and good
fortune may have some longevity -- enables it to demonstrate
a lack of change and hence it can claim existence (Bestaaen),
it nevertheless does not acquire constancy (Bestandighed), and
that is its main problem.
Insofar as it has existence, it exists, but insofar
as it has not won constancy amid change, it cannot
60

We should differentiate this claim in Works of Love
from Kierkegaard's early work, especially Either-or vol. II,
wherein he suggests the erotic (as in Plato) can be taken to
a higher level where it acquires an ethical dimension. (SV
3,34,49; EO II, 30,47). In Works of Love he has entirely
abandoned such gradations. Here all the existence spheres have
been reduced to the possibilities of a more definitive eitheror.
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become contemporaneous with itself. Then it is
either happily ignorant about this incongruity or
disposed to sadness. Only the eternal can be and
become and remain contemporaneous with every age;
temporality, in contrast, separates within itself,
and the present cannot become contemporaneous with
the future or the future with the past, or the past
with the present (SV 12,36-7; WL, 46-7).
The

consideration

of

constancy

is

important

to

Kierkegaard inasmuch as he defines human nature as a synthesis
of the temporal and the eternal. 61 On the one hand, the human
being is an historical being active in and subordinated to the
determinations of time. on the other hand,

the single self

also has an ontological foundation in transcendence, meaning
it is also subordinated to the determinations of the eternal.
Here the discussion has to proceed with some caution because
Kierkegaard, in the words of Vigilius Haufniensis, the author
of The Concept of Anxiety, differentiates between time and
temporality.
Time

Vigilius

defines

as

an

infinite

succession

of

moments "passing by" and hence as an "infinitely contentless
present" (SV 6,174; CA, 85-6). This means that time cannot be
defined as the present, the past, or the future, because this
distinction appears

only through the relation of time to

eternity and through the reflection of eternity in time. In

61 The central concept here to be kept in mind is that

according to Kierkegaard human nature consists of several
syntheses. Thus it is also a synthesis of psyche (soul) and
body sustained by the spirit, of infinitude and finitude, and
of possibility and necessity. These syntheses will be
discussed below.
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other words, time cannot be stopped at some fixed point that
would

enable

such

a

di vision,

meaning

the

present

only

represents "the abstract in-between of past and future and
such

an

abstract

in-between

is

a

nothing. n 62

The

point

Kierkegaard wants to make is that a life lived exclusively in
time,

meaning sensuous life,

"and is only of time,

has no

present (Ncervcerende) , " and, as the Danish word also indicates,
"has no presence" (SV 6,175; CA, 86). In contrast, the eternal
is the present, Vigilius explains, meaning thought can annul
the succession of time and, so to speak, attempt to stop it.
Thereby the present acquires fulness, it acquires presence. 63
But this means that neither can the eternal be divided into
the past, the present, or the future. As Johannes Sl0k points
out,

inasmuch as

time

and eternity are defined

"as

each

other's contradiction" and hence with the help of a common
conceptual device, it suggests "that it is possible to think
a

relation

precisely

between

them." 64

temporality,

That

conceptual

device

is

and it is differentiated from time

insofar as it relates to the eternal.
Temporality realizes this possible relation through one
of Kierkegaard's favorite concepts about the present, the now,
62 Sl0k, Kierkegaard: humanismens tcenker, p. 188.
63

"For representation it is a going forth that
nevertheless does not get off the spot, because the eternal
is for representation the infinitely contentful present," SV
6,174-75; CA, 86.
64 Sl0k,

Kierkegaard: humanismens tcenker, p. 190.
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the moment (0jeblikket). But the reader is cautioned not to
think of the moment as a determination of time just because
it separates out the past and the future from itself, since
the determination of time,

we are reminded,

is that which

"passes by." Rather, "the moment is that ambiguity in which
time and eternity touch each other," something that happens
in time. "With this the concept of temporality (Timeliqhed)
is posited, whereby time constantly intersects eternity and
eternity constantly pervades time" (SV 6,177; CA, 89). Or as
Kierkegaard posits this problematic in Works of Love in terms
of

genuine

love

thereby

distancing

himself

from

the

impoverished capacities of spontaneous love:
Consequently if the eternal is in the temporal then
it is in the future . . . or in the possibility. The
past is the actual, the future is the possible;
eternally the eternal is the eternal, in time the
eternal is the possible, the future. Therefore we
call tomorrow the future, but we also call eternal
life the future. The possible as such is always a
duality
and
the
eternal
relates
itself
in
possibility equally to its duality. On the other
hand, when the human being to whom the possible is
relevant relates himself equally to the duality of
the possible, then we say: he expects. To expect
contains in it the same duality which the possible
has, and to expect is to relate oneself to the
possible simply and purely as such {SV 12,240; WL,
234) .

The

human

being

is

a

synthesis

of

temporality

and

eternity we are now told in Works of Love, and from Vigilius'
explanation

of

these

Kierkegaard himself,

terms,

as

well

as

from

that

of

it would seem the eternal in a double
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sense relates itself to time. 65 Here it becomes necessary to
remind ourselves of Kierkegaard's philosophical anthropology
which claims human nature is constituted by body and soul
united in spirit

(SV 6,137;

CA,

43),

something that must

necessarily be cognitively acknowledged if his philosophy of
political consciousness is to be comprehensible. 66
This brings us back to the problem of spontaneous love
being able to claim existence but unable to exact constancy.
What Kierkegaard is talking about is precisely the kind of
existence that spontaneous love lays claim to, namely a lack
of presence and hence a life without what Vigilius (ironically
yet biblically) refers to as "the fullness of time" (SV 6,178;
CA,

90).

Presence

necessitates

necessitates

transcendence,

the

according

eternal
to

dimension,

Kierkegaard's

understanding of authenticity, and therefore spontaneous love
cannot provide authenticity, cannot lead to genuine humanity,
much less to human equality. Erotic love or friendship contain

65

Ibid, p. 191.

66

Reidar Thomte explains how Kierkegaard's philosophical
anthropology should be understood
in his
"Historical
Introduction"
to
The
Concept
of
Anxiety,
p.
xiv:
"Historically, the psychology with which Kierkegaard worked
is quite different from present day psychological research.
His is a phenomenology that is based on an ontological view
of man, the fundamental presupposition of which is the
transcendent reality of the individual, whose intuitively
discernible character reveals the existence of an eternal
component. Such a psychology does not blend well with any
purely empirical science and is best understood by regarding
soma, psyche, and spirit as the principle determinants of the
human structure, with the first two belonging to the temporal
realm and the third to the eternal."
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no ethical task,

a transcendent category,

but is entirely

dependent upon chance, a category of immanence. One may have
to be grateful for one's good fortune, but "the task can never
be that one ought to find the beloved or to find this friend"
(SV 12,55; WL, 64).
What has been shown here is that Kierkegaard's dialectic
defines the single self as qualified by empirical necessity,
and hence subject to change and to chance, as we have seen,
but this single self also has a consciousness that renders it
independent

of

time

and

hence

free.

That

is

to

say,

Kierkegaard insists on the distinction of the worldly life and
the spiritual life with the only connection between the two
being located in the existential enactment of the requirement,
that

is,

in

the

ethico-religious

moment.

Hence

the

concreteness of the self is precisely expressed by making
itself infinitely present to itself and to see this as its
task, as its primary ethical obligation (SV 12,55; WL, 64).

IV:7

Kierkegaard
(Elskov)

to

(Kierlighed) .

opposes

what
The

we

spontaneous

have

latter

chosen

implies

a

or
to

preferential

love

call

love

simply

transformation

of

the

passion expressed as erotic love or friendship into a kind of
love

that

can

claim

Existents

implying

among

other

characteristics constancy, yet without annulling love of the
beloved or friend.

If that were a requirement, Kierkegaard
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insists, the category of neighbor would be a fraud (SV 12,65;
WL, 73). However, love as an obligation is not dependent upon
the mysteriousness of

"falling

in

love."

"By coming

into

existence, by becoming a self, [the single self] becomes free,
but in the next moment it is dependent upon this self.

In

contrast, the obligation makes a person dependent and in the
same moment eternally independent" (SV 12,43; WL, 53). Love,
then,

is not dependent upon accident or fortune,

upon the

notion of "falling in love," something over which human beings
have no control. It is a constant inasmuch as the command of
the law is eternally posited.

It is universal inasmuch as

revelation was meant to speak to all humankind.
Love of neighbor is not an erratic passion qualified by
emotional and sensuous desires. Rather it is a love of the
spirit "which in earnestness and truth is inwardly more tender
than erotic love is in the union and more faithful in the
sincerity of solidarity than the most famous friendship" (SV
12,49; WL, 58). Kierkegaard is content to suggest that natural
inclinations cannot be counted on to initiate the "idea of
community." Therefore we get the law's demand which elicits
an obligation, something human beings can control.
This transfer of control is possible inasmuch as his
philosophical anthropology showed the human individual to be
a two-dimensional being making a dialectical life experience
possible. The point is that the single self must love in a
different way, in an ethical way, and that is an obligation
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constitutive

of

Kierkegaard's

its

(second)

authentic

nature.

self

is

a

In

other

words,

responsible

being,

responsible to the other, to the community, and to the self.

In this chapter we have seen how Kierkegaard begins to
implement his therapeutic "corrective" by differentiating the
categories freedom and equality from how they are conceived
by

liberal

theory.

To

Kierkegaard

these

most

important

principles of the modern experience have been incorrectly
understood as political rights.

This misunderstanding was

caused by the self-deification of man -- a symptomatic effect
of the separation of knowledge and experience -- resulting in
a materialist conception of these principles and indeed of the
single self.

It meant that the dialectic of

immanent and

transcendent experience, traditionally understood by classical
philosophy to render a differentiated human existence,

had

been confounded. Consequently the single self had been reduced
to an undifferentiated being who in its egological condition
experiences only estrangement and envy,

and thus a

being

reduced to its lowest common denominator.
Kierkegaard's "corrective" aims at revising this mistaken
interpretation of the single self and the principles that
governs its existence and thereby provide the possibility for
a higher form of existence.

He does so by emphasizing the

ethical nature of freedom and equality, meaning they are tasks
to

be

achieved

and

as

such
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will

express

the

"idea

of

community." He wants to remind people of the possibility of
a differentiated self that acts in the world in terms of its
most

genuine

characteristic

differentiates

this

constancy,

from

unreliable

because

form

erotic
it

of

which

is

love,

whose

love which
is

subject

love.

Kierkegaard

basic

he

considers

to

change.

trait

is

generally

Kierkegaard

overcomes this problem by positing the possibility for

a

higher form of love, for transcending this passion of love in
its most basic expression and become a love that understands
freedom

and

equality

as

obligations

fulfilled

by

love's

obedience to the demand of the law.
In the next and final chapter we shall look closer at the
law that is the foundation of the command "You shall love the
neighbor as the self," and we shall take a closer look at
Kierkegaard's concept of neighbor. More specifically, however,
we shall investigate his concept of

love with its unique

characteristic of upbuilding as its fundamental task. As such
we shall come to understand why it is that love must transcend
its basic self and become a higher form of love that has the
capacity to love the other as the self and hence the freedom
to acknowledge the other as the equal of the self.
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Chapter V
A THERAPEUTIC "CORRECTIVE":
LOVE AS UPBUILDING

The only actuality there is for an existing being
is his own ethical being; all other actualities he
is only knowledgeable about, but true know edge
consists in a translating within possibility.

1

See, now the discourse has stopped by that which it
wants to make the object of its considerations. The
commandment about being obliged to love the neighbor
turns out to be synonymous with that of being
obliged to love oneself. Our intention has not been
to talk about love of neighbor. Rather we wish to
talk about
that love is duty, that
we ought to love the neighbor;

for this is precisely the mark of Christian love
that it includes this apparent contradiction: that
to love is duty. And yet it is only this type of
love that discovers that the neighbor exists, and,
what then comes to the same, that everyone is that
[an existing neighbor]. If it was not a duty to
love, then there could be no talk of loving the
neighbor j the concept neighbor corresponds to loving
as duty.

By

making

neighbor
creates

1

as
a

the

oneself

higher

imperative
the

form

of

SV 10,22; CUP, 280.

2 PAP VIII 2 B 30:4.

that

foundation
love

by

one
of

should
love,

love

the

Kierkegaard

constituting

it

as

an

obligation. This he understands as an act of obedience. As
such it is not plagued by the vicissitudes of erotic love, but
rather engenders a constancy in existential experience that
renders harmony in the self.

Moreover,

by so cons ti tu ting

love, he is able to institute the concept of neighbor as a
relational quality of the self, something that was alien to
classical Greek philosophy.
In this chapter we shall look at how Kierkegaard qua his
"corrective" reveals a space for human action that transcends
the mundane egological reality of the single self. Here we
should take careful note of the fact that the possible implied
in this obligation to the law's demand to love the other as
the self is possible, and therefore it is a higher reality
than any the inauthentic single self may have created for
itself.

It is only possible,

however,

if the single self

freely chooses it. By choosing to love the neighbor, and by
extension all of humankind, in that special sense, the single
self has committed itself to a stance, that is, to a level of
political consciousness that expresses a concern for the good
of the whole thereby manifesting the "idea of community." By
choosing to

love in a

characteristic

of

sense that incorporates the unique

being

upbuilding,

the

single

self

has

created a space in which transparency can be achieved. It is
a

transparency

that

unconceals

the

single

self

acting

according to its understanding of citizenship, a category that
in and of itself unconceals the particular human being as a
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single relating self of character. It is the experience of
Existents.

V:1

Kierkegaard's emphasis on the law (SV 12,23-48; WL, 3457) has a two-dimensional aspect to it. As Bruce Kirmmse has
pointed out,

it is both rational

inasmuch as it posits a

command to respond to the universal

standards of ethical

conduct, and doctrinaire insofar as it demands obedience to
Mosaic Law or the Christian Law of Pauline teaching. In its
broadest sense Kierkegaard's conception of the law is meant
to "summon up both its Enlightenment philosophical sense and
its traditional New Testament dogmatic sense.

113

The latter

becomes necessary inasmuch as Christianity as a religion of
grace speaks to the single self as it really is according to
revelation: weak and sinful. For that reason the single self
is

in

need

of

"a

religion

more

absolute,

personal than the religion of rational,

outgoing,

universal,

and

ethical

statements (the Law)," which expect rationally perfected and
hence abstract beings for its fulfillment.

4

But there is more to the differentiation than this. The
problem for Kierkegaard is that, for example, with respect to

3 Kierkegaard's Politics: The Social Thought of S0ren
Kierkegaard in Its Historical Context. Ph.D. dissertation
(University of California, Berkeley, 1977), p. 592.
4 Ibid.
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Kant's categorical imperative the autonomous individual acts
on principle.

Kant's only concern is the validity of the

principle. In the case of the principle of utility, one acts
in accordance with a merely mechanical principle. The problem
is that acting "on principle" is to act in accordance with
something

external

which

means

and

to

engage

inherently

detrimental

disharmonious

Ultimately,

as we saw in chapter three,

in
to

something
the

self.

this is to be in

conflict with the principle of contradiction. Before we jump
to the conclusion that the principle of contradiction also is
an external principle,

however,

it must be remembered how

Kierkegaard understands this Aristotelian principle in its
moral application: to discern between good and evil. It is an
ethical qualification and therefore existential in nature.
In

the

cases

of

the

categorical

imperative

and

the

principle of utility the duty is to universal law; it is not
to the other nor to the self in the strict sense. As Climacus
comments in the Postscript, "(w]hen an individual [Individ)
abandons himself

in order to lay hold of something great

[ outside

himself),

forsakes

everything

his
to

enthusiasm
save

is

himself,

aesthetic;
his

when

he

enthusiasm

is

ethical" (SV 10,85; CUP, 350).
One might argue that the commandment to love the neighbor
is

equally

external

to

the

single

self,

especially

as

Kierkegaard defines it: as the law's demand (Fordring), as an
obligation that is not natural to the basic self. The point
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is that the obligation is entered into freely and only when
faith has become the actuality of the consciousness of the
single self, i.e. the possibility that is possible for every
single self. Moreover, faith cannot be categorized as external
to the self as it constitutes inwardness (Inderlighed). The
law that obliges the single self to love the neighbor as the
self is g priori in the sense of being a law written on the
mind, and in that sense is innate within the self. But the
law also comes from without in the form of the commandment to
which the self is obliged,

and inasmuch as this means to

become genuinely consistent with that deeper

self,

it

is

constitutive of selfhood. Conceived in this manner, obedience
to the law's demand constitutes Existents.
The purpose of the law is to compel the single self to
love the neighbor as itself, which for Kierkegaard is the
highest good. He insists Christianity teaches the shortest
way to find this good is through grace (SV12,56; WL, 64). And
since law addresses the single self as it is, no human being
can

claim

exemption

from

the

law's

demand.

There

is

requirement for the single self to be what it is not,

no

i.e.

there is no requirement for a specific talent or super human
effort. There is only the requirement that it, through grace,
wills to see the neighbor as its equal. Therefore,

as Paul

Muller has pointed out, the relation to transcendent being "is
the

unavoidable

(uomg~ngelige)
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condition

for

the

human

individual becoming a loving, social self. 115
A relationship to Christianity must therefore be sober
in

an

eternal

sense,

meaning

it

must

attain

a

self-

renunciating stance, which is precisely where it sets itself
apart from worldly love which essentially is self-love. To be
obedient

to

the

law's

demand

is

to

enter

into

a

sober

existence, while an irreligious life implies the intoxication
of self-feeling since erotic love and friendship are the very
height of self-feeling. As such they represent the height of
self-intoxication

(SV

12,60;

WL,

68).

It

is

a

delicate

dialectical move Kierkegaard engages in here. His intent is
to assure that the worldly -- neighborly love can obviously
not be practiced anywhere but within a social arrangement -must

be

carefully

balanced

yet

differentiated

transcendent experience of the standard (Malestok)

from

the

that is

embodied in the law, and to which the single self can never
be equal.

It is in this carefully balanced differentiated

experience that Kierkegaard's intentionality is rooted.
The law demands that we love the neighbor. Kierkegaard
promotes an interesting thesis about the concept of neighbor.
He suggests that erotic love and friendship as conceived by
"the poet" are categories that belong to paganism, while love
of neighbor is strictly a Christian concept. Among the pagans
there was no concept of neighbor, only a poetic celebration

5

"Kierkegaard som social og
Kierkegaardiana, 13, (1984), p. 124.
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politisk

tamker"

in

of erotic love and friendship. But in the New Testament the
poet will find no such celebration, only repeated celebrations
of the concept of love of neighbor. Here Kierkegaard makes a
rare judgment on revelation as such placing it and its message
of "the true love" (den sande Kjerlighed) above pagan (poetic)
teaching. Kierkegaard concedes that although it is true that
people listen more to the poet and his worldly promises than
to the words of the preacher, Christianity should not attempt
to ban poets or poetry reading. We live in that world, but as
Christians we understand everything differently from the nonChristian; we know how to make the distinction between worldly
and non-worldly promises (SV 12,52; WL, 61). The Christian may
speak the same language, but by his words he means something
entirely different.

V:2

Because

the

single

self

resides

in

the

world,

its

language contains a dialectical dimension that both endangers
and

harmonizes

existential

becomes an attitude.

experience.

Thus

belief

also

One should not believe evil but good

about one's neighbor. That is to say, the knowledge we have
about others is interpretation. Therefore, how we interpret
the neighbor is in the knower, not in the neighbor (SV 12,21920;

WL,

214-15).

consciousness
comments,

of

It is a
the

matter of the condition of the

single

self.

As

Kresten

Nordentoft

"To live is to interpret the uninterpreted given,
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not in an arbitrary pleasing of itself, but in a continuing
interpretation of the ambiguous.

116

Kierkegaard here posits the basic framework for reading
Works of Love, a framework that differs rather dramatically
from his earlier authorship.

There,

and especially in the

indirect communications of the pseudonymous authorship,

he

laid out the three existence forms: the aesthetic, the ethical
and the religious. 7 But here in the direct communication of
his later authorship, Kierkegaard in a sense, but only in a
sense,

goes back to where he started,

he again posits the

either/or. Now there are only two existence forms, and the one
unambiguously excludes the other, in contrast to the earlier
tripartite
necessarily

division
exclude

where
the

one

existence

others.

Thus

in

form

did

not

Works

of

Love

Kierkegaard is not operating on the abstract levels of the
aesthetic, ethical, and religious existence forms that belong
to the indirect communication of his pseudonymous authorship.
Now

the

6

communication

is

direct;

the

choice

has

become

Kierkegaard's Psychology, p. 339.

7

There are a variety of intermediate stages that have
been discussed in much detail in the secondary literature. See
for example Steven Dunning, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of
Inwardness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985; John
w. Elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous
Works (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Mark c.
Taylor Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship: A study of Time
and the Self (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975);
Josiah
Thompson,
The
Lonely
Labyrinth:
Kierkegaard
Pseudonymous Works (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Press, 1967; James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Company, 1953.
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concrete:

either you are a Christian or you are not. 8 The

requirement

is

that

the

whole

being

of

the

single

self

responds to this demand for choice.
The choice to be a Christian does not mean a withdrawal
from the world -- it is tempting to say that the opposite is
indeed true.
Erotic love and friendship relate themselves to
passion; but all passion, whether it attacks or it
defends itself, fights in one manner only: either - or: "Either I exist and am the highest, or I do
not exist at all, either all or nothing" (SV 12,50;
WL, 59).
From this it would seem to follow that human passion embraces
its own self-critical dimension 9 that requires it to progress
to

its

highest

understanding.
presents

the

dimension

in

Christianity,
highest

form

terms

of

according
of

its
to

own

self-

Kierkegaard,

differentiation

to

which

therefore passion must direct its efforts. That would mean
that obedience to the command to love the neighbor as oneself,
a command that never ceases, is considered a higher form of
passion than that expressed by spontaneous and essentially

8

As Kierkegaard remarked in his journal: "The whole
pseudonymous production, and my existence in virtue of it, was
in a Greek mode. Now I must elicit the characteristic
Christian form of Existents. For more on this change in
Kierkegaard's presentation of existence forms see Sylvia Walsh
Utterbach, "Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Christian Existence,"
Ph.D. dissertation (Emory University, 1975), pp. 1-8.
9

Not unlike Hegel's concept of spirit which also
progresses toward higher self-development by the self-testing
inherent to consciousness, what in traditional terms was
referred to as "the quest for truth." Hegel's Science of
Logic, p. 55.
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unreliable love.
But, of course, there is more to the story than that.
Love of other is seen as a higher form of passion than love
of self -- even worldly love recognizes some forms of selflessness
self,

(SV 12,123; WL,

that

is,

the

127). 10 But love of other,

immanent

self,

is

not

a

before
natural

inclination. Love of the neighbor does not come naturally to
human beings. Natural or spontaneous love is ultimately love
of self,

while the law that issues the "love-commandment"

(Kjerligheds-Budet) is essentially aimed at self-renunciation.
But this would seem to contradict the very language of
the

law

which

says

to

love

the

neighbor

as

the

self.

Kierkegaard should here be approached with much caution when
he says that "this commandment will teach each person how he
is to love himself" (SV 12,65; WL, 73-4). To obey the command
to

love

and

hence

to

comprehend

love

as

a

duty

is

to

acknowledge the self as essentially spirit. In this sense, the
"love-commandment" promises eternal life (Ibid) . 11 The spirit
is thus constituted as love, that is, as in love of other. To

1

°

Kierkegaard is somewhat ambiguous on the world's
perception of self-lessness. See, for example, SV 12,119-20;
WL, 123-24.
11

This is one of the few, if not the only place in Works
of Love where Kierkegaard hints at eternal salvation. Such
reluctance would appear to suggest that although that may be
the ultimate benefit to the believer, the struggle to achieve
the truth of one's self is for immediate purposes, to fully
concretize
or
existentialize
experience.
According
to
Kierkegaard, such a life constitutes a higher form of
happiness. See discussion above in chapter I.
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love the other is therefore to love oneself (as essentially
spirit).

To

love

oneself

in

this

sense

is

to

practice

Christian self-denial, while its absence is to succumb to the
"intoxication of self-feeling," meaning immanent self-love.
Self-denial is precisely this transformation of the self from
one sensually-psychically-spiritually qualified,
"purely

qualified

spiritual

as

spirit

qualification"

and

(SV

the

12,61;

to a

neighbor
WL,

69).

a

self

purely

It

is

a

transformation, as Kierkegaard says, "by which a human being
becomes sober in an eternal sense"

(SV 12,60; WL, 68), i.e.

he acknowledges the differentiated reality that constitutes
a concretized life.
about

an

It is in this sense Kierkegaard talks

ethico-religious

existence

as

relation between the self and the other,

it

concerns

the

the self and the

world.
The

perspective

essentially
universal

spirit,
authority

of

the

single

revelation,

the

embedded

in

self

understood

commandment,
this

and

command

as
the
gain

significance, but a balanced significance. Bruce Kirmmse may
be correct when he claims that this is the death of natural
man, 12 as long as we understand that this abolishment does not
imply an abandonment of the differentiated experience, that
Kierkegaard has so carefully developed, and make the single
self a religious fanatic. Thus Kierkegaard is very careful to

12

'
Kirmmse,

0 p.

C1
' t.

p. 592.
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add that to love in this sense does not prevent engagement in
erotic love and friendship, but now these relationships take
place on a higher level than before inasmuch as the beloved
and the friend are not just loved as unique human beings, they
are loved as neighbors as well (SV 12,65-6; WL, 73-4).

V:3

The understanding of differentiated experience developed
above

suggests

that

Christianity

also

represents

a

paradigmatic change in how human beings theoretically relate
to each other (SV 12,30, WL, 41). 13 For Plato and Aristotle
the obligation was grounded in the political relationship of
the zoon politikon toward the city, toward the whole, in an
organic

conception

of

that

relationship. 14

At

times,

13

As Eric Voegelin suggests in The Ecumenic Age, vol. 4
of Order and History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press,
1974),
p.232:
"Revelation is not a
piece of
information, arbitrarily thrown out by some supernatural
force, to be carried home as a possession, but the movement
of response to an irruption of the divine in the psyche."
14

We hesitate to use the organic conception to
characterize the political relationship as depicted in the
political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle inasmuch as this
would be an incorrect definition of the philosopher's
relationship to the political dimension of the city,
especially as we understand it in Plato's Republic. That,
however, would not constrain us from characterizing it as a
necessary relationship, but the category of necessity is not
connected to the organic conception in this case. Rather we
want to argue, fully realizing the conflicting opinions of
other interpretations, that Plato insists that the philosopher
returns to the cave, because he sees that it is the good that
wisdom rules in the city. The relationship of philosophy and
politics is therefore a necessary relationship. The Republic
of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,
1968), 517c, 519c-d, 520b-c, and especially 540a-b. It is,
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Kierkegaard

sounds

as

if

he

conceives

of

the

political

relationship in somewhat the same manner, for instance when
he as a twenty-three year old makes the following statement:
When the dialectical (the romantic) is worldhistorically lived through (a period I perhaps could
very appropriately call the age of individuality something which can also quite easily be
demonstrated historically), social life must again
come to play its role to the highest degree, and
ideas such as the state (for example as the Greeks
knew it; church in the older Catholic meaning) must
necessarily return richer and fuller, that is, with
all the content that the transmitted diversity of
individuality can give the idea, so that the single
self as such means nothing, but everything is as a
link in the chain. 15
But the concept of the neighbor puts a whole different light
on Kierkegaard's thinking.

For one thing,

it posits human

relationships based on conscience rather than on conventional
mores (SV 12,133; WL, 137), meaning authority is now located
within rather than externally. Yet in spite of its religious
connotations, it urges a political understanding.
Kierkegaard's concept of neighbor not only dates him, but
the "deduction" he makes from this concept of categories such

then, a rational qualification that governs the relationship
between philosophy and politics from Plato's perspective. On
the other hand, when Plato argues in Book IV of the Republic
that "each of the other citizens too must be brought to that
which naturally suits him -- one man, one job -- so that each
man, practicing his own, which is one, will not become many
but one; and thus, you see, the whole city will naturally grow
to be one and not many" ( 423d) , then Plato is indeed
characterizing an organic relationship. For a similar account
in Aristotle see The Politics, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1252b25-35, 1276b1535.
15

PAP I A 307 (JP 4070).
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as

equality

establishes

and

freedom,

him

as

a

humanity

political

and

community,

thinker

in

the

firmly
modern

tradition. There is no trace of any organic conception of the
state left in the picture his understanding of the concept of
neighbor reveals. That, however, should not be construed as
an introduction to a Kierkegaardian theory of state.

What

concerns him is how (hvorledes) the single self is disposed
to the larger whole, what throughout this project is referred
to

as

political

consciousness.

Kierkegaard

is

much

less

interested in the what of things, and therefore we do not get
a

theory

of

state

from

him

outlining

structures of procedural governing. 16

the

institutional

We might add that a

philosophy of consciousness does not necessitate a theory of
state,

while a

theory of state necessarily presupposes a

philosophy of consciousness. 17

V:4

Kierkegaard entitles one of the chapters of Works of Love
"You shall love the neighbor." It is time to find out who this
neighbor really is.

First,

Kierkegaard does not say "your

16

As we have already seen and shall see later, there are
other more compelling reasons why Kierkegaard does not provide
a political theory as such, the most important being that he
in fact accepted the natural emergence of liberal democracy
and its governing structures which in Denmark took the form
of a constitutional monarchy.
17

We are grateful to Joseph Roberts for reminding us of
this truth.
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neighbor" as it has heretofore been translated. In fact, the
Danish word he uses does not mean neighbor in the ordinary
sense at all. Neighbor in Danish is Nabo. The word Kierkegaard
does use is N~sten which is derived from neahgebur

(near-

dweller),18 and which incorporates within it the definitive
article.

Literally it would mean "the next one."

This

is

precisely the meaning Kierkegaard draws from it when he says
the neighbor worthy of your love is the next person you see,
"the neighbor is the one who dwells nearer to you than all
others, but not in a preferential sense" (SV 12,26; WL, 37),
"the neighbor

is

every human

being"

(SV

12,64;

WL,

72).

Kierkegaard asks whether the neighbor is closer to you than
you are yourself and answers in the negative. The neighbor is
as near to you as you are to yourself, and in that sense "the
neighbor is actually a doubling of your own self; the neighbor
is what the thinkers would call the other, that by which the
selfish in self-love is to be tested" (SV 12,26-7; WL, 37).
Kierkegaard is struggling to explain what "as the self"
could possibly mean without collapsing the concept of love of
other

into

manifested

an
by

egological
the

word

of

conclusion.
the

The

commandment,

"doubling"
and

it

is

is
a

doubling "the selfish [erotic lover] unconditionally cannot
tolerate"

( SV

12, 27;

WL,

38) .

His

burning

passion

would

18 Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking" in
Poetry. Language. Thought, tr. Albert Hofstadter (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), pp. 146-47.
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prohibit him from giving up his love if the beloved should
demand it. It would mean to deny what his passion dictates,
and this he is unable to do. "Consequently the lover does not
love

the

beloved

[fordrende),

"as

but this

himself,"

for

'as himself'

he

is

demanding

contains precisely the

demand [Fordringen) to him -- alas, nevertheless the loving
one believes

still to

love

the

other person higher than

himself" (Ibid, emphasis added). In that sense the other is
as close to the truly loving self as it is possible to be
with out attempting to change him or her

in any way;

the

egological move would be to succumb to the temptation of being
demanding,

succomb to the temptation to try to change the

other.
Using a

Heideggerian interpretation,

we can say that

Kierkegaard understands the law's demand (the only point where
demand apparently is appropriate)

that "You shall love the

neighbor as the self" to mean to let the other be. 19 Inasmuch
19

Ibid, p. 151: "Dwelling presences the fourfold by
bringing the presencing of the fourfold into things. But
things themselves secure the fourfold only when they
themselves as things are let be in their presencing. How is
this done? In this way, that mortals nurse and nurture the
things that grow, and specially construct things that do not
grow." Also Discourse on Thinking, tr. John M. Anderson and
E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1966), pp.
55-6 (Gelassenheit, pp. 24-5): "Releasement [or letting-be,
Gelassenheit] toward things and openness to the mystery [that
which shows itself and at the same time withdraws) belong
together. They grant us the possibility of dwelling in the
world in a totally different way . . . . What great danger then
might move upon us? Then there might go hand in hand with the
greatest ingenuity in calculative planning and inventing
indifference
toward
meditative
thinking,
total
thoughtlessness. And then?
Then man would have denied and
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as you choose to remain indifferent to the differences in the
other,

the other can be whatever he

wants

to

be.

To be

indifferent to his alterity is an act of letting-be.
In the direct communication of Works of Love Kierkegaard
is

less

concerned with

relationship

and

more

the

phenomenology

concerned

of

with

the

its

ethical

practical

possibility. On the other hand, the political in this concept
of other becomes dominant when Kierkegaard adds: "To be sure
the neighbor is in itself a multitude, for the neighbor means
all people

(alle Mennesker)"

(SV 12,27;

WL,

37).

Thus he

embodies the political in the ethical in a way reminiscent of
this unity in Plato and Aristotle.

As the single self is

obliged to the neighbor, in the same way he is obliged to all
of humankind. As is suggested, Christianity relates itself,
not to cognition, but to action thereby "imprisoning" (fange)
a questioner to the ethical, just as Socrates did to knowledge
(SV 12,97; WL, 103). One might argue that Kierkegaard posits
a universal responsibility for the state of the world on each
single

self.

individual

of

He thereby
liberal

enlarges
theory

upon the

whose

aim

duties
was

of the

merely

to

aggrandize his own lot in accordance with political rights to

thrown away his own special nature -- that he is a meditative
being. Therefore, the issue is the saving of man's essential
nature. Therefore, the issue is keeping meditative thinking
alive. Yet releasement toward things and openness to the
mystery never happen of themselves. They do not befall us
accidentally.
Both
flourish
only
through
persistent,
courageous thinking."
245

which no apparent obligation is attached. 20
Kierkegaard's philosophy of political consciousness not
only posits a responsibility for the neighbor, but it also
posits

the

criterion

for

this

relationship,

which

is

especially captured in his comparison of the self to the
other.

The

relationship

is

precisely

grounded

in

the

"likeness" of the two entities which rules out any apparent
differences in terms of talent, social position or economic
advantage or disadvantage.

In other words,

the neighbor is

simply any person that appears before you, and importantly the
neighbor

is

"the

absolutely

true

expression

for

human

equality" (SV 18,156; POV, 118} . 21 Hence justice becomes the
qualifier for the relationship of the self to the other, the
neighbor, meaning justice is the aim of love. In this sense
not only love, but justice as well, form the foundation of
Kierkegaard's "idea of community, " the task to which every

20

John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ch. V, #49.
Locke is remarkably scarce in his language in terms of
attaching obligations to the rights of possession "which may
be hoarded up without injury to any one." (Emphasis added).
21

Although very different from Kierkegaard,
it is
difficult not to be reminded of Emmanuel Levinas' "face to
face" encounter: "My relationship with the other as neighbor
gives meaning to my relations with all the others. All human
relations as human proceed from disinterestedness. The one for
the other of proximity is not a deforming abstraction. In it
justice is shown from the first." Otherwise than Being or
Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), p. 159. See also his Totality and
Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis,
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1969), pp. 212-14.
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individual consciousness is called.
The relationship of love and justice (Retf~rdighed) as
Kierkegaard understands it, finally compels us to accept that
his philosophy is anything but removed from the world of
action. Indeed this relationship underscores how the single
self is related to the state, and why the single self must
come before the state,

(as Kierkegaard admires in Plato). It

also explains why all of his energies are focused on the
single self -- the elementary unit of the state -- rather than
on the structures of the state.

v:s
Ideally,

the relationship between the single self and

the state is grounded externally in justice and internally in
love. Under the authority of justice, during peaceful times,
proprietary interests would be safeguarded,

and the state

would have no rights of intervention (SV 12,255; WL,

248).

That is to say, the difference between what is mine and yours
is unambiguous.

Everyone has what

is his or hers

and

if

someone attempts to defraud (fravende) another what is his,
justice will intervene.
The problem with this idyllic picture is that sometimes
calamitous events occur such as "revolution, war, earthquake,"
and

everything becomes

confused

(Ibid).

Then

justice may

vainly attempt to secure to each what belongs to the single
self, may vainly attempt to "emphasize the difference between
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what is mine and yours" (Ibid). But in the confusion justice
is

unable

momentarily
justice

to

maintain

have

despairs.

its

slipped
The

balance.

off,

result

and

Its

as

is

blindfold

Kierkegaard

social

chaos.

may

argues,

Political

authority has lost control and is unable to live up to its
foremost responsibility: "regulating and preserving property,"
to use the words of Locke's description of the obligations of
the minimalist state. 22
The problem with justice is in Kierkegaard's opinion its
inability to maintain stability. The reason for this is its
emphasis

on

proprietary

rights.

More

fundamentally,

the

problem with justice is its inherent concern with external
differences, the difference between what is mine and yours.
With emphasis on difference, any form of authority, whether
it is considered just or not, will be forced to choose sides,
and hence its legitimacy is compromised.
compromised,

most

fundamentally,

because

Its legitimacy is
its

focus

is

on

externality, and therefore it is relatively easy to unbalance.
Love (Kjerlighed), in contrast, although it within itself
represents change in its transformed expression as love of
other, nevertheless embodies a posture that dissolves/elevates
or suspends (oph~ver) the distinction between mine and yours,
and the more so the deeper the love.
Its perfection depends essentially on that it does
not reveal the original and continual difference
between mine and yours that is fundamentally hidden;
22 Second Treatise of Government,

248

Ch. I, #3.

consequently it depends essentially on the degree
of the revolution (Omvi!!l tning) ; the deeper the
revolution is, the more perfect is the love ( sv
12,256; W:,

249).

So rather than succumbing to distinctions, love decisively and
undauntedly expresses the "idea of community" even in the face
of calamities. As such love is more reliable with regard to
maintaining social stability where justice, in Kierkegaard's
opinion necessarily fails. In this sense love is essentially
political and necessary expressing the fundamentally political
nature of the single self.

V:6

The love of neighbor, as we have shown, represents much
more

than

a

utopian

and

otherworldly

conception

of

the

relationship between the single self and the world. But there
are other reasons for why Kierkegaard would appeal to the
concept of neighbor and thereby bring to fruition his "idea
of community."
On the one hand, Kierkegaard is well aware that people
are naturally disinclined to care for anyone beyond their
immediate circle of family and friends. To care for strangers
and to devote oneself to their needs is

in worldly terms

considered strange, something reserved for 'saintly' people.
The point is, no one would naturally love his neighbor if the
neighbor, as Kierkegaard insists, is merely the next person
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(Na!sten) you see. 23 on the other hand, Kierkegaard is fighting
the illusion promoted by the "wellmeaning .
false prophets of secularism"

.

. but .

(SV 12,74-5; WL, 81-2) who by

mechanical means claim to bring about "likeness in the world
among human beings, to apportion the conditions of temporal
existence equally,
12, 75;

WL,

82) .

if possible,

to all

human beings"

The earthly distinctions

(SV

that modern man

clings to as much as the citizens of Plato's Republic are
unchangeable, Kierkegaard insists, and no ideology is going
to improve on that condition.
From the distance of superior condescension the
distinguished person understands equality between
human beings; from the distance of concealed
superiority the scholar and the gentleman understand
23

Plato had the same problem and therefore we get the
often misinterpreted and ill labeled "noble lie." The
Phoenecian Tale has a twofold purpose. It wants to explain the
naturalness of the division of labor in spite of which the
people of the city in speech are all brothers. That is to say,
Plato engages in the tale in order to get across the reality
of an uncomfortable truth that will stand up against the
"dream images" which express the natural and conventional
differences (Republic 414d). Or to put it more bluntly, people
were comfortable with the worldly divisions, but would abhor
the call by Socrates, the physician, to brotherly love among
all the citizens unless it was couched in an "unbelievable
big lie." See Eric Voegelin, Plato (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
state University Press, 1966), p. 105. For a notorious
contrasting interpretation see Karl Popper, The Open Society
and Its Enemies, vol. I (Princeton NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1962, 1966), pp. 138-141. Note that Popper does not
mention Plato's insistence on the brotherhood of all men
although it appears twice in the tale (Republic, 414e, 415a).
Kierkegaard says much the same as Plato when he comments: "It
is veritably true, then, (what is already evident in what has
been developed, where it was shown that the neighbor is the
pure qualification of mind), the neighbor one sees only with
closed eyes or by looking away from the distinctions. The
sensual eye always sees the distinctions and looks to the
distinctions. (SV 12,71-2; WL, 79).
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equality between human beings; from within the
concession of a little advantage the one whose
distinction is to be as most people are understands
equality between human beings -- at a distance the
neighbor is recognized by all, but only God knows
how many recognize him in actuality, that is, up
close (SV 12,82; WL, 89).
Thus he charges the modern secular movements with attempting
to fool the people into believing that the natural condition
can somehow be altered by technical means.

In other words,

there is an appeal to ideology to promote brotherhood based
on the results of scientific progress. The implication is that
what was not possible before,

resulting in humankind being

plagued by caste and class systems, can now be remedied thanks
to modern technology. But brotherly love, Kierkegaard warns,
cannot be grounded in external illusions.
foundation

in

the

truth

promoted

by

It must have its
Christianity

that

spiritually human beings are all equal and are therefore able
to love one another in spite of the worldly differences. By
being Christian the single self is not "exempted from the
difference,
distinction"

but by being victorious over the temptation of
(SV 12, 73; WL,

81), he accomplishes the law's

demand. Thus Christianity wills that every single self carry
its difference loosely in order to allow its likeness to shine
through, thereby revealing the "essentially other, that which
for everyone is common"

(SV 12,90; WL,

96).

In that sense,

then, Christianity again represents a paradigmatic change in
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Kierkegaard's view. 24 From this it follows that Kierkegaard's
concept of neighbor in its proper application is not only what
is going to promote equality and the "idea of community" and
consequently the single self's fulfillment. Importantly, for
Kierkegaard, it will also restore Christianity to its proper
role as the standard

(Maalestok)

for human conduct in the

world. Essential to this standard is the concept of love as
upbuilding.

V:7

What appears to be unique about Kierkegaard's concept of
love

is

its

upbuilding

(opbyggende)

quality.

By

this

Kierkegaard means that through love
the loving one [den Kjerlige] presupposes that love
is in the other person's heart. and by this very
presupposition he builds up love in him -- from the
ground up. provided. of course. that he lovingly
presupposes it in the ground {SV 12,210; WL, 206).

24

Kierkegaard is either incredibly insensitive or
equally incredibly oblivious to the reality of the European
and American history of slavery, not to mention the history
of the world. Thus he claims even the non-Christian is
grateful to Christianity for having "saved humankind from the
evil II which in pagan times had expressed itself in such
11 inhuman II
iris ti tutions as slavery and the caste system ( SV
12,72,77; WL, 80, 84). He seems to forget that neither
disappeared after the emergence of Christianity. Of course,
in a theoretical sense he is correct inasmuch as Christianity
did II imprint the kinship between human beings because the
kinship is secured by each individual's equal kinship and
relation to God in Christ" {SV 12,72; WL, 80). But inasmuch
as Kierkegaard himself refers to historical conditions, he has
opened himself up to such criticism.
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Kierkegaard explains that this upbuilding quality is

like

nature's secret. Nature edifies inasmuch as its magnificence
compels one to reflect on its hidden but very present order
(SV 12,211; WL, 207). In the same sense love has an ordered
presence as its ground,

be it ever so hidden.

Kierkegaard

reflects on this ordered presence, conceding the incomplete
presence

of

Nevertheless,

eternal
love

love

in

any

transformed,

one
in

human

being

( Ibid) •

Kierkegaard's

unique

reading, possesses a nurturing quality that establishes the
other's worth thereby constituting the ground of community.
That is to say, love builds up the other in order to allow the
possibility of fulfillment in the other.

As such,

to love

would mean to be essentially responsible for the other. That
is the task.
The capacity to love in this way is present in every
human being inasmuch as it is not an
exclusive superiority based on individual talents,
such as knowledge and poetic talent and beauty, and
the like . . . Quite on the contrary, every human
being by his life, his conduct, by his behavior in
the everyday, by his association with those equal,
by his word, his expression ought to and could build
up and would do it if love rightly were in him (SV
12,206-07; WL, 202).
Kierkegaard is quite sure that the fulfilled life is not the
life measured by a given ordinary standard which essentially
would abolish the eternal dimension.
externally

directed

would

only

Such a life,
fulfill

entirely

itself

in

institutional, associational, or organizational entities, all
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of which express as their prime feature sheer number and thus
make

self-deepening

words,

the

love

impossible

expressed

in

and

unnecessary.

such

political

In

and

other
social

relationships, measured only in relative terms, would not have
the upbuilding quality required,

would demonstrate neither

the possibility nor the necessity of "the effort as well as
the self-deepening that develop the God-relationship in a
human

being

in

the

most

difficult

collision

of

infinite

misunderstanding." (SV 12,223; WL, 217). That kind of life is
too easy, Kierkegaard insists, reminding us that genuine love
implies sacrifice and hence suffering. 25
merely

by

reward

as

earthly

love

It is not stimulated

tends

to

be

and

which

therefore is essentially self-love. Here the reader must be
careful not to misread Kierkegaard.
As Roy Martinez has explained, the problem lies not with
the world as such or even the institutions. They are depicted
unfavorably only because human beings tend to revert to them

25

"One must actually have suffered a great deal in the
world and have been made very unhappy before there can be any
question of beginning to love the neighbor. The "neighbor"
only comes into existence [blive til] in self-denial's dying
away from earthly happiness and joy and good times. Therefore
the spontaneous person [den Umiddelbare] cannot really be
censured for not loving the neighbor, because the spontaneous
person is too happy for "the neighbor" to exist [vaere til] for
him. Anyone who clings to earthly life does not love his
neighbor --that is to say, for him the neighbor does not
exist." PAP VIII 1 A 269 (JP 4603). It would be interesting
to pursue this concept of suffering as an inherent and perhaps
necessary part of human existence, a concept modernity, and
especially liberal theory, has distanced itself from believing
all human existence must somehow hover in infinite happiness.
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in

times

of

stress.

Then

they

will

attempt

to

unburden

themselves of personal responsibility and will refuse to act
according to their own conscience. The "outside" world they
turn to is what Kierkegaard refers to as externality,

and

inasmuch as it is the natural thing to seek help outside
oneself

in

rough

this

times,

externality

stands

as

differentiated from what Kierkegaard refers to as inwardness
(Inderlighed).

Inwardness

is

that

which

emphasizes

the

conscious life of the authentic single self. Conscience is
that which links the single self directly to the eternal.
Insofar as the eternal's concern is with the truly good, the
single self must dialectically respond to this command and
relegate "pleasure, pain, and desire to peripheral roles in
his existence. 1126 Martinez continues,
What is involved in inward deepening is a growing
capacity on the part of the single self not only to
distinguish between his organic dependence and his
spiritual independence, but the sustained effort to
live out this recognition. 27
Kierkegaard's

point

is

that

because

of

our

natural

tendencies to resort to externality, to seek pleasure, the
claims of the eternal are expressed in terms of commands, such
as the command to love the neighbor. Such commands force the
single self to search deep within the self for the appropriate
response and thus recognize "that the dynamism of his essence

26

Roy Martinez,
"Kierkegaard's
Ideal
of
Inward
Deepening" in Philosophy Today, 32 (Summer 1988), p. 112.
27

Ibid. Cf. SV 12,344; WL, 332.
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issues from,

and points towards,

goal. " 28 It bears repeating,

a transcendent source and

then,

that Kierkegaard is not

positing a requirement to abandon the world or withdraw from
it. That, of course, would negate the thesis of this project.
The point is precisely to commit to the concreteness of a
daily life governed by the self's transcendent dialectic.
From this perspective, to presuppose love in the other
is to place a duty on oneself. As such this constitutes a work
of love. Kierkegaard warns, however,

that the other is not

loved in an upbuilding sense in order to transform the other
or to force love to the surface in the other. The tendency to
dominate must be avoided -- we must learn the act of lettingbe -- just as the tendency to tear down or to destroy,

a

tendency which is commonly associated with building up, must
likewise be avoided. As Kierkegaard notes in his journal, such
love presupposes that even if a wrong has been committed,
there has been no break, for only then is love upbuilding. 29
"When the loving one builds up, then it is the direct opposite
of tearing down,
himself:
person

because the loving one does something to

he presupposes that love is present in the other

-- which certainly

is

the

very

opposite

of doing

something to the other person" (SV 12,212-13; WL, 208). Where
upbuilding usually implies a lack of something -- Kierkegaard

28

Ibid, p. 113.

29 PAP VIII 2 B 50:6.
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uses the examples of the teacher who presupposes the ignorance
of the student or the disciplinarian who presupposes the
corruption of the other person -- but eternal love has no
other choice but to presuppose love as the ground in the
other. In this way the Good is elicited as love is encouraged,
as love is nurtured, in the other.
Unlike the teacher and the disciplinarian, however, both
of whom can show results, "the love that builds up has nothing
to show inasmuch as its work is merely to presuppose"

(SV

12,211; WL,

206).

To presuppose love as the ground in the

other,

have

no

yet

commitment

is

to

visible

practice

results
humility

to

show

and

hence

for

one's

to

build

character. "For it is more difficult to master one's mind than
to capture a city, and more difficult to build up as love does
than to execute the most astonishing undertaking" (SV 12,211;
WL, 207). Therefore we get the analogy to nature's secret work
which never stops, yet is never seen, but precisely in its
invisibility lies
single self to

its upbuilding quality. 30

It forces

the

reflect on the wonders of nature and the

creative force behind it. 31 In the same way, by presupposing
3

° Kierkegaard

reminds us of the gentleness with which
nature asserts itself on all people indiscriminately: "Imagine
that nature were as we human beings are, severe, domineering,
cold, partisan, petty, capricious -- and imagine, yes, then
imagine what would become of the beauty of the field (Markens
Dejlighed]" (SV 12,259; WL, 252).
31

These paragraphs in Kierkegaard's Works of Love lend
themselves to thinking about the question why it is we are
destroying the very environment on which we depend. Is it
possibly because we have forgotten how to wonder about that
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love in the other, the single self communicates invisibly the
foundation of the relationship which is the Good, a Good that
may be concealed, 32 but which nevertheless is expressed in
loving the other as

an equal.

By

insisting that

love

is

presupposed as the ground in the other, the other is seen not
for his apparent distinctions, for true love refrains from all
comparison, but for his likeness (Ligeliqhed). The aim of the
relationship is unity, not differance, for community can only
exist where unity makes a presence.
Kierkegaard asks the reader to imagine the kind of person
that would be preferred if indeed another person were to build
one

up.

Although

characteristics

the
as

reader

insight

may

at

first

and

knowledge,

opt

for

such

talent

and

experience, decisive would be that we all would want such a
person to be reliable and loving. "Knowledge puffs up. And yet
knowledge and the communication of knowledge

can also be

upbuilding, but if it is, it is because love is present" (SV
12,208; WL,

204). 33 What kind of love is this, Kierkegaard

asks? "Love is to presuppose love; to love is to presuppose
love in others, to be loving is to presuppose that others are

which we cannot see?
32

As Hannah Arendt has commented, the Good never sees
the light of day, for then it becomes tarnished and/or
perverted. On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 1963 and
1965), p. 98. Cf. Glaucon's argument in Plato's Republic 361bc.
33

Cf. Paul, First Corinthians 8:1: "Knowledge puffs up,
but love builds up."
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loving" (SV 12,216; WL, 211). To presuppose love as the ground
in the other is thus constructive, yet concealed.
Self-determination is uppermost on Kierkegaard's mind.
Only by choosing the qualitative life can the single self be
genuinely free in Kierkegaard's radical conception of freedom.
Hence any external support or build up must remain concealed
because the recipient must not be made to feel that he or she
is in debt, must not lose the self-defining character of his
or her being. Therefore the loving one must,
act

as

a

spiritual

midwife.

He

must

like Socrates,

maintain

a

certain

distance from the recipient inasmuch as "the person who does
not freely appropriate does not subjectively appropriate." The
recipient must grasp the truth on his own. 34 The element of
separation within the unity is evident here. The other should
know only that standing on one's own is one's own achievement.
In Kierkegaard's view that would be the greatest benefaction

34

Evans, Op. Cit. p. 103. Evans goes on to remind the
reader of the difference between the Socratic and the
Christian maieutic as presented in the concept of "neighborlove": "When Socrates has helped the other, he can take a
certain ironic satisfaction in observing the other stand alone
-- with his help. This satisfaction is bound up with Socrates'
own independence. The Christian maieuticist, on the other
hand, is bound to the one helped in a way that Socrates was
not. For the Christian both the one who is helped as well as
he himself stand alone -- with God's help. The helper and the
one helped are independent of each other but totally dependent
upon God. In thus sharing a total dependence on God's love
they are bound together in a way. This binding does not
compromise their independence of each other. The divine love
they share is infinite and eternal; it does not make
distinctions or draw boundaries around its love. It is this
love that the Christian grasps as the truth, and it is this
the Christian wants to communicate to others" (p. 110).
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one person could give to another. (SV 12,264-68; WL, 257-60).
By implicating Socrates, Kierkegaard wants to remind the
reader that this passion of love is, on the one hand, latent
within the single self and merely needs to be recalled. This,
however,

relegates

the

teaching

of

Socrates

to

merely

historical interest inasmuch as the truth he awakens in his
student is already within the student and therefore can be
recalled by the student herself.

(SV 6,17; PF,

12). On the

other hand, the transformation of the innate passion to a love
of the neighbor necessitates a different kind of teaching that
not only brings the truth of what love means, but provides the
condition for its acceptance and for understanding it.
By receiving the condition and the truth the single self
becomes a new person; there is a qualitative difference, a new
consciousness. Such a transformation, Kierkegaard claims, can
only be accomplished by transcendent manipulation,

by "the

god." (SV 6,19, 22-3; PF, 14,18-9). But even here the Socratic
principle applies inasmuch as the single self's consciousness
is awakened to the fact of his being untruth, that is to say,
untruth

is

discovered

through

self-examination.

"I

can

discover my own untruth only by myself, because only when
discover

it

"discovery"

is

it

implies

discovered"
untruth

was

(SV

6,19;

present

PF,
all

14).
the

I

But
time

(Kierkegaard's conception of original sin) thereby concealing
the need for truth by exclusion.
Kierkegaard,

can only come

That truth,

according to

from outside the

single self.
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Therefore

this

teacher,

in

contrast

to

the

midwifery

of

Socrates, must bring both the truth as well as the condition,
that is, grace, for its appropriation.
With truth and as

truth the

(Ibid).

single

self

is

able to

presuppose love in the other. To presuppose love in the other
involves a decisive act of self-consciousness which expresses
the single self's comportment towards other human beings.

V:8

Kierkegaard distinguishes between the powers of faith and
those of knowledge. Knowledge by itself, he says, is incapable
of performing the same feat. That is, speculative knowledge
can

only

inherent

operate

in

impersonal

the

category

indifference

of

possibilities.

prevents

it

from

Its

making

choices, and thus it sets itself outside "the actuality of
existence in possibility" (SV 12, 223; WL, 218). Knowledge is
incapable of producing commitment, indeed its perfection is
precisely to remain uncommitted.
Why

is

knowledge

bound

to

this

stand?

Kierkegaard

suggests this is because speculative knowledge keeps company
with skepticism (Mistroiskhed) which is the exact opposite of
love

inasmuch

as

it

believes

nothing.

For

it

truth

and

falseness have the same value, honesty and dishonesty carry
the same weight. Thus while knowledge remains non-committal
and hence is not to blame especially since it provides a
valuable cognitive service, acts of judgment, decision, and
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choice must come either with skepticism which believes nothing
or with love which believes all things.
Precisely because existence (Tilvcerelsen) has to
test "you," test "your" love, or whether there is
love in you, precisely for this reason and with the
help of the understanding existence confronts you
with the truth and the deception in the equilibrium
of the opposite possibilities so that as "you" now
judge, that is, as you now in judging choose, what
dwells in you must become disclosed" (SV 12,220; WL,
215).
Before the decision, love and skepticism partake equally of
knowledge
conclusion,

(SV

12,223;

WL,

218).

But

life demands a decision,

existence

demands

a

and then they become

opposites. Skepticism chooses not to choose in its distrust
of all judgment. As such it can never function as a mediator
of

human

relationships,

for

ultimately

its

message

is

nihilistic. If it is nihilistic, it can never be upbuilding,
and that was the criterion for such a mediator.
In contrast, love, inasmuch as it believes all things,
can presuppose love in the other and thus in its upbuilding
capacity it has laid the foundation for individual character
and the disposition toward human community. "When knowledge
in

a

person

has

placed

the

opposite

possibilities

in

equilibrium and he is obliged or wants to judge, then who he
is, whether he is mistrustful or loving, becomes apparent in
what he believes about it" (SV 12, 223; WL, 218).
To love in this upbuilding way is to be genuinely human
(Menneskelig).

It

(Menneskelighed).

is

to

express

one's

true

humanity

Kierkegaard has thereby demonstrated the
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goodness of his scheme,

for it has indeed concluded one's

nature as essentially love. It is the fullest demonstration
of what Kierkegaard defines
consequently it
Robert

Musil

is a

would

as

passionate

inwardness

demonstration of character,

call

the

qualitative

life.

and

of what
Moreover,

inasmuch as Christianity demands self-renunciation, yet we are
born with the need to love,

it follows that love must be

directed away from the self and toward someone external to the
self, namely toward another human being who as neighbor, as
"the

person

you

see,"

universalizes

the

condition

that

expresses the idea. That is to say, when spontaneous love is
confronted with a demand and thereby commanded to a duty, its
source is now the demand and not the object. It is for this
reason that love cannot now stop.
disappoint,

but

the

loving

The beloved can fail or

one

(den

Kjerlige)

will

nevertheless love inasmuch as he shall love {SV 12,56-7; WL,
65). As Johannes Sl0k expresses Kierkegaard's induction,
Because man in an ontological sense is love, he is
already at the outset on an errand of love. The
command 'You shall love your neighbor' -- and it is
this command that from a purely dispositional
perspective
dominates
Works
of
Love
is
consequently a command that at the outset is in
agreement with that which man is by nature. 35
Here
spontaneous

it may be useful
love

may

have

to

recall

existence,

that
but

immediate
can

claim

or
no

constancy. If it does exist, it is purely accidental because

35

Kierkegaard: humanismens t~nker, pp. 138-39.
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it can change at any time.

Spontaneous love only has the

eternal within it in the imagination of the poets, but it is
not consciously grounded in the eternal and hence it cannot
become contemporaneous with itself. That is to say, it is not
possible while it exists to say that it exists, because it can
change; only afterwards, when it is all in the past, only then
can one perhaps say about it that it existed. 36
Just as self-love in the strictest sense has been
characterized as self-deification, so erotic love
and friendship (as the poet understands it, and with
his understanding this love stands and falls) is
idolatry. For in the last instance, love of God is
the decisive; from it derives the love of neighbor"
(SV 12,61-2; WL, 69-70).
With erotic love and friendship preference becomes "the
middle term,"

but with love transformed,

a

transcendental

dimension becomes "the third person" in this equation, becomes
the possibility

(Muligheden)

for

"seeing"

the neighbor as

oneself, and in the neighbor every human being as oneself. In
these words we thus find the ground both of the ethical and
the political, for the concept of neighbor is a representation
of all humankind.
define

the

It is not appearances,

relationship.

The

then,

neighbor's

that will

hostility

or

receptivity is not the ground of this relation of love, but
rather oneself. "To love the neighbor is therefore the eternal
equality in loving"

(SV 12,62; WL, 70), it is an expression

of the essential quality of human relationships and hence a

36

Also Ibid, pp. 205-06.
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manifestation of genuine human equality (Menneske-Liqhed) (SV
12,64; WL,
note:

72). As Kierkegaard tersely states in a journal

"Hvad

er

Menneskelighed?

Det

Uliqheden er det Umenneskeliqe."

er

Menneske-Liqhed.

(What is humanity?

It is

human equality. Inequality is the inhuman") . 37

V:9

In his analysis both of the human condition and Christian
teaching Kierkegaard has found that the only source of true
equality is within the single self, in its inwardness with its
transcendent

appeal.

foundational

consciousness

As

equality

such
of

represents

Kierkegaard's

"idea

a

of

community" with its constitutive elements as laid out above.
The "idea of community" requires that the single self not
cling too tightly to the temporal differences,

but instead

lets the eternal equality shine through. This is to allow the
meaningfulness of its commonality with its fellow human beings
to emerge and make it want to do what it "shall" do: love the
neighbor as the self (SV 12,92; WL, 98). Ultimately the "idea
of

community"

represents

freedom

in the

truest

sense.

By

achieving a disposition or comportment toward the world in
terms of genuine equality is,

on the one hand,

freedom

and

from

all

physical

social

to achieve

determinations

(Bestemmelser), and, on the other hand, to achieve freedom to

37

PAP VIII 1 A 268.
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be equal in a relationship of love (Kierlighed) with all of
humanity.
The dialectic of Kierkegaard's single self (den Enkelte)
is thus embodied in the thinking that the "idea of community"
is something that must emerge from within before it can truly
express itself in the world. The difficulty lies in that first
step which signifies the conception of freedom as understood
by Kierkegaard.
Freedom is not a disposition like temperament, nor is it
a property handed down. Freedom only exists in the transition
from possibility to actuality, what Anti-Climacus phrases in
the language of becoming: "the self [which] has the task of
becoming

itself

in

freedom"

(SV

15,92;

35). 38

SUD,

Consequently the synthesis expresses both the single self's
independence as well as the eternal's demand on it. The single
self

is

free,

yet

obligated

not

to

fulfill

divine

providence, as it were -- but to fulfill the requirements of
its own constitutives which compose the authentic self.
The constituent requirements of the authentic single self
call

for

the

existential

appropriation

of

the

"idea

of

community." As Johannes Climacus promises in the Postscript,
the ethical constitutes "even in solitude the reconciling
fellowship with every human being" (SV 9,126; CUP, 136). This
accomplishment, then, constitutes the concretization of the

38

Cf. Sl0k, Kierkegaard: humanismens t~nker, p 158.
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single self, constitutes what both Climacus and Vigilius refer
to as actuality. Inasmuch as the single self is then prepared
to

express

its

human

equality

(Menneske-Lighed),

it

is

prepared to express its humanity (Menneskelighed). From this
it would follow that the act of citizenship -- how the single
self is disposed toward the "idea of community"

presupposes

a relationship to the transcendental which makes it possible
and, indeed, is not indifferent to it. 39

39

PAP VII 1 A 20 (JP 4110). Kierkegaard does not usually
entitle his journal notes, but in this case he made an
exception: "The Dialectic of Community or Society Is As
Follows: . . . The individual is primarily related to God and
then to the community, but this primary relation is the
highest, yet he does not neglect the latter." Robert Dale
Bonser in "The Role of Socrates in the Thought of Scpren
Kierkegaard" Ph.D. Dissertation (University of California,
Santa Barbara, 1985), pp. 118-19, argues good citizenship is
merely a by-product of the Christian concern for salvation
inasmuch as Kierkegaard in agreement with Socrates does not
stand indifferent to things secular, but consider it a matter
of priorities. Proper concern with the highest things first
would lead to the proper ordering of the other aspects of
life. But Works of Love, a book Bonser has omitted from
consideration, would seem to suggest not only a relationship
of necessity in each act as has been shown above, but
apparently also a necessary relationship between the two acts.
Thus Kierkegaard explains: "The matter is quite simple. The
human being shall begin by loving the invisible, God, for
hereby he himself shall learn what it is to love. But the fact
that he then really loves the invisible shall be indicated
precisely by this that he loves the brother he sees" (SV
12,156; WL, 158) , meaning that he does not love what is
apparent before him, but rather, he loves what is concealed
in the other, the other's equality (Lighed) with himself. Of
course, this could be read as if to love the other is only for
the purpose of demonstrating one's love of God. But if such
an interpretation were to capture Kierkegaard's intent, not
only would it be a negation of what he has so carefully
constructed in Works of Love, but his critique of the present
age and the positing of a "corrective," an undeniable event
as we have tried to show, would be nonsensical.
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In

contrast,

by

granting

freedom

and

equality,

Kierkegaard charges what "the world honors and loves under the
name of love" is engendered (SV 12,119; WL,

123). Then the

world becomes dominated by collective and united self-love
which demands the sacrifice of any transcendental relation for
the sake of

secular solidarity and hence essentially for the

sake of appearance. 40 The happiness that follows from such
love is dependent upon good fortune and is always subject to
change

( SV

12 , 5 5 , 3 6 ;

WL,

64,46},

echoing

Aristotle's

differentiation of friendship based on utility or pleasure
from friendship grounded in a common love of a greater good. 41
That the world itself is confused as it,

on the one hand,

regards self-love as the soundest "practical wisdom," yet at
the same time also regards a more noble love as praiseworthy
(SV 12,118,256; WL,

123,249},

is an irony Kierkegaard most

profitably exposes. More seriously, however, where Liberalism
grounds freedom and equality in enlightened self-interest, 42
it follows that the single self needs only prudently to act
on his or her self-understanding of these interests to achieve
fulfillment.

4

In this case an appropriation of the political

°

Kierkegaard distinguishes between "self-love" by which
"every man has in himself the most dangerous traitor of all,"
and love of self "in the right way," which he says
"corresponds perfectly" to loving one's neighbor (SV 12,28;
WL, 39}.
41 Nicomachean Ethics, bk. VIII,

1156a6-1158b10.

·
·
·
·
L.T. Ho b house, Liberalism
(London: Oxford University
Press, 1964} pp. 33-4, 66, 69.
42
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dimension

of

human

existence

is

diminished

insofar

as

individual freedom is expressed in proprietary acts that owe
nothing to society. 43 In contrast, Kierkegaard argues freedom
and

equality

are

grounded

in

expressed as obligation to a

acts
law.

of

self-determination

Inasmuch as these acts

originate in love, which is an inherent attribute of human
nature that essentially seeks satisfaction in community (SV
12, 150-55; WL 153-58) , it follows that political consciousness
becomes a necessity for the completion and fulfillment of
human experience.

Thus Kierkegaard's "corrective" posits a

love as duty which does not deny the tension within individual
experience, but which does assist in overcoming some of these
contingencies and misconceptions of modern political life that
he claims has confused modern individual experience. From this
perspective it can be concluded that Kierkegaard's conception
of community as an external social arrangement presupposes an
internal

43

transformation

of

human

nature,

presupposes

As T.H. Green expressed it in his essay on "Political
Obligation" in The Political Theory of T.H. Green, ed. John
R. Rodman (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1964), p. 123:
"That active interest in the service of the state, which makes
patriotism in the better sense can hardly arise while the
individual's relation to the state is that of a passive
recipient of protection in the exercise of his rights of
person and property." Also James L. Wiser, Political Theory:
A Thematic Inquiry (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986), p. 101: "By
positing the existence of certain natural rights, liberal
politics secures a grounding for the worth and dignity of the
individual, which is believed to exist independently of any
specific social custom;" and Leo Strauss, Natural Right and
History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950,
1953), pp. 245-46.
•
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character.
To come to understand oneself and hence to undergo the
necessary transformation means to reveal one's true nature as
a social being. The achievement of such self-consciousness is
the achievement of genuine actuality. Kierkegaard complains
that all too often human beings "find escapes in order to
avoid

this

deceptions

happiness, "

and

instead

in order to deceive

themselves unhappy"

(SV 12,152; WL,

they

themselves

"manufacture
or to make

155). What he means is

that in such single selves love in its true sense is utterly
lacking inasmuch as they find no one worthy of their love. For
them there is no actuality, no community,

because they are

unwilling to love in the unconditional way required by the
law's demand. Such people, unwilling to commit to an authority
chosen

in

freedom,

Kierkegaard

points

out,

would

rather

attempt to transform human society, transform the person seen,
but that is utopian and hence superfluous.
Kierkegaard's point is precisely that it is a duty to
love the person one sees, thereby transcending objectionable
differences (SV 12,156-57; WL, 159). It might be argued that
this

is not an act of

freedom.

But Rousseau argued that

freedom is precisely to place oneself under a necessity which
is self-imposed. 44 To place oneself under the demand of the

44

"Removing all morality from his actions is tantamount
to taking away all liberty from his will." "On the Social
Contract," in The Basic Political Writings, bk. I, ch. 4, pp.
144-45; also ch. 6, p. 148.
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law, is to freely choose the act of self-deepening, to embrace
the highest level of existence human capacity can aspire to.
This

requires

that

the

single

self

maintains

a .constant

dialectic vigilance, that has a twofold dimension.
In order to understand one's true nature and hence to
understand love as a duty, it is necessary to actively engage
in the transcendental relationship. However, satisfying one's
social nature requires the act of community, meaning there has
to be a continuous recognition of 'the other' as a distinct
human being,

namely the person one sees.

Kierkegaard thus

embraces the plurality of givens characteristic of modern
society inasmuch as it poses no hindrance to the "idea of
community." 45 Simultaneously the other must be recognized as
a neighbor,

and hence as an equal whom one must love.

The

single self must acknowledge the tension of its experience and
balance

the

desire

for

transcendent

experience

with

its

immanent obligations.
Kierkegaard anticipates character in the single self to
uplift political and/or social life as he or she acts out the
"idea of community." That is to say, if human beings did not
act in different ways, unlike animals, and we therefore could
be

judged

in

terms

of

a

universal

criterion,

the

transcendental relation ( inwardness) would fall away and human
existence would express itself entirely in externality, that

45 PAP 1 A 139 (JP 4062).
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is,

exclusively

in

political

or

social

terms.

Then

the

required deepening of the self would be neither possible nor
necessary. From that perspective the political or social would
not have the capacity

for upbuilding the self nor for judging

another person.
Kierkegaard's point is that knowledge places contrasting
possibilities in equilibrium -- what the single self believes
in becomes apparent, its character is revealed: whether it is
skeptical or loving. In other words, the question is whether
the

judgment

of

acknowledgement

the

of

single

love,

or

self

is

whether

grounded

it

is

in

grounded

the
in

knowledge which can only judge in general terms and is not
able to distinguish human differences in terms of love. It is
a decision between good and evil, he says, between loving and
skepticism or nihilism (SV 12,226; WL, 220).
It is this form of self-control that in Kierkegaard's
opinion will engender a more genuine and therefore longer
lasting

social

order.

The

competition

for

goods

will

be

superseded by the higher criterion of reciprocal response to
the

law's demand

(SV 12,212,216;

WL,

207,211).

From that

perspective it becomes clear that Kierkegaard's ''corrective"
merely re-constructs

what

self-interest

has

torn

down

in

liberal theory, the rational argument to love the neighbor as
oneself,

which

Locke,

quoting

272

the

"judicious

Hooker"

considered
therefore,

a

"natural

love

duty.

1146

constitutes

In
a

that

upbuilding

philosophy

of

sense,

political

consciousness. That is to say,

freedom and equality become

acts

in

self-determination

of

Kierkegaard's

underscoring his acknowledgement that,

in addition to the

immanent world of particularized concerns,
another

reality

experience

that

enters

necessitating

Kierkegaard's

"corrective"

into

the

each

"there

moment"

self-defining

thus

thought

transcends

is also
of

human

act. 47

S0ren

the

problem

in

liberal theory which perceives of political society as a mere
convenience, 48 and instead posits the political as a necessary
requirement for human fulfillment.

46

Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Ch. 2, #5.

47

John B. Cobb, Jr., "God and the scientific worldview"
in David Tracy and John B Cobb, Jr., Talking About God (New
York: The Seabury Press, 1983), p. 53.
48 Locke,
ch. 8, #95.

Second Treatise of Government, ch. 7 #90,91;
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